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ABSTRACT 
The management of water and sanitation services has always been a major concern in 
developing countries, where many people still do not have access to such services. 
Researchers have demonstrated that in majority of the cases failures in watsan projects 
are related to lack of suitable institutional frameworks, rather than to technical problems. 
Lately, world-wide a higher private sector involvement in the provision of these services 
has been seen as a suitable mean of achieving institutional efficiency. In Bahia, Brazil, 
urban watsan services have been run mainly by a state owned company, that, as in many 
developing countries, is 'in debt'. It is also an organisation providing insufficient 
maintenance and misallocating investments. In addition to these problems, there is no 
current formal policy for the sector. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that a significant extension of private sector involvement 
in urban watsan sector in Bahia, Brazil is the suitable means to solve institutional 
problems. Therefore, promoting greater effectiveness of investment and efficiency of the 
services with a demand driven approach, with more responsiveness to the needs of users. 
The thesis investigates the British and French approaches for managing watsan services 
as in these European countries there is a large involvement of the private sector. The 
thesis proposes an institutional arrangement for managing urban watsan in Bahia, Brazil, 
with a higher private sector involvement. 
The conclusion is that an extension of private sector involvement is one of the means that 
can help the watsan sector to reach higher performance levels and can be used as a 
shortcut to achieve the targets. However, institutional strengthening of the current 
institutions can also be used for achieving the same purposes. 
KEY WORDS: England and Wales - France - Brazil- Bahia - Water and Sanitation 
Services- Institutional Framework- Privatisation- Water Institutions- Management. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES 
The management of water and sanitation (watsan) services has always been a major 
concern, particularly in developing countries where many people still do not have access 
to these services, which are directly related to health and survival. 
In different parts of the world, water and sanitation services are provided to the public by 
various types of institutions and organisations, within different organisational 
frameworks. The provision of this public service, as with others, is directly related to the 
historical development of access to the services; to the role of the state for regulating 
and/or organising the provision; and the development of public bodies as providers. 
During the 19th century, Europe and industrialised America had to face the challenge of 
reacting to their rapid development and urbanisation processes. From 1830, cholera 
·epidemics were predicted by English hygienists who were aware that only massive 
investments in sanitation infrastructure could diminish the high level of mortality and 
morbidity. In 1880, the steps for a Public Health Reform had already been implemented 
on an international basis in different countries (Brown, 1989; Jacobson, 1989; Kirwan, 
1989). At that time, developed countries invested heavily in water and sanitation services 
as part of their infrastructure for urban areas. 
During the 1970's and 80's developing countries spent huge amounts of money on 
infrastructure (4% of their national output or 20% of their total investment according to 
WDR, 1994). 
The investments have been made through the national budget, international agencies or 
NGO's. Nevertheless, the provision of watsan services is still a major problem in many of 
those countries. There are one billion people in developing countries without proper 
water supply services and nearly 2 billion without adequate sanitation (WDR, 1994). 
However, the World Bank (op. cit.) has reported that despite the large resources 
invested in watsan, past investments have not had the development impact expected. 
Thus, it is essential to improve the effectiveness of investment and the efficiency of 
services. 
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So far, expenditure on infrastructure, and more specifically in watsan, has meant the 
construction of new systems, rather than investment in the quality of service provided. 
Latest studies have shown that the main causes of failure are related to the lack of a 
suitable institutional framework rather than because of technical problems. (Franceys, 
1993a; Morales- Reyes, 1993; WDR, 1994; Saunier, 1991). 
Regarding this issue, the World Bank Report (WDR, 1994), found that availability of 
infrastructure (per capita coverage) tends to be correlated with GDP per capita but not 
the quality of service provided (efficiency and effectiveness), (Ingram and Kessides, 
1994). 
Researchers have also indicated that efficiency and effectiveness, and success and failure 
in projects are more related to the institutional environment, and that changes in 
environment can improve effectiveness even when conditions of income are low (Ingram 
and Kessides, 1994; Franceys and Barker, 1992; Saunier, 1991). 
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
Until recently, the trend had been to allocate resources to supply (or increase) quantity of 
infrastructure, rather than to the quality of the service provided. Thus, maintenance is 
often neglected, which makes much of the infrastructure perform to a lower level than 
that for which it was designed. An examination of the World Bank projects showed that 
badly maintained water supply systems deliver an average of 70% of their output to 
users, compared with designed targets of 85% (lngram and Kessides, 1994 ). Also; as a 
result of stressing expenditure in construction, very often systems have been built to the 
wrong standard with premature investment that absorbs resources that should be used in 
maintenance or improvements in the service. (See the case of the sewerage system in 
Salvador, Bahia on chapter IV) . 
The current approach is that poor performance is basically related to: 
absence of competition; 
lack of managerial and financial input; 
lack of real prices (In gram and Kessides, op. cit). 
In addition, there is a generalised supply driven approach adopted mainly by engineers, 
for managing the sector. This approach makes the watsan sector emphasise the supply of 
facilities to communities who presumably will one day become consumers, as opposed to 
a demand driven approach where providers become more responsive to the stated 
priorities and wishes of communities, thus focusing management on the demand side. 
2 
M.F.D.Carteado Introduction and Methodology 
The challenge in such a situation is to find the institutional arrangement which will make 
the suppliers of the setvices more efficient and responsive to the needs of the users. 
(In gram and Kessides, I 994 ). 
There are many ways to address the issues of changing organisational features. Different 
countries :ire dealing with the problem in different ways. 
Table 1.1 shows the current different types of organisational framework for 
infrastructure. As can be seen, there is a wide range of arrangements, from completely 
public organisation to completely private, and a situation in which individt<al 
communities run the setvices directly. However, privatisation or high private sector 
involvement, is one of the ways now being promoted to achieve more effectiveness and 
more autonomy in the provision of services. 
1.3 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
A model of management is defined by its institutional organisation, legislation, financing 
structure and sharing of roles and responsibilities among the actors involved. It is 
replaced when it is no longer coherent, failing to provide an architecture that meets the 
needs of the community. This is what has been happening world-wide: the models reach 
a crisis point because in the current context they are not efficient and do not respond to 
the needs of the community. 
This is the reason why changes have been seen in the management of these setvices, 
specially in developing countries: the changes are related to the sharing of responsibility 
between different levels of government and between the public and private sector, also 
introducing major participation by local communities. In practice these changes result in 
two major tendencies: the first one is toward an efficient financial structure of the sector 
and its institutional development, seeking profitability and self sustainability sometimes 
with a trend towards privatisation. Even when there is no privatisation, there have been 
big changes in the financing structure, and in the roles played by the actors involved, 
mainly the provider organisations, either public or private, and their relationship with 
customers. The second tendency is toward decentralisation with a major role played by 
the local communities. 
Changes in management methods mean changes within the state and in the equilibrium of 
the relationship between the groups involved. Lately, the inefficiency of public bodies has 
been stressed and has led to strong support for privatisation. 
The inefficiency of the public organisations is due to: lack of obligation, as hardly any 
public sector managers are held accountable for their actions, and mismanagement is 
3 
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compensated for by subsidies or transference from the Government; fiscal advantages; 
and the important fact that they do not face a bottom line, or a threat of bankruptcy. 
Morales-Reyes, (1993) compiled the different causes and situations that promote 
inefficiency of state owned companies. This compilation is in Table 1.2 
1.4 THE NEW TRENDS 
The WDR 1994 advocates three elements of institutional and policy reform: 
application of commercial principles of operation; 
broadening competition; 
involving users more in project design and operation. 
These elements should be used either for public or private sector provision of the 
services. Nevertheless, it is clear that those elements are more likely to appear when 
there is an increasing involvement of the private sector in finance and operation tasks. It 
is argued that the past has provided numerous examples of failure of public bodies and 
increased evidence of more efficiency and user responsiveness when the service is 
provided privately. 
Roth (1987), suggests the institutional arrangements for either private or public provision 
should be chosen according to the way they actually work in practice, rather than 
through the traditional way employed by economists, that is the potential market or 
Government failure. 
Piped water supply appears to be unsuitable for private provision, as it does not fit the 
conditions he considers necessary for allowing private sector participation because it is a 
natural monopoly. There is an economy of scale; it is difficult to charge for the service or 
to exclude those who do not pay and there are substantial externalities that are not 
reflected in the accounts of private suppliers. However, Roth (1987) describes many 
cases of private sector involvement in the provision of piped water. In francophone 
Africa, the French system, with leasing 'affermage' or concession contracts, is more 
common. 
Very often, institutional reform of water bodies has led to more private sector 
involvement, as was described by Morales-Reyes (1993); Coing (1991); Saunier (1991). 
For Saunier (op.cit), it is likely that in the near future, technical assistance will consist of 
privatisation of operation of the public utilities. 
lngram and Kessides (1994) see the changes in management as a 'revolution', since the 
main concern now is in deciding who should be responsible for providing the service to 
customers and how it should be delivered. On these grounds, efficiency in the service has 
5 
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TABLE 1.2 CAUSES AND SITUATIONS THAT PROMOTE 
INEFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS 
A GENERAL FOR ALL TYPE OR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: 
-Sometimes SOEs have fallen under public ownership as a result of public rescue following financial crisis Wlder 
private sector operation. 
- Shortfall of capital. 
- The Government sets standards and then denies the means of financing them. 
- Nation's budgets that constrain or prohibit access to capital markets and control inveslment programs in ways 
that seem arbitrary from the industry's point of view. 
- Govenunents take a short tenn approach to what are long tenn requirements. 
- Government interferes in the managing of business. 
• Sometimes objectives are seldom specified and mutually inconsistent 
·Vital decisions are detennined by extraneous, usuaUy political considerations. 
-Excessive indebtedness is often not measured adequately. 
- Inexperienced management and excessive personnel substitutions by political interests or government periods. 
- Lack of monitoring and supervision of lhe general perfonnance and poorly defined indicators and goals. 
- Valuation of fixed and operation assets are rarely done. 
- Excessive levels of bureaucracy. 
- Corruption. 
- Deficiency of personnel aptitudes but also auirudes. 
- Lack of conunitment in lowly motivated workers. 
-Personnel problems due to low salaries. 
-Limited professional capability of institutions. 
- Inadequate career lines in the staff. 
- Limits of govenunent for supervision. 
-Considerable external influence that makes the managers/staff indecisive and slow. 
• Managers acting as politicaJ agents. 
-Weak agencies in the technical and fmancial supervising ministers. 
- Govenunent make unrealistic financial promises that cannot be kept 
- Poor planning of the total resources availability and the priority for expenditure of the Finances Ministers. 
- Poor management of targeted subsidies which do not reach the objective. 
• Excessive and over-exened size of SOEs. 
·Inadequate Legislation and Rights allocation. 
B WITH CLOSER RELATION TO WATER ENTERPRISES: 
• Centralised government that gives priority to investment but forgets operation and maintenance. 
-The often conflicting objectives between the social and fmancial factors. 
- Nationalisation acts prohibit or consuain the industry from caring commercially orientated business. 
-The variables of the source., its availability, size and quality. (water,agriculwre, electricity) 
·Social and economic situations of the customer that limit revenues or induce social and labour problems. 
-Demand growth that cannot be satisfied (water, electricity, housing) due to the huge cost involved. 
-Institutional complexity and overlapping of responsibilities. (National, Regional, Local levels) 
- The high percentage of water unaccounted. 
~ The increasing difficulty of managing the high cost of operations and maintenance. 
- The legal, political and social limits to raising tariffs. 
- Inadequate or unfair tariff structure. 
- Droughts and/or environmental changes that detennines lack or excess of water/resources. 
Source: Compiled from: Camey, 1991; Cowan, 1990; Pina 1991; Kalimwenjuma, 1992, 
Coyaud. 89; Rees, 1992; Millward, 1988; Ramanadham, 1989, Kikery, 1990; Rondinelli, 1991; 
Roth, 1987; Clarkson, 1991; Twort, 1985; quoted in Morales Reyes, 1993. 
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been greatly encouraged by the use of private sector involvement in the management of 
watsan services, as a means to stress the importance of the institutional strengthening of 
providers. This has been led by international organisations, headed by IMF (International 
Monetary Fund) and the World Bank. 
According to Coing (1994) there is no recent document from the World Bank about 
urban services without the description of the French model of management and the 
different forms of private sector involvement, concluding that this is best for the 
developing countries. 
Adjustment packages for developing countries, promoted by the IMF and the World 
Bank, strongly support the involvement of the private sector in the services. In their 
logic, privatisation comes together with the economic stabilisation programme, goods 
and capital markets, prices, deregulation, democratisation and welfare of the population 
(Morales-Reyes, 1993). Those are considered the tools for solving the problems related 
to increased population, unequal income distribution, poverty and sanitation coverage, all 
of which are characteristics of developing countries. 
Morales Reyes, op.cit., shows that half of the lending from the World Bank to state 
owned companies in the period 1980-1989, has a strong private component. 
Another argument used for privatising is that it is necessary because of the crisis of 
public finances and privatisation would release the state for other tasks (Coing, 1991). 
This new approach in many cases, means a complete change from the traditional way of 
managing urban services, provided in a monopolistic way and run by the council or by 
the central government. 
For Clutterback (quoted by Morales- Reyes, p.32) and Rondinelli (1991) privatised 
companies do offer better and cheaper services and gains in efficiency, and the 
preparatory measures in state owned companies have already given positive results. 
It is also said in support of privatisation that publicly owned capital deteriorates faster 
than privately owned capital, as the owner tends to devote more to maintenance in the 
latter (WD R, 1994; Haarrneyer, 1994 ). The former ends up being a very costly failure as 
experience has shown that savings in maintenance expenditure have to be compensated 
for later by much larger expenditures on rehabilitation or replacement. WDR (1994 ), 
reports that badly maintained water supply systems deliver an average of 70% of their 
output to users, compared to design targets of 85%. 
Those who back the idea of privatisation argue that private sector involvement in the 
management of water and sanitation services in developing countries would provide 
better services at lower costs. For them, a private sector means greater productivity, the 
reduction of operation and maintenance costs, an improved efficiency of installations and 
smaller deterioration of equipment. 
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The international organisations and those who back their ideas, assume that the private 
sector has demonstrated a higher level of efficiency. 
Although evidence suggests that under proper conditions the private sector and non 
governmental organisations can provide public services efficiently, little comprehensive 
or systematic assessment has been made of their comparative advantages (Rondinelli, 
1991). 
In fact, one cannot say that there is a direct relationship between the efficiency and 
ownership of provision of the services. The Asian Development Bank states in its 1994 
report that the most efficient water organisation in the region is the Singaporian water 
organisation, which is a completely public body (Asian Development Bank, 1994). In Sri 
Lanka, the National Water Supply and Drainage Board is a public body that, after 
undergoing an institutional development project, achieved significantly improved 
performance levels (Tillekeratne, 1993). 
Although new in water and sanitation services, privatisation of urban services has been 
an hegemonous trend (Coing, 199-la), mainly in developing countries where the 
international fund agencies play an important role in defining policies. 
The World Bank has been increasingly investing in the development of institutional 
aspects of the services, as this is regarded as the main reason for failure in World Bank' 
projects (See Chapter VI). 
Advocates of privatisation emphasise that lower prices in delivering services can be 
achieved by private companies as they are less restricted in work and hiring practices 
than the public sector and consequently can use the work force more productively, 
reducing it when necessary more easily than governments, therefore lowering the cost of 
labour force per unit of output. Also, the private sector makes investment decisions more 
effectively than public bureaucracy. They also point out that even under contracting out 
services, which is one category of public-private partnership, there are advantages, as in 
many cases it allows the public sector to take advantage of specialised skills in non-
governmental agencies and permits Government to appraise the real cost of production. 
1.5 WATSAN IN LA TIN AMERICA 
This thesis has as its aim the improvement of water and sanitation services in Bahia, 
Brazil. 
Public urban water supply goes back to the second half of the 19th century in Latin 
America. After a period where urban services were run under concession contracts given 
to European (mainly English and French ) and American companies, the pattern changed 
to that of a service run by a public enterprise involved in creating the necessary 
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infrastructure for development, capable of mobilising the necessary internal and external 
resources and allocating them in the most rational and effective way (Coing, 1994a; 
Carteado, 1993; Carteado & Franceys, 1994 ). This continued until the beginning of the 
present century. 
Unlike the developed countries, where water and sanitation services were traditionally 
run by local authorities, in developing countries the tradition was centralisation of 
services (Coing & Montaiio, 1986). This also applies to the pattern of financing the 
services in these countries, which is heavily based on external funds, which had been 
favouring large scale centralised management and large scale engineering projects. 
This hegemonous model of managing water and sanitation services, with a national or 
regional public company, has been evolving into different models, regarding not only a 
privatisation process, but also different institutional arrangements, such as 
decentralisation in operation and maintenance, financing and investment, etc. 
The pattern was for the service to be highly subsidised and run by public entities, 
completely public or para statal organisations. These public entities are generally 
deficitary as the public sector have difficulties in charging the real cost of water. In 1988, 
more than half of the urban water companies in Latin America were running sizeable 
deficits (Faudry et al., 1991). In addition, the average price charged for water supply in 
developing countries typically covered one third of the costs of supplying it. (Ingram and 
Kessides, 1994) 
In Latin America, where the majority of the population live in urban areas, 70% do not 
have access to sanitation services. In these countries the Governments have been trying 
to maintain availability of the service in step with the level of population growth, but 
rapid urbanisation together with the constant budgetary problems, made it impossible to 
achieve their aim, making investment in the service highly dependent on external funds. 
1.5.1 The New Trends 
The international financial crisis during the 80's affected developing countries in a deeper 
way; they had to face high levels of inflation together with increasing debts. The 
adjustment programmes that followed the crisis were often sponsored by international 
organisations such as IMF and the World Bank, which involves investment in 
infrastructure as part of the programme to overcome the crisis, by reducing public 
deficits and subsidies, tariff related to real cost, institutional autonomy of providers 
removed from political pressure. 
In Latin America, many countries undergoing stabilisation programmes emanating from 
the International Monetary Fund or The World Bank, have already implemented a larger 
private sector involvement in water and sanitation services. 
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In Buenos Aires, water supply and sanitation seiVices are now run under a concession 
contract by a consortium headed by French companies together with Argentinian and 
British private capital. In many other cities in Argentina, there has been a re-organisation 
in the sector, sometimes leading to privatisation, sometimes not, but in all cases seeking 
higher efficiency in the same patterns (Coing, 1993); 
In Colombia, the Inter American Development Bank suggested the dissolution of the 
National enterprise responsible for watsan services in small and middle size cities, to be 
replaced by municipal organisations to work in a self sustainable basis; and an 
institutional change of delegating watsan seiVices to private companies in many of the 
big cities in the country such as Baranquila and Bucaramanga (Coing, 1994a). The 
institutional change has led to a market based approach with setting of tariff based on the 
cost of the seiVice; 
In Mexico, the city of Puerto Vallartia has signed a construction and operation 
agreement with the British private company Biwater whereby the company is committed 
to invest US$ 3 million annually for modernisation of the city's water and wastewater 
plants (Haarmeyer, op cit.); 
In Venezuela, the capital city put the watsan service out to bidding in 1994, without 
success; 
In Peru, a gerance contract made the private sector responsible for different tasks of 
provision of water supply, such as meter reading, computer seiVices, billing and 
collection, etc.; 
In Chile and Guatemala, the Governments offer territorial concessions in large cities for 
long period of time to companies that operate water systems (Rondinelli, 1991); 
In Brazil the first concession contract for water and sanitation services has just been 
signed (April, 1995) for a middle sized city in Sao Paulo state, between the Municipality 
and a consortium formed by one of the biggest French private companies in the sector 
(see Chapter III), Lyonnaise des Eaux and one of the biggest Brazilian contractor 
companies, CBPO. 
Some other countries are preparing legislation and conditions in order to enable more 
private sector involvement. 
Analysing the privatisation contracts signed for watsan services in Latin America, Coing 
(1993) noticed that the terms of the contracts required from the private providers 
demand results that have never been required from the public authorities, such as bench 
marks, supply of poor neighbourhoods with defined quantity and quality, equity in 
provision, etc.. Actually, these requirements placed on private operators are not a 
consequence of privatisation, but of the new relationship between providers and 
consumers discussed earlier in section 1.3 (Institutional Changes). Therefore, those 
requirements need to be met either by a public or a private provider. 
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1.5.2 Watsan in Brazil and Bahia 
In the specific case of Brazil, urban water and sanitation services were organised 
according to the national water and sanitation master plan (Planasa) that was in place 
from the 70's to the 90's, which is discussed in chapter IV. 
Before Planasa, the tradition was for watsan services to be run by Municipalities in 
Brazil. The large number of municipalities dealing with the services was one of the 
reasons given for the problems in the service at the time. Thus, the new plan was 
centralised with a policy for a technical approach and rationalism in the sector. It had as 
one of its bases the sustainability of the parastatal provider organisations. This was not 
achieved, which caused the vast majority of provider organisations to fall into deficit by 
the end of the plan in 1990. After that, no other plan has been set up. 
Researchers fail to state whether this fact is intrinsic to the adopted model or was caused 
by mismanagement on the part of companies. 
In Bahia, although defined in the Constitution which came into force in 1989 ( art. 227-
229), the necessity to set up a new policy for watsan services has not been met, which 
has been causing controversy over the efficient use of financial resources in the sector, in 
the absence of any study. 
When a new policy must be formulated from the legal point of view, Embasa (Empresa 
Baiana de Aguas e Saneamento S.A.), the state owned company created in 1971, as part 
of Planasa, obtains a loan from the World Bank in order to modernise the sector. Embasa 
was chosen together with two other companies among the 26 in the country. 
This modernisation programme follows the already mentioned recipe used by 
international· organisations, which stresses the institutional strength of the company, 
financial efficiency, sustainability of the provider, a charge for the real cost and the 
introduction of a new important managerial approach, that of comparative competition 
among the companies in the programme, in order to assess further resources. 
Coing (1991) reported the importance of international organisms in defining institutional 
arrangements of urban services in developing countries. Carteado (1993), in a study 
about institutional changes in the watsan sector in Bahia during the 20th century, noticed 
that changes in the sector have been dictated by external agencies, as is shown in Chapter 
V. 
1.6 THE PROBLEM, HYPOTHESIS AND THESIS OBJECTIVES 
Similar to the pattern in other developing countries, water and sanitation services in 
Bahia have the problems described earlier, such as unreliable discriminatory provision of 
services, an indebted provider organisation, insufficient maintenance, misallocated 
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investment, unresponsiveness to users and technical inefficiencies with stress on the 
quantity of infrastructure, with new construction, rather than in the quality of the service 
provided, etc. 
Also similar to other water and sanitation institutions, the one in Bahia had not taken into 
consideration the affordability of population, their willingness to pay or the standard of 
service that they expect. Due to the stress in construction, controversial if not premature 
investment in capacity has been made in a sewerage system that ends up not servicing the 
low income population more unlikely to meet individual solutions for wastewater; and 
has built a water system that increased the debt of the state dramaticallyl.l, absorbing 
resources that could be used in maintenance or improvement in the quality of services. 
The current situation in Bahia state and in Salvador city concerning urban watsan is 
detailed in chapter V. However, some information is necessary to contextualise the 
problem. 
Some characteristics of the service are: 
8.44% of the urban population have adequate sanitation services; and 
73.93% of the same population had access to safe water, in 1992 (Cabes, XVII, 
1994); 
50% of the treated water is unaccounted for water as leaks and illegal connections; 
the state owned company is deeply indebt- US$ 300rnillion in 1993-(Embasa, 1994c). 
It is clear from the literature review on Brazil and in interviews that the level of services 
is different for the rich and the poor populations. Jacobi (1989) and Carteado (1993), 
also noticed in different researches the discrimination in provision and delivery of 
services in Sao Paulo city and in Salvador city respectively. 
Causes of problems are generally related to the lack of suitable institutional organisation. 
In the specific case of Salvador, Bahia, Carteado ( 1993 ), came to the conclusion that 
different institutional arrangements lead to different management styles and patterns for 
the services. 
The role of the private sector in water and sanitation services in Bahia has been as the 
contractor for building systems, . suppliers of materials and equipment, projects and 
designing, and lately accommodating personnel due to legislation constraints for hiring 
new staff. 
1.1 It was costly ·about US$ 115,000,000 were spent in construction between 1971-1975 for a conventional sewerage system of 
Salvador, the capital city, which serves about only 9.8% of the population (First,1991; Embasa, 1994a). see chapter IV; Espinheira, 
(1991), studied the decision making process and the cost of the largest water supply system of the state. 
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The hypothesis of this thesis is that a significant extension of private sector involvement 
in urban watsan service in Bahia is the suitable means to solve institutional problems, 
therefore promoting improvement of effectiveness of investment and efficiency of the 
services, with a demand driven approach, with more responsiveness from suppliers to the 
needs of users. 
• 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the discussion on a new institutional 
framework for watsan services in Bahia, Brazil. 
Its objectives are: 
to investigate the British and French systems for managing urban watsan services with 
private sector involvement; 
to develop a proposal for the management of urban watsan services in Bahia, Brazil 
with a higher private sector involvement; 
It investigates the British and the French models as together they comprise a 
comprehensive range of alternatives for institutional arrangements in which the private 
sector plays a major role. 
Experience has demonstrated that the models of managing public services are .the result 
of complex technical, economic, social and political processes in a society, at a specific 
moment, with a combination of factors different from the previous ones (Coing, .1991). 
Therefore, they cannot be transposed from one situation to another. Nevertheless, past 
experiences can be studied and treated as references to be adapted to specific conditions. 
It is with this in mind that the British and the French models were chosen as a suitable 
starting point for the development of a proposal for managing watsan services in Bahia, 
Brazil. 
1.7 THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH MODELS OF MANAGING 
WATSAN SERVICES 
Concerning more participation of the private sector in the management of watsan 
services, the two most important models are those used in England and Walesl.2 , since 
1989, called the British approach; and the one used in France, since the 19th "Century, 
called the French approach. These approaches have influenced and have been used as the 
1.2 The 'British' approach is used only in England and Wales. In Scotland, the water industry was not privatised in 1989. and the 
services are run by the Council. See Water and Environment Management. April.l994; and Aerning. 1994. 
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base for a number of developed (Australia, United States of America/3 and developing 
countries in setting up new ways for managing public utilities in general. 
The British model gained its importance as it represents the highest level of privatisation 
occurring in the sector, comprising the divestiture of assets of the former public 
authorities that ran the services; and strong regulatory bodies. Besides, historically, 
England has played a key role as a centre for developing new technological and 
managerial approaches in the world, specially in those former colonies and participants of 
the commonwealth, where the country still has an important presence. 
On the other hand, the flexible and ancient French approach has had long term success. 
It comprises different managerial arrangements and has been used throughout the century 
in a diverse countries, in different political and economic situations, showing a great 
adaptability to different situations. 
1.8 METHODOLOGY 
The research was developed in four steps: 
The first step was directed towards investigating the British and French systems, as a 
previous study and practical experience with the Bahian system had already provided the 
necessary initial knowledge of that system. Thus, the starting point was a preliminary 
literature review in order to identify the main aspects, actors and issues in each of the 
European models. This study provided the knowledge of the main aspects of each system 
and produced the definition of subjects that should be assessed in the next step of the 
research. 
The second step comprised field work with interviews and a deeper and more 
concentrated literature review focused on the selected key aspects of the systems. 
Questionnaires and interviews had been prepared in order to assess subjects related to 
the characteristics of the services before and after privatisation, stressing aspects such as 
managerial style, customer service, legislation and regulation, and tariffs in order to 
appraise the main constraints in the systems, their weaknesses and strengths. The 
schedules of the interviews and questionnaires, together with a summary of the responses 
are in Appendix I -I. Interviews were carried out in different languages and then 
translated into English in order to be summarised. 
Fieldwork was undertaken in France where interviews were carried out with researchers 
at '/' Ecole Nationale des Pants et Chausses'. Useful papers and research reports with 
I.J ln Sydney, Australia, a concession contract wu signed for25 years, from 1992; Haarmeyer (1994), cites many contracting out in US 
cities such as New Orleans, Houston, Fannington, and mentions lhe growing number of US municipalities that have been signing 
affermage contracts, generally for a period of S years. 
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important data were obtained that later helped in the description and assessment of the 
French system. However, attempts to approach representatives of the French private 
companies were unsuccessful. Although some information was available on the private 
companies, reported data is provided for the whole group (holding company). 
In England, interviews and questionnaires with representatives of the privatised utilities 
were made, together with an examination of some primary sources, such as the Water 
Act 1989, which is the basis of the system, and documents from regulatory bodies. 
Having identified the key issues in both European models, fieldwork was undertaken in 
Bahia, Brazil, in order to assess the view point of policy makers and influential people in 
watsan services for a new policy for the state. Thus, the Brazilian system was assessed 
through the literature available, including primary sources from Embasa, the state owned 
company; and interviews with representatives of the main organisations related to the 
system. These primary sources and interviews, together with key issues defined for the 
European countries, were the basis for assessing the main problems and those key points 
in the system, that had to be considered in setting up the proposal. 
The next step in the research was necessary because of the diverse approaches of the 
three models, especially the French and British ones, which made it necessary to use 
some tools that would allow a systematic description and assessment of the three watsan 
systems. 
An Activity Responsibility Matrix and a Qualitative (Systematic) Analysis were made for 
each of the systems. An Activity Responsibility Matrix was also made for the proposed 
Bahian system. In addition, some objective performance indicators of the sector were set 
for the three countries. 
Activity Responsibility Matrix and Qualitative (Systematic) Analysis are both tools to 
analyse institutions or institutional frameworks. The activity responsibility matrix is a self 
explanatory table that shows at a glance the inter-relationship between different 
organisations in the system and indicates the division of responsibilities, involvement and 
interests in the provision of the service. It also shows any overlapping, competition or 
gaps in the system (Franceys and Barker, 1992; Franceys, 1993b). 
Regarding the Activity Responsibility Matrix, in this thesis, responsibility is related to the 
organisation that decides and carries out a task; involvement is generally related to the 
organisation that provides data or controls a task; and the organisation affected by the 
decisions is said to be interested. The scope of the matrix is on Appendix I-2. 
The Qualitative (Systematic) Analysis of the sector was adapted from Cullivan et a! 
(1986), when describing subjective categories for performance indicators in the 
guidelines for assessing water and wastewater institutions. Although not designed for 
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sectoral assessment, the guidelines can be adapted for a broader use. To do so, following 
as much as possible the recommendations placed in the cited guidelines, the National 
Policy Environment (Political, Economic, Social and Technological Environment- PEST) 
of each country, the Legislation and Organisational autonomy, the long range demand 
and technological requirements within the sector were also assessed. The definitions used 
in the qualitative (systematic) analysis are given in Appendix 1-3. From Franceys 
(1993b), subjective performance indicators are very much the perceptions of the 
information gatherer. In this sense the 'Qualitative Analysis of Watsan Sector' shown in 
Appendix 1-3, is the perception of this researcher based on the already mentioned 
sources and personal experience in the field. 
Objective performance indicators are also tools usually used to measure the behaviour of 
an institution and its achievements. They must be specific and measurable in order to be 
compared with the previous conditions of a specific institution or with the same results 
from other institutions (Franceys, 1993b). In this thesis, objective performance indicators 
were used wherever possible in order to provide a quantitative approach capable of 
facilitating comparison amongst the three countries as far as it is possible. Nevertheless, 
only a few comparable indicators were able to be set up. Again, the very different 
organisation of watsan systems in the three countries posed difficulties in comparisons, 
although data is provided for Embasa. For the French system, because of its highly 
decentralised nature, (there are 15,000 water organisations in the country) which is 
described in chapter III, quantitative data is not available for the system as a whole, but 
for some cities. Also available is official data from a private company but most of the 
data refers to the holding company as a whole, which makes the information 
incomparable to the data available for the British system provided by regulators, mainly 
OFWAT (see chapter II). 
Finally, the fourth part of the research is the development of a proposal for managing 
urban water and sanitation services for Bahia, based on the analysis of the characteristics 
and on the lessons learned from the British and French models. 
1.8.1 Contents of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised in six chapters. Chapters 11 and III describe and discuss the 
British and the French approaches for managing water and sanitation services, 
respectively. The Activity and Responsibility Matrix and Qualitative Analysis are placed 
at the end of each chapter. In addition, there is a brief comparison of the British and 
French models at the end of chapter Ill. 
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Chapter IV describes and discusses the management of watsan services in Bahia. In order 
to contextualise the approach, a brief description is given of the situation in Brazil and in 
the state. In that chapter some indicators related to the current performance of Embasa 
are analysed, as well as the interviews carried out in Brazil. 
The Activity and Responsibility Matrix of the system is shown, followed by a discussion 
on the main problems of the current situation and on some alternatives that have been 
considered by researchers, politicians, etc. Then, the Qualitative Analysis of the watsan 
sector in Bahia, Brazil is presented; finally, a brief comparison among the three systems 
is made, based on some quantitative indicators. 
Chapter V develops the proposal for managing water and sanitation services suggested in 
this thesis. This comprises the principles of the proposal, the main problems to be solved, 
its organisational framework and formal bodies, tools for price definition, etc .. Then, the 
activity responsibility matrix of the proposal is described, followed by a brief discussion 
on points that will facilitate or adversely affect the implementation of the proposal. 
The last chapter gives the conclusions drawn from the research and gives 
recommendations for the management of watsan in Bahia, and for further research, both 
on the Bahian and on the European systems of managing water and sanitation services. 
17 
M.F. D.Caneado watsan in E & W 
CHAPTERII 
THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES 
IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the overall structure and some aspects of the current institutional 
model of managing water and sanitation services in England and Wales. It also analyses 
the role played by the main actors involved in the system. The model, cited in the Water 
Act, 1989, which provided for the privatisation of the water industry and for the creation 
of regulatory bodies, is still in the process of construction. This abrupt modification of 
the insititutional framework had as its main aim to facilitate the investment necessary to 
accomplish the EC directives without burdening the Public Service Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR). 
The chapter also highlights some of the issues that the system has been facing and the 
manner in which they have been discussed. The intention here is to predict possible 
constraints arising during the implementation of a new urban watsan policy, which is 
aimed at increasing private sector involvement 
The current model formally started in November 1989 when the single flotation to 
privatise the water industry took place. Nevertheless, as will be seen in this chapter, 
changes began many years ago within the different water policies. 
The chapter is divided into five parts. 
Firstly, there is a brief description of the development of the water industry in England 
and Wales, to put the current model into context, as it is a consequence of previous 
policies. 
Secondly, there is a description of the current framework with its operational and 
regulatory bodies. 
Thirdly, a self explanatory Activity Responsibility Matrix of the system is given, in order 
to visualise the relationship and the sharing of the tasks necessary to provide the services 
under the model. 
In a further section the model is discussed, examining its main issues according to some 
of the actors involved, i.e. the regulators, the customers and the companies, as pointed 
out by researchers on the subject. 
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Finally, a Systematic Analysis of the model is presented, following the proposed 
methodology. 
2.2 BACKGROUND 
ln the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban services were pioneered mainly 
by local authorities, as part of the infrastructure necessary for industrial production. In 
1939, most of the water supply in the country was provided by local public authorities. 
(Stoker, 1993). 
After the second world war, the role of local authorities in urban services was removed 
and most functions were taken over by nationally-organised quasi governmental 
agencies. Nevertheless, in 1962 the Central Water Committee reported its concern over 
the large number of separate agencies, diverse in size and character, that were dealing 
with water (Reeve, 1987; Stoker, 1993). 
The Water Resources Act 1963, failed to change this aspect of the water organisation, 
and there remained a large number and diversity of authorities dealing with the 
management of water resources, water supply, sewage disposal, sewerage, and the 
prevention of pollution. 
Continued concern with this situation led to a complete change in water management and 
to a consideration of managing the whole water cycle. 
This new approach was first employed in the Water Bill 1973, which came into force in 
1974. The Water Bill represented a cataclysmic change in the organisation of water 
services in England and Wales, with the idea of Integrated River Basin Management 
(IRBM), which meant the creation of multi-purpose agencies rather than single-purpose 
ones. Under this Bill, the local authorities ceded their responsibility for water supply to 
the Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) (Reeve, 1987; Stoker, 1993; OFWAT, 1993a; 
Richardson et al, 1992). 
The 1973 Water Act created the ten multi-purpose Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) 
that would be privatised in 1989. Those RW As were given control of all regional aspects 
of the water industry. 
The Bill provoked considerable debate and polarisation since it meant a loss of local 
authority power. It is said that it reflected the dominance of technical aspects in 
management over the political ones, although the Local Authorities still retained some 
influence, through a strong lobby (Reeve, 1987; Richardson, et al, 1992). 
The dominance of technical aspects helped the growth of a strong corporativism of the 
technocrats within the sector, which would be important during the process of 
privatisation. 
Those changes also represented a radical shift in the managerial approach within the 
sector, as it did not try to upgrade the existing framework, setting new duties in the 
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organisational system. The idea was to create brand new structures. Only the 29 
Statutory 'water only' private companies that supplied about 25% of the population 
remained in the new system. 
Because of the idea that the Local Authorities were preventing the system from working 
effectively, The Water Act of 1983 took away some rights of representation from the 
Local Authorities and stressed the commercialism approach, calling for attention to the 
sustainability of the system, through the requirement of a rate of return on fixed assets 
(ROFA) of 2%. Water supply and sewerage services would henceforth be regarded as 
economic goods or a commodity. (Richardson et 3.1, 1992; Reeve, 1987; Saunders, 
I 984). This changed the distribution of power in the sector, strongly minimising the 
influence of local authorities and putting economic considerations at the heart of +e 
decision-making process. 
In 1986, the White Paper, "Privatisation of the Water Authorities in England and Wales" 
proposed the privatisation of the water industry "in toto" i.e., privatising the ten water 
authorities with their responsibilities for providing water supply and sewerage services 
and also their duties as regulators, the latter including environmental regulation as 
control of river water quality and abstractions. 
The idea at that time was that privatisation would encourage the companies to compete 
effectively where they could. Where this was not practical the Government would 
introduce a system of regulation to stimulate the competitive approach. Profit was 
considered to be a more effective incentive than government controls. In addition, the 
idea of the integrated river basin would be retained. (Richardson et a!, I 992; OFW AT, 
1993a) 
After a deluge of opposition from different levels of society, including the possibility of 
problems with the European Commission (EC), privatisation in those terms was rejected. 
It was obvious that the role played so far by the Regional Water Authorities as 
"gamekeeper and poacher" could not remain when management was in private hands, 
and the Government could not downgrade its environmental responsibilities in order to 
maximise profit. (Glynn et a!, 1992; Richardson et a!, 1993). 
In 1989, the water industry was privatised under the rules set by the Water Act 1989, in 
the way later described under heading 2.3.1. 
At this point, it is necessary to make some brief comments on the privatisation policy of 
public utilities that started in the UK from the late 70's. 
As previously indicated, the privatisation of watsan services was incorporated in a 
broader privatisation programme. 
Before 1979, the majority of urban services were provided by elected local government 
and various quasi-governmental agencies, and in this process of municipalisation, the 
municipalities became managers of many public services (Stoker, 1993). 
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The idea of privatisation of urban services in the UK emerged in a context where the 
local authorities accounted for about a quarter of all public expenditure and 10% of the 
gross domestic product. The economic crisis of the early 1970's and the consequent 
concern over public expenditure encouraged the idea (Stoker, 1993). 
By promoting private involvement wherever possible, the government could escape from 
the role of universal problem solver, and would reduce the public service borrowing 
requirement (PSBR) and privatisation became a major feature with British Telecom in 
1984 and British Gas in 1986. 
A publicity campaign was undertaken to sell shares of the companies to the public and to 
institutional investors. The shares of each utility were over subscribed, reinforcing the 
view that the shares were underpriced. 
The concept was that the public authority was no longer the provider of public utilities, 
but should try to ensure that the needs were meet through other agencies using private 
and voluntary resources as much as possible. 
This implies, amongst other things, that where local authorities are involved in managing 
services, involving a massive work force and assets, they are distracted from their 
essential function as governors. 
A key goal on the establishment of the privatisation policy was the disposal of a 
considerable amount of local authority assets (Stoker, 1993). 
To sum up, some characteristics of the process of privatisation are: 
Not only the idea of, but also the attitudes towards, privatisation did not grow in a 
political vacuum- the Government was dissatisfied with the non commercial approach 
of the Water Authorities; 
There was no Local Authority participation in the process. The attitude of central 
government was shared by the bureaucracy involved, allowing an organisational 
change within the water industry; 
The Government was able to depolitize the subject, taking the trade unions and anti 
privatisation groups out of the process; 
The water authorities, some of which were in favour of privatisation, lobbied 
parliament. 
Under the Water Act 1989, a Director General of Water Services- OFWAT- was 
appointed as the economic regulator of the industry in order to control prices and protect 
customers. The National Rivers Authority -NRA-, was also created. This is a non-
departmental public body playing the role of environmental regulator, taking on the 
responsibility for water quality in rivers, lakes and bathing areas and for the associated 
functions.(Water Act, 1991). 
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The Government decision was that only water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal 
would be privatised and the NRA, remaining under government control, would regulate 
the environment. 
2.3 THE CURRENT MODEL 
The current model of managing water and sewage services in England and Wales was 
established by the Water Act 1989, which included the privatisation regulation and stated 
the organisation and relationship between the different bodies involved in the provision 
of the services. 
The system was built with two main concerns: 
I. To stimulate competition among companies, encouraging technical efficiency and 
preserving the business approach by the suppliers. The companies are managed to 
"ensure their business skills" (Byatt, 1991, p.96); 
The competitive forces must be preserved; the customers are free to have their 
own licence to abstract water, as well as the industrial sewage customers. 
2. To protect the customers and society as a whole from the abuse of a natural 
monopoly in private hands and the effects of information asymmetry i.e. the 
private companies have better information than the public sector. 
The main actors in this model are the regulators, the companies, and the customers. 
According to Byatt (1991), the Director General of the economic regulator, the creation 
of independent regulators took away the mechanism whereby political decisions were 
constrained by public exeenditure. As previously stated, regulation is still being 
developed, and the review identified problems and issues that will be briefly stated. 
2.3.1 The Privatisation 
In November 1989, the water industry was privatised in a single flotation, in which 
shares in the 10 water and sewerage companies were offered for sale. The earlier 
mentioned 29 minor Statutory Water Companies that have always been privately owned 
but operated under different regulations, were also put under the same regulatory 
control. 
The expensive preparation for privatisation included: 
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Evaluation of assets of the companies, in order to assess the cost of maintaining and 
replacing the system. This was done through statistical sampling rather than through 
the previous existing accounting practices, of historical and current cost account. 
Besides, Asset Management Plans (AMP) were adopted for each company as a tool 
to cost the investments they should make in the next ten years after privatisation. 
Infrastructure accounting was introduced as a new approach for estimating the value 
of infrastructure assets in financial accounts, providing more realisitic information for 
preparing the AMP; 
the writing off of the water industry's debts: about five billion pounds; 
1.6 billion pounds in a "green dowry" cash injection in selected companies to improve 
their financial position; 
cost-pass- through concession relating to the new legal requirements; 
cost of installing domestic water meters; 
beneficial corporation tax treatment, which means the water companies possibly will 
not pay mainstream corporation tax over ten years because of the billions of pounds 
of unused capital allowances available to be offset against pre-tax profits (Richardson 
et a!, 1992; Triche, 1992; OFW AT, 1993a). 
According to OFW AT (1993a), the benefits to the private water industry such as 
writting off of debts, cash injection and beneficial tax treatment were a recognition of the 
implications of EC legislation for improved standards on water quality that would impose 
great costs on the newly privatised companies. It was also due to the lack of investment 
in the industry in the past 
In fact one of the primary objectives of watsan privatisation was the need for huge 
investments in the industry to meet EC legislation. 
2.4 REGULATION 
The legislative framework for this aspect comprises: 
The Water Act, 1989; 
The Water Industry Act, 1991; 
The Competition and Services (Utilities Act, 1992) - which applies also to regulatory 
bodies for the other privatised utilities of gas, electricity and telecommunications. 
Within this framework the private companies are regulated as follows: 
Water Quality regulation - the responsibility of the NRA and the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate; 
Economic regulation - is conducted by OFW AT; 
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Other aspects - are regulated by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
and the European Commission. 
The Secretary of State for the Environment is responsible for regulating drinking water 
quality and for environmental policy, for which he employs the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate and the NRA as of his Department. The NRA negotiates on behalf of users 
and consumers and reports to the Secretary of State. 
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who is responsible for mergers, consumer 
and competition policies, receives recommendation from the MMC. The MMC has 
power over the costs and efficiency to the industry, being able to review OFW AT 
decisions, and is briefed to promote the competitive aspects of the utility. 
The Director General of the Office of Water Services (OFW AT) is responsible for the 
economic regulation of water and sewerage. He is appointed by the secretary of State 
and, while autonomous in the judgement of his duties, must report annually to the 
Secretary of State for the Environment. 
In addition to these regulations there is the watchdog who has the power to control 
prices for the same services, monitors service quality and acts as a conduit for customer 
complaints. (Stoker, 1993). 
Although stating that regulation would have an open style, allowing companies to 
exercise their business skills, the British adopted a strict regulatory policy to monitor the 
monopolistic companies. This approach to regulation leads to higher costs for companies 
in providing information to regulators, Triche (1992). In fact, this is one of the strongest 
criticisms made of the British model. 
2.4.1 The National Rivers Authority (NRA) 
The National Rivers AuthoritY (NRA) was set up to take responsibility for the control of 
pollution in the controlled waters of England and Wales. 
In 1991, the following further legislation consolidated its duties: 
the Water Industry Act, 1991; 
the Land Drainage Act; 
the Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions). 
The Water Resources Act, states the legislation related to NRA and concerned with 
water quality and quantity. 
Each of the former water authorities was succeeded by a new nominated company. There 
are, therefore, ten regional NRA' s. 
Although the NRA took up the functions of the former water authorities (Water Act, 
1989, chapter 15, section !), it has quite new statutory powers, concerning the water 
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environment, only few of which will be stressed in this work, i.e. the ones strictly related 
to water supply and sewerage discharge, which are the key issues in the debate with the 
economic regulator. 
Others functions are related to water resources, flood defence, salmon and freshwater 
fisheries, as well as some navigation, conservancy and harbour authority functions. The 
NRA also has the duty of promoting the conservation and enhancement of the natural 
beauty and amertity of inland and coastal waters, and the promotion of their use for 
recreational purposes. 
The NRA sets Water Quality Standards for different purposes under the Water Quality 
Regulations of 1989. Nevertheless, the standards for drinking water are set by the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate, which was also established in the Water Act 1989 within 
the Department of Environment. 
Together with the NRA, the Inspectorate of Pollution has powers under legislation to 
regulate and control discharges to controlled waters. Such waters include ground waters, 
fresh waters, estuaries and "relevant" territorial waters, among others. It is also 
responsible for the determination and issuing of consents for discharges into controlled 
waters, the monitoring of the extent of pollution in these waters and the achievement of 
water quality objectives. (Bowman, 1992). 
The NRA sets the standards for quality and quantity that the discharges must meet, 
reviews discharge consents and, when necessary, revises them to ensure that standards 
are meet. (Bowman, 1992, p.570) 
The NRA charges the private water comparties for abstraction of water from rivers and 
aquifers and also for discharges of dirty water to the watercourses. (Water Act, 1989, 
chapter 15, section 145). There are charges also for issuing consents to discharge and of 
monitoring compliance with discharge consents and also charges for the consent of 
abstraction. 
The price is related to the volume the company has been licensed for consent. It is 
argued that nowadays the way the NRA charges the companies is not related to the 
concentration of pollutants they discharge. For this reason, there is no incentive or 
environmental care policy for the companies. Besides, the abstraction is charged 
according to the volume they are permitted to abstract, not the real amount abstracted. 
(Giynn et al, 1992; Kinnersley, 1992). 
Economic instruments are used as a tool to prevent companies from discharging 
pollutants into the water. The idea here is that of encouraging companies to invest in 
environmentally friendly technology as opposed to having to face the costs of pollution. 
The NRA has the power to prosecute those who cause pollution to the waters and can 
take direct action to prevent and remedy the pollution. 
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As an environmental regulator, the NRA is concerned with the following elements: 
(Bowman, 1992, p.576) 
licence abstractions to control water quantity and flow rate; 
controlling discharge of effluents to water; 
clear licence and conditions which are understood in the same way by abstractors, 
discharges and regulators; 
charging schemes for discharging; 
clear prosecution scheme for those who breach licences and consents; 
According to Hugh Tebbutt (1994 ), the former Regional Authorities had difficulties in 
prosecuting the water companies as " ... they worked for the same boss". When launched, 
the first issue the NRA had to face was related to their credibility; that the body would be 
able to act on behalf of the customers, despite the existing relationship between water 
companies' people and the NRA's staff, as both were originally from the former Regional 
Water Authorities. 
Trying to comply with the EEC Treaty, which says that actions related to environment 
should be taken at the Community level, the NRA works both at national and local level. 
At national levels, it works together with other bodies involved in the industry such as 
OFW AT and the Water companies, and agrees the priorities for the industry: 
The agreed priorities in this stage, are: compliance with the EC directives and other 
statutory obligations; maintaining existing quality standards and reversing recent 
deterioration; and then targeting futttte improvements. (Crickhowell, 1993, p.2.1). 
At local level, the NRA acts with farmers to discuss the feasibility of capital programmes. 
2.4.2 The Office of Water Services (OFWAT) 
OFW AT is an independent government department whose general duties are to ensure 
that: "the functions of water undertaker and of a sewerage undertaker are properly 
carried out as respects in every area of England and Wales"; and; 
"without prejudice to the generality of the previous paragraph, to secure that companies 
holding appointments as water undertakers or sewerage undertakers are able (m 
particular, by securing reasonable returns on their capital) to finance the proper carrying 
out of the functions of such undertakers." (Water Act 1989, chapter 15; part II, section 
7). 
"OFW AT shall perform in the way to look after customers, ensuring that their interests 
are protected as respects the fixing and recovery by the company ... " (Water Act, 1989, 
chapter 15, section 7). This means that it must set prices in such a way as to reflect what 
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the customer imposes on the water and sewerage systems, in order to provide a proper 
service. In other words, it is responsible for the quality of that service. This means that 
the regulator has the conflicting duties of ensuring profitability of the private companies 
as well as acting on behalf of customers, protecting them from the monopoly position of 
private operators. 
OFW AT has four policy divisions: 
• Legal and land, providing legal advice to the office in all aspects of regulation-
ensuring that customers get a fair share of the proceeds of sales of surplus land; 
• Engineering intelligence, covering operating efficiency and capital investment-
supervision of asset management planning and monitoring capital expenditure and 
company performance; 
• Consumer affairs, covering consumer aspects of regulation (codes of practice, 
guaranteed standards scheme), consumer complaints, consumer care 
(comparisons, etc.) and management of the customer service committee (CSC) 
staff; 
• Charges control, covering economics, accountancy, corporate finance policy on 
tariff structures, charge limits. 
source: Byatt, 1991 
In summary, the main concerns of OFW AT are: 
service standards; 
customer representation; 
price control ensuring reasonable return on capital for shareholders of private 
companies; 
facilitating comparative competition between suppliers trying to prevent the 
companies from misusing their monopoly position. 
2.4.3 Service Standards 
On regulating service standards, the Director General (DG) asks the companies to report 
progress on seven indicators: pressure, interruption to supplies, flooding from sewers, 
availability of water resources, hose pipe bans, response to written complaints, and 
response to billing queries. There are targets to be achieved on the three first indicators. 
There is also a guaranteed standard scheme which obliges the suppliers to pay a penalty 
of five pounds per incident or per day for failing to keep appointments without good 
reason. 
As stated in OFW AT's Annual Report 1992, one of its key objectives is to move to a 
position in which the company performance is measured in terms of the quality of 
service delivered, instead of levels of activity or expenditure, (p.52). 
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2.4.4 Customer representation 
Under the Water Act, 1989 (chapter 15, part I, section 6), the DO appointed a customer 
service committee (CSC) to each company. 
Their statutory duty is to represent the views of the customer in each area and to deal 
with the customer. The CSC's identify the main concerns of water consumers in its 
geographical area, ensuring that customer complaints are properly dealt with, and advise 
the DO. 
The range of issues brought to light by the CSC's includes the problem of debt and 
disconnection, the use of compensation paid by the companies for less than reasonable 
service and as a complaint remedy, optional metering, services for elder and disabled 
customers, involvement of customers in tariff policy, in the Periodic Review, etc. 
(OFWAT, 1993b). 
Because many of the issues raised by the customers have a national dimension, the 
OFWAT National Customer Council was created in 1993 to speak with an authoritative 
voice on behalf of customers. It is formed by the chairmen of each of the CSC's and the 
DO. 
A bigger concern with customers is one of the results of privatisation, because of 
OFWAT and regulations the Companies are more customer friendly. The customer 
manager is an important person in the companies. The former regional water authorities 
did not think of customers. They only did what they thought they had to as part of their 
duties. (Tebutt, 1994) 
2.4.5 Price definition and control 
The main concern of economic regulation has been the setting of prices. The system is 
such that it is OFW AT's duty to define the limit of charges that water companies can 
make for providing their services. 
The limit is given by the formula RPI + K, where K is a charging limit that represents 
the amount by which average charges can rise in any one year above the rate of inflation. 
At the time of the flotation, K was established for ten years by the Secretary of State for 
the Environment and for Wales (or each company. It was defined that the value of K 
should be reset after ten years, at a periodic review. However, under the terms of 
Licence, a review may take place after five years if proposed by a company or by the 
DO. 
RPI is the Retail Price Index which measures inflation. The RPI to be used in calculating 
the price limit is the value in November prior to the start on April I of the charging year. 
(OFWAT, 1993b). 
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The K figure should reflect the amount each company needs to meet its capital 
expenditure programme and its operation and maintenance costs. 
The idea is to make the companies search for the best profits through implementation of 
cost-reducing innovations. Thus, K is affected by the firm's own level of costs and size 
of assets. 
The K value permits prices to increase faster or less fast than the RPI (Byatt, 1991, 
p.94). The first revision on K after privatisation was carried out by OFWAT in 1994, 
together with the review of different aspects of the system. The new K value took effect 
from April, 1995. 
This system aims to provide stability for customers and incentives to companies to 
reduce their costs. But according to Byatt (1993), it does not avoid the issue of rate of 
return on capital, which was one of the objectives of the price cap system. 
To avoid the possibility of the K factor being only the end result of calculations and 
bargaining, OFW AT is disaggregating K, between clean water supply and waste water 
disposal, between quality enhancement and efficiency, between infrastructure and 
improvement and utility service. (Byatt, 1993, p.4.3). 
2.4.5.1 The raising of prices • Since privatisation, the prices of the services have been 
increased by about 4% above inflation. This has led to the increase by the private 
companies of using disconnection for non payment. 
Table 2.1 shows the percentage of increase in average water bill since privatisation and 
the average household bill for 1993-1994. 
The average water and sewerage bill for 1993-1994 was £185 for unmeasured 
connections. (OFWAT, 1993b). 
In March, 1993, Byatt, (1993) stated that the price was about £0.50 per 1000 litres and 
about the same for waste disposal, which was considered good value for money. (See 
tables 4.12 and 4.13). 
These price increases have been necessary to make up for the Jack of investment prior to 
privatisation, and because of the new obligations placed on companies by the EC 
directives, by the Secretary of State for the Environment and for Wales and by customers 
(OFWAT, 1993b; Langdon, 1993). 
Another source of rising prices has been the maintenance and upgrading of assets. 
According to Byatt (1993), it represents about l/5th of the total cost of water. As K is 
defmed taking into consideration this value, it is necessary to examine if companies are 
overestimating expenses in this area or if the standards have been too high and costly. 
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Table 2.1 Average Household Bills for Unmeasured Water and Sanitation. 
1993/94 
COMPANY %Increase % Increase %Increase %Increase 
89-90/90-91 90-91191-92 91-92/92-93 92-93/93-94 
Anglian Water 22.3 19.7 13.4 9.0 
Bournemouth & West 19.6 23.2 13.5 11.5 
Hampshire1 
Bristol Water 7.2 15.5 11.6 9.5 
Cambridge Water 19.1 26.5 13.4 6.3 
Chester Waterworks 11.5 18.4 6.3 4.4 
Cholderton & District 
Water 
10.0 19.0 9.1 9.0 
Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig 18.3 16.2 9.4 8.2 
East Surrey Water 34.0 25.8 5.3 6.1 
Essex Water 16.0 13.1 9.9 8.6 
Folkestone and Dover 
Water 17.5 18.4 11.3 7.7 
Hartlepools Water 15.9 14.9 9.9 8.0 
w Mid Kent Water 25.1 12.9 6.4 4.1 
A Mid Southern Water 21.8 21.9 11.3 8.5 
T North Surrey Water 15.6 23.2 12.3 12.4 
E North West Water 12.7 14.8 8.6 9.0 
R Northumbrian Water 8.3 17.2 10.6 9.8 
Potsmouth Water 12.6 14.5 8.1 10.3 
Severn Trent 14.9 14.0 9.2 7.8 
South East" 29.1 27.0 12.6 3.9 
South Staffordshire 12.5 14.4 8.9 5.7 
South West Water 12.9 16.6 12.9 13.4 
Southern Water 12.2 15.6 9.3 7.1 
Suffolk Water 31.9 17.0 18.2 15.8 
Sutton District 20.3 22.8 13.7 10.0 
Tendring Hundred 30.1 31.2 17.1 18.3 
Water 
Thames Water 16 12.9 5.5 6.8 
Three Valleys' 16.2 17.5 10.2 4.4 
Wessex Water 12.6 17.1 8.7 9.5 
Wrexharn & East 22.7 17.8 13.4 7.8 
Denbighshire 
York Waterworks 16.3 13.1 7.2 6.4 
Anglian Water 7.3 12.5 9.3 9.0 
s Dwr Cvmru Cvfvngedig 9.7 16.3 9.4 10.1 
E North West Water 12.5 14.5 9.7 8.4 
w Northumbrian 19.5 16.5 10.3 9.3 
E Severn Trent 12.9 14.7 9.5 8.4 
R South West Water 12.2 17.1 23.0 19.1 
A Southern Water 10.3 18.4 9.6 7.6 
G Thames Water 10.3 16.2 11.3 9.1 
E Wessex Water 11.2 13.0 7.9 9.3 
Yorkshire Water 9.8 13.1 6.7 6.8 
Source: OFWAT(l993b) Annual Report 1992 
Notes: 1 Bournemouth & West Hampshire Water Companies comprise Bournemouth & District Water plc and West 
Hampshire Water plc 
2 South East Water comprises Eastbourne Water, Mid Sussex Water plc and West Kent Water plc 
Level for 
1993-1994 
(£) 
116 
85 
86 
92 
105 
Ill 
123 
141 
91 
92 
71 
114 
102 
79 
79 
80 
65 
73 
155 
69 
106 
77 
105 
99 
134 
75 
86 
95 
124 
80 
132 
109 
90 
92 
91 
160 
114 
77 
114 
84 
3 Three Valleys Water Services plc comprises Lee Valley Water ltd, Colne Valley Water lt.d and Rickrnansworth Water Itd. 
30 
M.F. D.Carteado watsan in E & W 
2.4.5.2 Metering- The population of England and Wales are not accustomed to using 
meters. The possibility of paying for those services according to the quantity they use has 
been an issue in the system, with lively public debate and political dispute. 
The method used before privatisation was to charge water according to the rateable 
value of houses, that is relative to local taxes. Only about 25% of the volume of water 
supplied in the UK is charged for by measured volume. The system is considered 
discretionary and there is no plan for universal metering. 
The population is concerned about the cost of installing meters in existing properties. 
While the cost of installing meters on new construction is about £25.00, the average cost 
of installation on existing units is about £150.00 (Triche, 1992). There is also concern 
about paying for what one uses, especially related to health needs. 
Metering is seen by OFW AT as one of the methods to be appraised when a company 
needs to reinforce its transmission or distribution schemes. The possibility of metering 
will be appraised together with the possibility of resource development and leakage 
control, in order to minimise the customers' bill (Byatt, 1993, p.4.2). 
In the view of the companies, universal metering is not justified on economic grounds. 
(Byatt, 1993; Tebutt, 1994). On the other hand, it makes sense to charge for water 
supply services according to the consumption. 
Companies can choose to use metering where it is likely to be economic. This is probable 
when the development of new resources would be required. Within the strategy, all 
customers should have a meanngful option to pay by meter. 
Because most of domestic water is not charged for by volume, Byatt admits that the only 
way to finance increasing demand is by increasing price. Therefore, increasing demand 
would be one of the cases where metering would be studied, compared to the cost of 
resource development, as well as the use of hosepipes initially for the unmettered 
customers (Byatt, 1993, p.4.5). 
In the system, low income families who find it difficult to pay their water bills, can get 
some support from the Department of Social Security and the Benefits Agency in order 
to avoid disconnection (Langdon, 1993 ), but the companies argue that they must be able 
to disconnect. 
2.4.6 Comparative competition 
Competition is one of the bases of the model. The DG proposes that through regulation 
and comparative competition it will be possible to achieve the same balance that is found 
in the competitive market (OFWAT, 1991; 1993b). 
A spectrum of indicators has been evolved by OFW AT, together with the industry, to 
assess the relative efficiency of companies, related to cost of capital expenditure 
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activities, financial cost capital, service levels and consumer care. The comparison on 
these figures is said to be very useful to the regulators in setting prices (Byatt, 1991). 
Having the result of the efficiency study of each company, OFW AT adjusts each price 
limit. This price control intends to ensure that customers and shareholders will be 
beneficiaries of improved efficiency. If a company is able to increase its efficiency beyond 
the point that was predicted, it will be able to retain the extra profits to cut its costs until 
the next periodic review. 
Furthermore, the price limit is not set takin& into consideration the cost of each firm 
separately, but the cost of those companies which are judged to be relatively efficienL 
Although competition in a monopolistic environment is lower than in a non-monopolistic 
system, it is claimed that comparison in performance will help in setting prices. 
In spite of the efforts made by the government to increase competition, one of the bases 
to sustain the model, observers agreed that the flotation did not achieve its aim in this 
sense, and one of the interests in privatisation by investors is their monopoly position. 
(Stoker, 1993). 
According to Andrew John, director of The National Utility Services -NUS:z.1 -
"comparative competition" or the "quasi-competitive" forces within the water industry 
have not started working yet. "Water is the only industry to have moved from public 
monopoly to private monopoly". (Water Services, November, 1993a). From his point of 
view, the lack of competitiveness within the system gave users no tangible benefits from 
privatisation, as happened with Telecommunications. While shareholders and 
Government have all the benefits, the customers face " .. soaring bills without the ability to 
do anything about them". (p.13). 
According to his considerations, privatisation, which is supposed to benefit customers, 
has not played this role in this area. 
2.5 THE COMPANIES 
Under the Water Act 1989, each of the water service companies has been appointed 
water undertaker and/or sewerage undertaker for a geographical area, the water region, 
and/or sewerage region. Generally, these areas are coincident, except for those places 
where water is supplied by one of the statutory water companies or where water supply 
or sewerage services are carried out by a neighbouring water services company. 
The companies are licensed as undertaker by OFW AT. The appointment runs for a 
minimum period of 25 years and, in the event of inadequate performance the regulator 
has the power to revoke, terminate or transfer it in specific circumstances. Circumstances 
that could trigger changes in the licence are related to shortfall in achieving legal 
2
·
1 NUS is a private company that deals with cost control and price of utility services world-wide. 
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obligations of service standards, and variations in proceeds from the sale of land. 
Nevertheless, OFW AT has encouraged companies to ask for amendments in their 
licences where necessary on the grounds of cost raises due to any new legal 
requirements. 
The ten water and sewerage companies are formally represented by the Water Services 
Association whereas the water companies are represented by the Water Companies' 
Associati0n. In the time of privatisation there were 29 statutory water companies - the 
water only companies. Currently, after some mergers they are 23. 
The ten water and sewerage companies provide 75% of the water supply and all the 
sewerage services in England and Wales and the remaining 25% of water supply is 
provided by the water only companies (Langdon, 1993). 
The ten water and sewerage companies are: 
Anglian Water Services Limited; South West Water Services Limited; 
Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig (Welsh Water); Southern Water Services Limited; 
North West Water Limited; Thames Water Utility Limited; 
Northumbrian Water Limited; Wessex Water Services Limited; 
Severn Trent Water Limited; Yorkshire Water Services Limited. 
The water only companies are: 
Bournemouth & West Hampshire Water Companies;Mid Southern Water plc; 
Bristol Water plc; 
Cambridge Water Company; 
Chester Waterworks Company; 
Cholderton & District Water Company Limited; 
East Surrey Water plc; 
East Worcester water plc; 
Essex Water plc; 
Folkestone & District Water plc 
Hartlepools Water Company; 
Mid Kent Water plc; 
Water York Waterworks plc. 
Source: OFW AT, !993b, p.24 
North East Water plc; 
North Surrey Water Limited; 
Portsmouth Water plc; 
South East Water Limited; 
South Staffordshire Water plc; 
Suffolk Water plc; 
Sutton District plc; 
Tendering Hundred Water Services 
plc; 
Three Valleys Water Services plc; 
Wrexham & East Denbighshire 
Company. 
The figure 2.1 shows the geographical distribution of the ten water and sewerage 
companies. 
The sizes of the water companies vary widely: the largest one in population served is 
Thames Water, which delivers service to 7,225,000 people. 
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The smallest one in water setvices is the water only company Choldenon and District 
Water Company, which serves 2,000 people. (OFW AT,l993b) 
However, the water and sewerage companies are generally large. Their main business is 
within the water industry but all of the ten companies have been diversifying, investing in 
their non-core business as solid waste management, environment consultancy, hotels, etc. 
' 
They are also undergoing an internationalisation process. Some of the British water 
companies have invested in off shore projects to design, build and operate water and 
waste-water plants in Mexico, Thailand, Macao, Egypt, etc. 
There is a large international market to be conquered, in which they can use their 
experience and skills (The Sunday Times, 15.05.1994; Water Services, November, 
1993b). 
The industry is big business: 
Its turnover for the years 1990/1991 was£ 4,374million and for the years 1991/1992 it 
was£ 4,735 million; 
The dividends distributed to shareholders were, respectively, £810 million and £734 
million in 1990/1991 and 1991/1992; (OFWAT, 1993b) 
And the profit for the 10 water companies was £1.3 billion in 1990/1991. 
Their monopolistic position makes it possible for them to have a profit per employee 
varying from about US$38,000 to US$70,000, while the biggest French companies in the 
sector makes a profit of about US$3,5002·2 (Financial Times Newsletter, 1994a). 
Management salaries have been increasing in the private companies and this has been 
seen as an issue by pan of the public in the national press. Generally, it is compared with 
the rise in water bills. 
This issue also illustrates the great change in management style after privatisation; 
switching from a technological driven to a financial driven style. Historically, the water 
industry was run by the technical people, engineers and chemists. After privatisation, the 
chief executives are generally financial people. (Tebutt, 1994). 
A survey made by the NUS indicates that shareholders' pressure is playing an imponant 
role in the high prices. 
2
·
2 A comparison between some indicators on British and French watsan private providers is under subheading 4.11 and tables 4.11, 
4.12,and4.13. 
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FIG. 2.1 The Ten Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales 
North West 
Yorkshire 
Severn Trenl 
source: Langdon, 1993 
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2.6 INVESTMENT 
Invesonent in the industry is decided by the companies, according to the obligations 
placed on them and their invesonent master plan, which covers a period of ten years. As 
owners of assets, the private companies are responsible for investment in rehabilitation. 
The master plan carried out by the companies determines the customers' view on cost/ 
benefit for the invesonents (Langdon, 1993) and, according to the companies' point of 
view, the invesonents are decided according to the customer's willingness to pay, and in 
areas they see as important. 
The K factor for each company is determined by the DG taking into consideration the 
level of invesonent the company is expected to make. To comply with their "K 
Invesonent Programme" each water group makes assumptions for the rate of 
deterioration of the assets, the increase in demand for water and sewerage services, etc. 
Initial K setting estimates that £30 billion (1992-1993 prices) would be invested by the 
industry between 1989 and 1999 (OFWAT, 1993b ). 
Until July 1993, £7 .9billion had been invested, most of it in infrastructure improvements. 
Of the £30billion companies expect to invest in water and sewerage services, about 
£13billion is for improvement in the quality of drinking water (Langdon, 1993, p. 5.2). 
This represents £600 per person in England and Wales. 
There are two main ways of regulating utilities: return on fixed assets ans price caping. 
The return on fixed assets system (ROFA) can lead to over invesonent while the price 
capping system is designed to lead to efficiency gains, although it could generate excess 
profits between price revisions. 
Price rises have been justified by the large investment made by the companies in order to 
meet the EC directives and environmental regulations. 
The Government does not provide any subsidy for the necessary invesonents and the 
bulk of them will be met by the market. 
The companies, together with the economic regulator, think that the customer must be 
sovereign (Byatt, 1993; OFWAT, 1993a; Langdon, 1993) and will be the one to decide 
which sort of improvement they want and how much they are willing to pay for it. They 
also insist on the importance of the legislation taking into consideration the cost benefit 
approach when setting standards related to water or environment. 
The decision, then, is whether the burden of payment for invesonent should go to the 
current or to future generations. This issue has made the industry seek a more cost 
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effective approach and look at life time costing, questioning the way of doing things, in 
such a way as to make customers happy as well as shareholders. 
OFW AT is also concerned about the possibility of cross-subsidy within the water groups. 
The Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 empowered the regulator to prevent 
the groups from subsidising other activities of an enterprise at the expense of water 
customers. 
2.7 ACTIVITY AND RESPONSIDILITY MATRIX 
The Activity and Responsibility Matrix (fig. 2.2) shows a system where roles are well 
defined, without overlap in tasks. It also demonstrates a centralised approach to the 
system, where decisions are taken by regulators and private companies and local 
authorities do not participate in the system. 
2.8 DISCUSSION 
The economic regulator, OFWAT, acts on behalf of customers. At the same time the 
regulator has, as its duty, to ensure that shareholders of the private companies will get 
reasonable returns on their capital. This gives OFW AT the task of balancing between 
over regulation and lack of control. 
Acting on behalf of the customers, OFW AT is preoccupied with the quality of the service 
and with their pocket. The NRA is concerned with the environment, including the quality 
of the water. It seems, then, that they have conflicting objectives and the Government 
faces a dilemma, as the pressure for improving the environment is growing and, on the 
other hand, the concern is rising about the cost. 
It is the economic regulator's function to be concerned with the consequence of the cost 
of the improvements on the water bills. On this topic, OFW AT and its Director General, 
Mr. Ian Byatt, have already delivered many documents stating their point of view and 
sometimes responding in a critical way to the EC directives and to the NRA 
interpretation of them. (Byatt, 1991, 1993; OFWAT, 1993a). 
From their point of view, environmental investment should be made according to the 
extent to which customers are willing to pay. The NRA view, on the other hand, with its 
responsibility for protecting a wider interest, states that the level of this investment 
should not be decided by the customers alone. Supporting this idea, the regulator must 
always aim high, being ambitious and pressing people faster than they are willing to go. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the estimates of water companies and OFW AT are 
showing exaggerated figures in the hope that it will alarm the Government into stopping 
37 
w 
00 
FIG 2.2 
ACTIVITIES 
AGENCffiS 
Central 
Government 
Regional (State) 
Government 
Local Authority 
or Syndicate 
of Communes 
State Owned 
Company 
Private 
Company 
Financial Basin 
Agency 
Regie (Municipal 
Companv) 
Reeulators 
R =Responsibility 
ACTIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX 
England and Wales- The British System 
Environmental Water Quality Financial Set of Tariff Tariff Operation 
Regulation Regulation Regulation Preparation Approval Investment 
IT IT IV .. -- IT 
-- --
-- -- -- --
IV IT IT -- -- IT 
--
-- --
--
-- --
IT IT IT IV IT R 
-- -- -- --
--
--
--
-- --
.. 
-- --
R R R R R IT 
IV= Involvement IT = Interest 
Capital Operation and 
Investment Maintenance 
IT IT 
-- --
IT IT 
-- --
R R 
-- --
-- --
IV IV 
M.F. D.Cartcado watsan in B & W 
the whole process towards environmental improvement, as tariffs are defined based on 
their investment programme.(Crickhowell, 1993) 
Efficiency in investment planning has always been an issue in watsan. In this case, 
although the price cap system tries to avoid over investment, the need for huge 
investment in the next ten years makes it unclear whether or not this arrangement can 
succeed in its uims. The population is complaining as prices have been increasing 
steadily. The key issue is to decide who is going to pay for environmental improvement, 
this or future generations. 
Competition, one of the principles of the system, occurs in the stock market rather than 
within the system itself as was planned. The comparative competition that is stressed by 
OFW AT does not seem to be completely achieving its aim as the regulator is still in 
process of developing the spectrum of indicators suitable for assessing the relative 
efficiency of the various companies, because there are specific features in each company 
affecting its specific cost, such as level of treatment required and amount of pumping, in 
addition to customer care. 
The conflicting duties of ensuring 'fair returns on investment to shareholders' and acting 
on behalf of customers places on the regulatory body, standing between providers and 
customers, a very difficult role to play. So far, it seems that OFW AT has been 
responding to companies' pressure in their needs to ensure investment capacity and 
returns, making this arm of the system (the companies), the one that is profiting from it. 
In balance, OFW AT has been cartying through the task concerning the companies but 
has not fully accomplished that of acting on behalf of customers due to its difficult 
position between conflicting interests. Even so companies have been complaining about 
the extension of regulation and agitate for deregulation. They argue that if it is for them 
to keep costs down, that they must be assured that regulation will place no unnecessary 
constraints on the industry and that the industry will have freedom to decide what needs 
to be done. At the same time, customers complain about the cost of the service. 
The system is facing an attempt at over regulation, imposing a cumbersome and 
expensive system on one hand, when in many cases, it seems that it can only work 
effectively through negotiation and consultation. 
The balance between the extent of freedom of the private companies and the role of the 
regulators to meet the interests of shareholders, customers and public health is the key 
factor in this system. Security of water services should be ensured through the companies 
which would be exposed to scrutiny and judgements of the financial market. But the 
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market is only profit motivated and not public health motivated, which makes the 
difference when a public service is run privately. 
Examination of the British system has taught about the process of implementing a radical 
policy innovation that dramatically changed the equilibrium of forces between the actors 
involved in the provision of watsan services and has highlighted the issues and conflicting 
interests likely to arise during an implementation process. This approach for involving 
the private sector in the service is studied in contrast to the incremental approach to 
change happening in France, which will be investigated in the next chapter. 
2.9 SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS 
The model for managing water and sanitation services in England and Wales, described 
earlier in this chapter, is formed by different organisations that play well-defined roles, as 
either providers or regulators. 
• National Policy Environment 
Both of the countries under consideration (England and Wales) are regarded as 
developed countries with stable political, economic and social infrastructures. 
Economic and Social data refer to the UK as a whole unit in the World Development 
Repon (WDR). It is considered that this does notprejudice the analysis of these aspects. 
According to the World Bank, the countries are highly urbanised (89% of the population 
live in urban areas) with a low rate of population growth (0.3%) and a high income 
economy. (see table 2.2) 
Regarding social aspects, most of the population already has the basic needs, such as 
water supply, sanitation, health care, education, etc. typical of developed countries. 
In technological terms the United Kingdom is a highly industrialised nation, of which 
England is the most industrialised. Regarding water and sanitation, the British Water 
Industry is recognised by its high standard. 
• Legislation and Organisational Autonomy 
The management of water and sanitation services in England and Wales is defined by the 
Water Act, 1989. The services are managed by ten water and sewage companies and the 
current twenty-three water only companies, which operate in all the English and Welsh 
regions. Thus, there is no flexibility in choice of management. 
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Table 2.2 Political and Economic Indicators- United Kingdom 
Population (million) YEAR 
Total 1992 57.8 
Urban 1992 51.4 
Urban (as a % of Total) 1992 89 
In urban agglomeration of one million or more (as a % of) 
Urban 1992 26 
Total 1992 23 
Average annual growth rate 1980-92 0.3 
Access to (in urban areas as a % of total population) 
Safe drinking water 1980 n.a. 
Sanitation 1980 n.a. 
Safe drinking water 1990 lOO 
Sanitation 1990 lOO 
Household income 
Share of top 20% of households 1989 44.3 
Share of bottom 40% of households 1989 10 
Share of bottom 20% households 1989 4.6 
GNP per capita (US$) 
Total 1992 17,790 
High income group 1992 21.960 
Energy consumption per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 
Total 1992 3,743 
High income group 1992 5,101 
Note: (n.a.) not available 
Source: World Development Report (WDR), 1994 
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The private companies work on a monopoly basis in their geographic region, therefore 
there is no real competition in the system. Nevertheless, the economic regulator, 
OFWAT, tries to create "comparative competition" among the companies through 
regulation; comparing costs and performance between them. It is thought by policy 
makers and regulators that increasing efficiency should lead a specific company to retain 
extra profits until the next periodic review in prices. Competition occurs in the stock 
market where the industry competes with different businesses. 
Box 2.1 
The Director General proposes that through regulation and comparative competition 
it will be possible to achieve the same balance that is found in the competitive market. 
(OFWAT, 1991, 1993a) 
Nevertheless, according to Andrew Johns, from the NUS, "comparative competition" 
or the "quasi-comparative" forces within the water industry have not staned working 
yet. "Water is the only industry to have moved from public monopoly to private 
monopoly" (Water Services, Nov. 1993, p. 13). The users had no tangible benefits 
from privatisation. 
Legislation and regulation, which are strong points in the system, provide a means by 
which the regulatory bodies monitor and control in a systematic way: 
the quality of the service and product delivered; 
the prices of services; 
and the service to the customer. 
• Long Range Demand and Technological Requirements 
The low rate of population growth in the UK (see table 2.1) means that the investment 
required for covering unattended demand is low, i.e. there is very little need for 
increasing the quantity of water delivered However, investment is required to make up 
for the lack of investment in the years before privatisation and to meet the standards set 
out in the EEC directives. 
Box 2.2 
Of the £30 billion companies expect to invest in water and sewerage services (among 
1989 and 1999) £13 billion are for improvement in the quality of drinking water .... 
(Langdon, 1993). 
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• Organisational Culture 
The commercial approach of the water industry is the main settled belief shared by those 
involved in the sector. The Water Bill, 1973, was a starting point towards a more 
independent water industry. It reflected a more commercial approach to delivering the 
service, a view of water and sanitation as economic goods. 
This approach was strengthened during the process of privatisation of the water 
companies and after the flotation, when financial professionals started to run the 
industry, and a profit making culture grew throughout the system. Managers of the new 
companies generally worked in the former public water industry. 
• Commercial Orientation 
The principles of watsan in England and Wales are highly commercialised. The economic 
regulator monitors the tasks of the system to achieve a highly cost-effective product. The 
DG of OFW AT is strongly against the use of subsidies in the sector and seeks, as one of 
his duties, to ensure that shareholders of private companies will receive reasonable 
returns on their investments. 
From the private companies' perspective, the business has been very profitable. (see 
section 2.5) 
• Consumer Orientation 
The system is highly customer oriented. Under the law (Water Act, 1989) the Customer 
Service Committee set up for each private company deals with customers' concerns, in 
particular those related to customer complaints. There is also a similar national body. 
A sophisticated scheme insures some basic rights to the customers as compensation paid 
by companies to settle complaints. 
The system also allows for customer' involvement in setting tariff policy and company 
strategy (market plans) made by the private companies. This includes a wide consultation 
with customers. The master plans are presumed to help the industry to define their 
investment strategies in order to meet customer's requirements. 
There is also a concern for elder and disabled customers, for whom payment facilities are 
provided. 
Although there is no special regulation in the tariff structure for low income households, 
special attention is given to problems related to debt, disconnection and choosing a 
metering system. The trend is for the sector to make agreements through the Benefits 
Agency in support of low income customers. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES 
IN FRANCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes and comments on the French model of management for urban 
watsan services. It also analyses the role played by the main actors involved in the 
system. This system is different from that in England and Wales, where the privatisation 
of the water industry meant a deep change in management which is, still, a big issue. In 
France, there is no rigid institutional framework for the service; the involvement of the 
private sector in the water system goes back to the nineteenth century and has been 
increasing over the years. 
In France, the urban services have always been seen as industrial by nature and private 
sector involvement in urban services has never been a political issue. This unique form of 
managing urban services, especially the ones related to watsan, includes a number of 
institutional alternatives with a range of different levels of private sector participation and 
flexible regulation. 
The chapter describes an approach for managing watsan services different from the 
British one but with the same large participation of the private sector. The end of the 
chapter provides a brief summary of the main differences between the British and the 
French systems in order to address some of the issues that will be discussed when 
defining a proposal for providing watsan services in Bahia/Brazil. 
The chapter is divided into six parts: 
Firstly, a brief description of the development of watsan services in France is given. 
Secondly, there is a description of the current framework with its diverse institutional 
alternatives for operation, maintenance and investment 
Thirdly, a self explanatory Activity Responsibility Matrix for each of the institutional 
arrangements available in the French system is shown, in order to visualise the 
relationship of and the share of responsibility for the necessary tasks to provide the 
services under the model. 
In a funher section the model is discussed, taking its main issues according to some of 
the actors involved. 
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Then, the Systematic Analysis of the model is presented, following the proposed 
methodology. 
Finally, some aspects of the British and French systems are discussed, stressing their 
main differences in approach on selected issues. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
In the eighteenth century, watsan services were provided mainly by water vendors 
working on a door to door basis. Since then, there have been many changes in the 
provision of urban services in France, but the utilisation of the private sector has always 
been important. 
In 1782 the Perrier brothers were granted a concession to deliver piped water to Paris 
for fifteen years. In 1839, the first concession was signed in Paris with water vendors. In 
1866, an English private company- General Irrigation and Water Supply Company of 
France Limited - was the first to have a licence in France, for the provision of water in 
Cannes. ~ 
It was about the same time that the major French Compagnies in the provision of urban 
services were created, Compagnie Generate des Eau.x, in 1853, and Societe Lyonnaise 
des Eau.x, in 1880. 
At that time, there were both public and private forms of managing water and sanitation 
services. In the private one, the company with a franchise would make the necessary 
investments and would operate the system at its own risk. 
In the instances of public management, the municipality would operate the service 
directly or through a public enterprise- La regie. 
Progressively, other sorts of contracts were developed in such a way as to fill the gap 
between the forms of management, and jurisprudence added guaranteed results clauses 
to the franchises. 
All of the new contracts created had, as a common feature, the combination of private 
management with public financing and a transfer of ownership of the most costly 
equipment such as water and waste treatment plants, sewage stations, etc. to the public 
sector. 
These forms of contract are the ones used nowadays for the majority of public services: 
Affermage, regie interessee and gerance. 
The original model was strengthened after the second world war due to the speed of 
urbanisation in France at that time. 
In 1946, local services were nationalised. Nevertheless, in July 1947, a law was passed 
authorising the municipalities to revise or to rescind the contracts with private companies 
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signed before or during the war. This was due to the considerable changes occuring in 
the economic environment 
Since then, different decrees and 'information notes' have been issued to guide the 
relationship between the local authority (mayor) and the private sector under different 
systems. (See box 3.1) 
The contracts should follow the appropriate schedule of rates (cahier des charges). If 
this did not occur then the approval of the Minister for Agriculture and the Minister of 
the Interior was required. 
Also, when the contract was longer than 30 years, a decree was necessary from the State 
Council. 
According to the law of decentralisation, which came into force in March 1982, the 
contract is agreed between the private sector and the mayor and there is no need for 
approval from other authority levels. Also, new rules on public accountability gave more 
freedom to the elected mayors to run the service. (Loosdregt, 1990; Barthelemy, 1992) 
Although released from the obligation to follow the cahier des charges, Loosdregt 
(1990) noticed that these documents are still widely used as reference for the new 
contracts. 
Box 3.1 
Decret n.47-1554 (13.8.1947) Cahier des charges for concession contracts for 
drinking water distribution; 
Decret n.51-859 ( 6.7 .1951)* Cahier des charges for leasing (affermage) contracts for 
private water distribution; 
*This decret was replaced in 1980 
Decret on 16.10.1981 Cahier des charges for leasing (affermage) contracts for 
sanitation services; 
Information notes addressed by the Ministry of Agriculture on 5.3.1964 regulating 
drinking water services regarding 'regies' only, and a further one on 20.2.1969 for 
any system. 
Source: Adapted from Loosdregt, 1990 
The environment in which the model was made had the following characteristics: a large 
number of communities with a strong character of co-operation among them; short 
distance between the mayor and the citizen; and a strong central state. 
The French model of managing urban services seems to have been developed 
progressively according to the necessities of history, in an incremental way. It has a 
range of mechanisms, which provide freedom of choice to the 'commune' for deciding 
its own specific sort of management. 
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3.3 THE CURRENT MODEL 
Legally, the 'commune' is responsible for the provision of water supply and sewage 
services. It has the monopoly of the service and is the only owner of physical assets. It 
can either run the service on its own or delegate it. 
The model is based on the right of the 'commune' to choose the method of managing 
urban services it prefers. It is pragmatic and flexible enough to accommodate any 
alternative and all the problems. 
'Commune' is a unit of local government. It differs in size, from a small rural village to a 
town or municipality. The communes have the possibility to work together for managing 
services of common interest in supra communal units. Very often they join together in 
these units with different levels or grades of commitment such as: single purpose 
associations, multi-purpose associations, districts, urban communities, but mainly in 
syndicates. Two thirds of the more than 36,000 'communes' have joined a syndicate. 
This is the way they choose for seeking technical and financial co-operation with 
economy of scale. 
The high number of communes leads to a very fragmented administrative framework 
which makes watsan services quite decentralised, regarding responsibility of operation, 
maintenance and ownership of assets. 
Most of the communes delegate the service to the private sector. In total, about 80% of 
the French population have a water supply operated by private companies, under public-
private contracts, through different forms of delegation, whereas half of the sewage 
plants are operated by private firms (Coyaud, 1988; Lorrain, 1991; Triche, 1992; 
Moraru-de Loe and Mitchell, 1993). 
For water services, a statistical survey on the central 'commune' of urban areas with 
23,000 inhabitants or more showed that: 34% of the services were operated on a public 
basis; 12% through a franchise; 43% through Affermage, regie interessee or gerance 
arrangement (Lorrain, 1992). 
From the juridical point of view, water and sanitation services are local public services 
with industrial and commercial characteristics that must meet the following principles: 
equity in provision, continuity, and constant improvement of the service. 
From the formal point of view, the model is a simple one, based on the two main actors: 
the community with the elected trtayor and council, and the big private companies that 
work together with the public authority. The legal system helps to establish the rules of 
the relationship and the Central Government overlooks (supervises) the system. It is 
based on co-operation, sustainability and institutional flexibility. The water source 
belongs to the central state. 
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The flexibility makes it possible to meet all kinds of situations between partners, whether 
technical, political or institutional matters. Thus, the 'commune' can decide to delegate 
only some tasks such as the bill collection or the entire service. 
The choice of management and the process of private sector involvement can be the 
result of different reasons and the process can take different forms. Some of these 
reasons are: 
l. Cutting down the importance of unions. Much of the privatisation occurred in the 
late 80's and early 90's and was a consequence of the victory of right wing 
mayors in the local elections; 
2. The wish of the mayor to confirm his personal authority. In many instances, the 
decision to privatise the service is taken by the mayor in conjunction with his 
direct advisors, without any consultation or participation of the community. 
When this occurs, discretion is justified on the grounds of efficiency. This 
happened in Montpellier, 1989; in Caen in 1992 and in Grenoble, where the 
mayor decided to delegate the service three months after the election, when the 
subject had never been discussed during his campaign; 
3. Carrying out a modernisation programme without raising taxes. With the private 
sector, the commune does not have to assume the negative political role of raising 
bills to finance necessary investment and, sometimes, still receives payment from 
the private company which can be used to finance different projects. This was the 
case in Paris, Bordeaux, Marseille, Toulouse, Montpelier, Caen, and Saint-
Etienne. 
4. Because of security and technology. In many cases private involvement is due to 
the technical condition of the private companies. In fact, their world wide 
experience makes them better skilled than the communes for solving technical 
problems promptly, mainly in the current conditions where the EC directives must 
be met. 
5. Because of the integration and complexity of the network. The security and 
compatibility of the network can lead to having only one operator for different 
services. Also, the operation of one system can facilitate the operation in 
neighbouring places. This has happened with the big French companies such as 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, which operates several suburbs of Paris. 
Source: Adapted from Lorrain, 1993a; Jamati, 1994; Financial Times Newsletter, 1994c, issue 18/5. 
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The elected mayor is supposed to be reliable and he is given power to decide on behalf of 
the citizens. Only recently, under the law 93-122 of 29th January 1993 a competitive 
bidding became mandatory, but the contracts can be formulated in general terms without 
details or specifications (Triche, 1992; Cordier, 1994). 
Nevertheless, communes can gain assistance in the preparation and monitoring of 
contracts from the Ministry of Equipment. 
The important thing is the relationship between the two main actors involved: 
communes- represented by the elected Mayor -and private groups. The legal fraraework 
legitimates them. 
Part of this relationship is the general attitude of the companies regarding the local 
authority: their discretion, and pragmatism are profitable for both of the actors (Lorrain, 
1993b). 
3.3.1 The different sorts of management 
The organisation of watsan services can take many different forms. The main differences 
among them are related to the extent of private sector involvement; who is the 
commercial risk taker and who finances working and investment capital. The 
organisation of management can be divided in three broad groups: 
Direct Management (Regie) 
Semi direct Management (Regie Interessee) 
Delegated Management (Affermage, Concession) 
Table 3.1, (Watsan in France), summarises the types of institutional arrangements and 
gives some characteristics. 
3.3.1.1 Direct Management- 'Regie' 
Regie means administration. Under this system, the Local Authority, commune or 
syndicate takes responsibility for construction and operation as well as ensuring 
technical, financial and commercial management with its own staff. Its responsibility also 
includes works from water catchment to distribution and from sewage collection to 
disposal. 
This system can take three different forms, according to the staff conditions and budget 
autonomy: 
Regie directe or regie simple 
Regie autonome 
Regie personnalisee 
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Table 3.1 Watsan in France 
. 
DELEGATED MANAGEMENT SEMI· DIRECT MANAGEMENT DIRECT MANAGEMENT ! 
TYPE OF Concession Lease Administration Management Service Rigie Personnalisle Rigte A utonome Rigie Simple 
CONTRACT Affermage Rlgie Inttressle Contract Prestation 
Glrance Pnrtielle 
Who nnances new operator public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities 
works? 
Who provides operator operator public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities 
ooeratln2 capltal7 
Who sets rates public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public authorities public aulhorities 
puid by the n.ccording to contract according to ctmtntct 
t:unsumer1 
Client bound operator operator operator local authorities local authorities local authorities local authorities local authorities 
contractuallv to 
Contracting included in rates included in rates % of cost plus set rate depending according to ... ... . .. 
party's Income productivity bonus on physical contract 
parameters 
Cover of public surcharge surcharge receipts receipts receipts ... . .. . .. 
authorities 
Responsibility of very high high average average minimal ... ... ... 
private operator 
\. 
Financial very high high average average minimal ... ... . .. 
commitment of the 
I prl\':lte operator 
Source: Adapted from I. Cheret, World Bank Semtnar, 1985; Quoted m Saunter, 1991. 
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La regie directe or regie simple- in this case, the utility staff is part of the municipal staff 
and the accounts are incorporated within the government's budget. This means that there 
is no financial autonomy. French law no longer permits the creation of this type of 
system, but it remains in some small rural towns and villages where it was adopted before 
a decree which created the 'regie personnalisee' in 1926. 
La regie autonome- in this case, utility management is conducted by a separate local 
organisation, and the utility has managerial autonomy, although its accounts are attached 
to the government's budget. Very often it has autonomy for financial operations. In this 
case, the organisation does not have a juridical personality. 
La regie personnalisee- under this system, created by decree on 14.10.1959, the utility 
has an autonomous board or independent management. That is, there is financial and 
managerial autonomy. The accounts for the utility are distinct from the government's 
budget. 
3.3.1.2 The semi direct management (Girance, Regie Intiressie, Prestation Partielle) 
The main characteristic of these arrangements is the low level of commercial risk of the 
private sector. It occurs when the public authority does not want to relinguishing leave 
the responsibility for the provision of the service, but needs technical and administrative 
assistance to deal with the tasks. It can also be used as an early stage towards a higher 
private sector involvement. 
Gerance (Management Contract)- legally, this system is a "service contract", in which 
is specified those parts of operation and maintenance for which the private company will 
be responsible. 
Services under private company responsibility can range from a very few such as 
metering, invoicing, billing, water treatment, networks maintenance etc., to the operation 
of the whole system. 
Major repairs, extensions, increased demand, etc. are made by the municipality. 
The municipality is also responsible for financing, design and construction of the system. 
It is used for municipalities that wish to retain control over the service. 
Very often there is an administrative committee to oversee the administrative aspects of 
the contract, and a technical department to supervise the technical aspects. 
The customers remain clients of the municipality. 
The period of contract ranges from 10 to 12 years. 
Tariffs are fixed by the public authority and the private company does not assume 
commercial risks. 
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Compensation of the private company is similar to that for consulting companies. 
Generally it is based on: 
(i) number of connections, regarding the size and expense of maintenance and meter 
replacement; 
(ii) volume of water sold - a fixed sum plus a proportional payment are paid to the 
company to cover the costs of water distribution; 
(iii) volume of water produced - a sum is paid to cover the cost for production, 
treatment and pumping. The volume of water taken as reference for payment is 
the volume of water sold plus a fixed percentage of unaccounted for water. 
Regie Interessee (Management Contract with Profit Sharing)- It is very similar to the 
gerance contract. In some cases, the public authority shares with the private company 
any profit gained through productivity bonus, in addition to a fee that is calculated as a 
percentage of the turnover. 
As in the Gerance contract, the customers can remain clients of the municipality or of the 
operator and prices are set by the 'commune'. 
This is an old form of management, which is declining nowadays due to the difficulties 
confronting the elected mayors in trying to raise prices to the extent required by 
investment demands. In Bordeaux, where one contract was signed for the period 1969-
1992, with prorrogation until 1999, the contract form was changed into that of a 
concession. It was also used in Paris suburbs comprising a syndicate of Municipalities. 
On the other hand, for Barthelemy (1992), it is evident that these mixed solutions 
concerning public private partnership, are superior to the extremes ones, totally public or 
totally private, as among the ten French systems he studied, the private companies 
seemed to be technically and financially more efficient, whereas the Regies tend to be 
better skilled in management of operation. 
Prestation Partielle (Contract for specific Operation Service)- in this system, the 
private company provides the necessary resources to the public authority, when 
requested. It can range from loaning staff, technical assistance, billing connection, 
maintenance of the network, operation of production facilities, etc. 
In this case the private company is compensated as a consulting company i.e. time based, 
lump-sum, cost-plus, fixed-fee, etc. (Coyaud, 1988; Moraru de Loe and Mitchell, 1993). 
The payment made by the public authority is entered as an expense for operation in the 
public authority budget. 
3.3.1.3 Delegated Management 
Delegated management means a wider private sector involvement in running the service. 
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There are two different types: ajfermage and concession. The main difference between 
them is the investment. In the former the private operator finances capital expenditure, 
and in the latter it is done by the municipality. 
Affennage (leasing contract). Nowadays, this is the main type of contract for providing 
watsan services in France (Coyaud, 1988; Lorrain,1992). 
It involves private management with public financing. Under this system the commune is 
responsible for the initial capital investment and a private company for operation and 
maintenance. 
Even during the contract, the commune remains responsible for major civil works, 
expansions and renovations. 
Financing is carried out by the 'commune' through the aid of subsidies, grants or 
municipal loans. The private company is financially responsible only for the renewal 
e~penses of short economic life components (i.e. connections, meters, etc.). The private 
company, called "fermier", has two major obligations under the contract: 
to supply the service (water, waste water treatment) according to the established 
standards; 
to give the physical assets back in good condition to the 'commune', at the end of the 
contract. 
The private company's revenue is based on the tariffs charged from customers. The 
prices are set up during the contract and rise automatically through a formula based on 
official indices. 
Generally, the contracts are signed for a period of 10 to 12 years, and can be renewed by 
tactical agreement for up to 20 years. This should be long enough for the company 
(fermier) to pay off its operational investment costs. 
Part of the tariff goes to the private company whereas the remaining value is transferred 
to the public authority who financed the fixed assets of the system. 
The remaining value is calculated after the operation and maintenance cost, as well as the 
company's profit. 
The percentage of the tariff that will go to the private company is one of the clauses 
included in the competitive bids during the process of choosing the company, or is part 
of negotiation between the mayor and the private company. 
The company pays to the municipality on an annual basis the amount of surcharge it is 
due to collect from the customers. The surcharge can be used by the municipality to pay 
loans made to finance the fixed assets of the system as long economic life components. 
The private companies are currently lobbying for an extension of the length of ajfermage 
and leasing contracts, as longer contracts will reduce their risks and will lead to lower 
tariffs. 
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Concession (turnkey or full service) - also called BOT- Build, Operate and 
Transfer- In this type of management, the community or syndicate of communities signs 
a contract with a single private company. The private company is then responsible for the 
whole cycle of service: design, construction, operation, maintenance, and also for 
financing the system and upgrading it when necessary. 
It is the most comprehensive form of private sector involvement used in France. 
Chatacteristics of this arrangement include: 
The revenue of the private firm comes straight from the customers; 
The initial tatiffs ate negotiated between the '"commune"' and the company in the 
contract, taking into consideration the capital investment cost besides operational, 
maintenance, other costs and the company' s surplus. There are rules to revise the selling 
price of the service, reflecting economic changes and assuring the profitability of the 
company. 
Formerly, the contracts were signed for 20 or 30 yeats, whereas nowadays they tend to 
be shorter (15 to 20 yeats). 
During the period of validity, the private company acts as the real owner of the utility. 
At the end of the contract, if it is not renewed, the company gives back all the assets to 
the comniune, in good condition. (Moraru-de-Loe and Mitchell, 1993, p.141) 
Coyaud(1988), noticed some slight differences between concession contracts. 
According to this author, part of the tatiffs received by the company are given to the 
commune, and at the end of the contract, the company is compensated for the residual 
value of the system components that have been financed during the last 10 years of the 
contract. 
1f the public authority upgrades the system through existing facilities, financing or 
subsidies, during the validity of the contract, the contribution given appeats as a 
surchatge in the customer bills and goes back to the public authority. 
The concession contract arrangement was very popular in the late 19th century, when 
the lack of public funds made it useful, as the private companies had more opportunities 
than municipalities to borrow loans from the financial matket. 
After a period of little use, since the late 80's it has been increasing again due to the 
necessity of investment mainly in sewage treatment plants, as about 70% of the French 
population dischatge their waste water into the natural environment. It is likely to be 
widely used in the near future due to the need for investment to meet the EC directives 
(Lorrain, 1994a). 
54 
M.F.D.Carteado watsan in France 
3.3.2 The semi public enterprises 
Lorrain (1991, 1992); Moraru-de Loe and Mitchell (1993), call attention to the 
importance of the semi-public enterprises in the French model. They represent an 
important form of co-operation in the system, which takes place in its capital structure. 
The semi-public companies started in the 20's, for the implementation of economic 
activities, in order to raise funding for urban structure financing. After some years of 
neglect, they re-started in the late 50's, in order to accelerate development of the urban 
infra-structure. 
The system was organised witb national companies at the top, specialising in different 
subjects, with engineering enterprises and Societes d'Economie Mixte -SEM- at the local 
level, responsible for operations and directly linked to the mayors or deputy mayors. 
The government call on the Caisse des Depots et Consignation-CDC- to mobilise 
financial and human resources and set up the mixed enterprise- Societes d' Economie 
Mixte- (SEM) where the government has the majority of shares. 
These companies used to work in the same way as any other private company. The 
capital funding and tbe loans were provided by the public partner, but the private sector 
attached to the company had the real power. 
Lorrain (1991) states tbat a quasi-industrial sector was created in France until the mid-
70's. It was of macro-economic importance, on an industrial scale, with a limited number 
of leading companies. 
The model became unacceptable to mayors and local authorities since it involved a 
weakening of their autonomy of decision in relation to the future direction of urban 
development. As a result, from tbe mid 70's the semi-public enterprises took on a 
different character. Many local and regional enterprises were created using local financial 
and human resources and developing local experience. 
This was a consequence of the French tradition of political autonomy of the commune 
and the importance of tbis level of organisation. In many situations the commune wants 
to have control over the operation, without dealing with everyday problems. 
3.4 REGULATION 
The basic regulation operates through the contracts signed between the key actors: the 
elected mayors, on behalf of the 'communes', and the private companies, rather than 
through general strict rules. These contracts result from jurisprudence and the traditional 
relations and are written to adapt to real situations. 
55 
M.F.D.Carteado watsan in France 
Having no formal board of regulators, there are many bodies involved in the service at 
different levels of the administration. 
At the National Level, the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) establishes national 
guidelines for water quality management, and, together with the Mission lnterministeriel 
de /'Eau, drafts laws and regulations and puts together and reviews the water-related 
decisions of the different ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Industry, Building, Health, etc.). It 
is also responsible for revising th:: multi-year programme of the River Basin Agencies. 
(Moraru-de-Loe and Mitchell, 1993; Lorrain, 1992); 
The Ministry of Urbanism and the Direction of Local Activities establish contracts and 
fmance urban communities; 
The Ministry of Economy and Finance monitors tariff levels at the 'departements' level. 
The Departement is the political division headed by a pn§fet appointed by the central 
government with representatives of the major ministries. There are 99 departements in 
France. 
The Ministry of Public Health promulgates laws to enforce drinking water standards. 
At the Regional Level, the regional prefects (or regional officials of the central 
government) make sure that the laws, regulations and guidelines of MOE are applied. 
Regional prefects control, co-ordinate and direct the activities of the departmental 
prefects. It is at this level that funds for water and waste water are allocated to 
departments and 'communes'. 
It is also at the departmental level that measures for water controls and enforcement are 
applied. 
The departmental prefects play a key role in the system as they must ensure the 
application of the measures. They issue prefectoral decrees on water quality objectives 
and effluent standards, and also enforce these standards at departmental and communal 
levels. (Moraru-de Loe and Mitchell, 1993, p.l39) 
The six River Basin Agencies are responsible for resource mobilisation and investment 
planning. Basin Committees, with representatives of the local authorities and users, set 
charges for abstraction and pollution. They also establish five year investment 
programmes. Currently, due to the EC Directives, these programmes set a target for 
each of the river basins. These targets are a reference for investment but do not have the 
force of law. 
The control of the service, of the monopolistic private company in one commune or 
municipality, can take two different forms: the first is "global regulation". It occurs when 
the commune delegates the service and the delegation means transfer of responsibility. 
The control is only a global and indirect one. If the users do not complain, the operator is 
doing his job well. The control exercised by the elected authorities is much more political 
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than technical. If "les gens sont satisfaits' i.e. if people are happy, the companies are 
doing their jobs well. It is more important than the figures of performance indicators. 
The private companies are quite free to initiate policies on their own. (Lorrain, 1991). 
This is what takes place in the majority of delegated management for water supply and 
sewage services. 
This system has, in principle, a low cost which is seen as advantageous as there is no 
extra regulatory costs Also, there is no duplication in activities. Each actor knows his 
role perfectly. 
In the second form of regulation, the "detailed control", the commune delegates the 
service but wants to have control over it. There is a department in the council with 
qualified personnel to assess the private company's policies. This system increases 
operation costs and there is also a duplication of roles between the private company and 
the department (the experts), or even the political local authorities. This model also 
increases the cost of regulation. 
This system should be closer to the British system where in fact the private companies 
complain about the cost of regulation and the possibility of over regulation. 
3.4.1 Price Definition and Control 
Price is defmed according to the specific system of management of the service. In the 
regie system it is defined by the local authority, as well as in semi direct management In 
delegated management, prices are defined in the contract, or when it occurs, through the 
bidding to choose the private company. 
In research comparing the prices of water in different countries in Europe, MUller & 
Scheele (1993) noticed the difference between the French case and other countries in 
Europe. In France, the diversity of public and private corporations have different price 
regulations. 
Barthelemy, in a comprehensive investigation of the 10 biggest watsan networks in 
France, noticed that the cities under public management tend to have lower tariffs than 
the ones under delegated management. 
Langdon (1993) presents a comparison of water tariffs in Europe showing higher levels 
of average tariff in France than in the UK. (See fig.3.1). 
Price is defmed on the basis of actual consumption. Connections are measured, although 
in old buildings there is no meter for each apartment. 
Price setting is a very important tool in the system. It will make possible the long term 
strategies for the private company as well as for the commune, as it will drive the service 
from a public based management towards a market based orientation. It is seen as the 
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most sensitive pan of the relationship between the private and the public sector and can 
not be seen as a technical matter only. 
Generally, water tariffs cover the full cost of water supply, including depreciation. 
Sewerage is generally subsidised. Subsidies are provided by the commune or by the 
regional authority. Pan of the investment cost is financed by River Basin Agencies. 
When the company is chosen through bidding, the tariff is one of the indicators. Triche 
(1992) states that when a bid is made, the control on prices during the contract is less 
strict. Although defined for the whole time of the contract, there is flexibility for 
changing prices according to changes in the circumstances. In this case, modifications are 
agreed between the community and the private operator. There are no strict rules to set 
and modify prices. 
Negotiation is conducted on the basis of full cost recovery plus profitability of the private 
company. 
This is also a strategy that has been used by the private companies as an alternative for 
the lack of public investment in the sector. Wherever possible they lobby to make it 
possible to finance new investments through tariffs paid by those who could pay 
reinforcing the market based principle. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the system departs from the principle. Contracts are drawn up 
in such a way as to protect private companies from bankruptcy. 
3.5 THE COMPANIES 
Although decentralised in the responsibility for provision of urban water supply and 
sanitation services, the actual provision of those services is concentrated in a few French 
private companies: Compagnie Generale des Eaux and Societe Lyonnaise des Eaux. A 
third company, Societe d'Amenagement Urban et Rural (SAUR) is active in smaller 
towns and rural areas. 
The first two companies supply about 68% of the population. By regulation none of 
them can supply more than 50% of the water and waste water market. 
Their strategy can be seen as the current trend among the French private companies 
involved in the watsan service, all of them having a tendency to horizontal and vertical 
integration, cross diversification and transnationalisation. Very often, the same company 
or its subsidiaries work in different urban services in a given 'commune'. 
The development of these companies began at a time when the public companies 
operating these services faced a spiral of deficits. Initially, they worked only in water 
distribution but later they extended their activities to almost all urban services and other 
activities, such as water treatment and disposal, solid waste, heating, car parks, 
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management of building and construction works, public lighting, local cable networks, 
cellular telephones, funeral services, collective catering and leisure activities (Lorrain, 
1991; 1992). 
In fact, horizontal integration was the strategy they used to overcome the problem of the 
high number of communities. Very often, a private company, alone or as partner of the 
commune in a semi-public company, is involved in the provision of the vast majority of 
the urban services in a community (Lorrain, 1991; 1992). 
The companies offer state of the art solutions for technical problems. Their subsidiaries 
are specialised in the whole range of problems concerned with the service, and their 
capacity of mobilising equipment and the labour force readily is very important in 
assuring the continuity and the quality of the service. 
Their strategy of growth in each place is a mixture of market competition and 
geographical expansion with new municipalities, the big cities having a special place in 
their plans. The big cities work as a reference for their strategy (Lorrain, 1991). 
More recently, their strategy has been leading to internationalisation and now the French 
companies have contracts in the USA, Macao, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, many 
countries in Africa, and in the European countries of Spain, Italy and the UK, where it 
has caused political controversy. 
In the UK they have shares in the water industry and Lyonnaise des Eaux seeks to take 
over one of the ten private water companies. 
The main characteristics of the companies are: 
Compagnie Generale des Eaux- Founded in 1853, this company had 200,000 
employees in 1993 (Financial Times Newsletter, 9.2.1994), and supplied water to over 
than 22 million people in France and more than 8 million around the world. As other 
companies, it diversified its activities by vertical integration together with a cross-
diversification. It is involved in all urban services, plus leisure activities and health clinics. 
Lorrain (1991) states that it is present in practically all sectors which concern urban life. 
In 1988, the company served 30% to 32% of the French water supply market. 
Its process of internationalisation has strengthened since the late 80's. 
In the UK, the company had equity interests in 9 out of the 29 British statutory water 
companies (1993) and in the United States they bought shares in some American water 
companies, including Philadelphia Suburban Corporation, which was the fifth largest 
water supplier in the United States. (Moraru-de-Loe and Mitchell, 1993). 
The vertical international integration of the Company led it to gain contracts in more 
than 30 countries world wide, ranging from services in renovation of water plants to the 
management of the services and the upgrading of local officials' skills. 
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Societe Lyonnaise des Eaux- Established in 1880, this company provides water to 14 
million people in France in addition to 40 million world-wide (Lyonnaise des Eaux-
Dumez, 1994). As a diversified company, it also has business in other urban services and 
construction, and it is the largest mortuary company in France. 
Its strategy of diversification started during the 70's, to protect it from the consequences 
of nationalisation. Its vertical integration led it to extend its business in a way that made 
it the world leader in water treatment and the European leader in waste collection and 
disposal. 
Under its internationalisation strategy, the company bought four statutory British water 
companies in the late 80's, which made it the owner of 24% of the British private water 
supply market and 6% of the total national market (Moraru-de-Loe and Mitchell, 1993). 
To promote the expected favourable environment of an oligopolistic market, with low 
risk, the development of the these companies was helped by a juridical corpus which 
enables the system to protect the companies through municipal grants, to help them to 
overcome problems due to wars, unexpected inflation and special arrangements. Also, 
the articulation between the public and private sector can help to explain profitability in 
the sector. 
The public authorities in the system have always acted as a partner of the private sector, 
linked to it, much more than an external actor. They are placed between the companies 
and the consumers. 
Affermage, regie interessee, and gerance contracts, together with their variations, solved 
the problems of capital accumulation and return of investment as, in these cases, the 
public authority makes the investment. Those arrangements helped the development of 
the French companies, as they did not put their profitability at risk because of the need 
for expensive capital funding. 
The arrangement works in two different ways: At the same time that it allows the public 
authority to have more control over the future of the service and gives it more power; it 
diminishes the risk of loss for the private companies. 
Affermage was encouraged by the central State, which made specific grants to the 
'communes' for financing water supply and sewage systems. Thus, local authorities 
fmanced the public utility with public capital, getting loans from national credit 
institutions such as Caisse de Depots et Consignations or the Credit Agricole, that does 
not need to have the same profitability as capital obtained in the market (Moraru-de-Loe 
and Mitchell, 1993; Lorrain, 1991;1992). 
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3.6 INVESTMENT 
Investment can be fmanced by the public authority or by the private sector according to 
the sort of management. (See section 3.3.1). Nevertheless, planning remains in the public 
sector. 
In the majority of cases the public authority is responsible for financing investment and 
the fact that it does not operate the service can lead to inappropriate investment. 
Decisions are taken by municipalities using information from the .:>perators. As water 
tariff seeks full cost recovery, both operator and financing body will try to meet optimal 
investment. 
In sewerage, as it is subsidised, it is possible that investment is not optimised. In 
concession contracts the company that operates the service uses resources obtained from 
the market, i.e., the payment made by the users with no dependence on the state or 
municipality. The capital investment comes from cash flow generated in the market or 
within the business. 
To meet the EC Directives there is an investment programme of US$ 15million. Of this 
value, US$ 6.5 million will be fmanced by the River Basin Agencies and the remainder by 
the local authorities. 
3.7 ACTIVITY AND RESPONSffiiLITY MATRICES 
The matrices (fig. 3.2-3.6) show a system able to accommodate a diversity of situations 
within the country. Tasks are shared between Local Authorities and private companies 
and the level of responsibility for the latter is decreasing gradually from the concession 
contract to the Regie system. Tasks of each of the actors involved in the system are well 
defined and there is no overlap. 
3.8 DISCUSSION 
The number of the necessary activity and responsibility matrix for the system shows to 
some extent its diversity and the number of alternative arrangements that the system can 
take. 
The system is very much based on local government, rather than on local or national 
agencies, as happens in the UK. The elected local authority has a position that legitimates 
its decision about the service and all the needs of the population. If the mayor or local 
representatives want, they can co-ordinate the services and avoid professional or 
technical control. The management of the service depends more on political rather than 
on technical legitimacy. 
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In many cases the mayor does not interfere in a regie, but through a contract plan he is 
the one who sets specific goals for the organisation. (Miieller and Scheele, 1993 ). 
Regulation is supposed to have a minimum role. It just gives a yardstick for the users, 
comparing prices and providing information to everyone. The users are voters and they 
will decide at the next local election, whether the service has been good or not. 
The lack of formal regulatory bodies and the French approach to control within the 
sector is explained through politics: the users are the voters and the elected mayor is 
responsible for the service. The informal approach of the institutional architecture 
provides big gaps where the private companies take their profits, which are not stated in 
the contracts. The importance of no written rules is recognised in their development. 
Those rules are not in the contracts, but are accepted by the local authorities and 
communal administrators, which means important marginal benefits for the companies. 
These procedures include the long period of contract, which makes a re-negotiation 
difficult, the use of the companies' subsidiaries for specialised services without bidding 
and delay in repaying money to the public authority when collected on its behalf, as well 
as tax and other payments. (Lorrain, 1991, 1992). This means that there is an asymmetry 
in the business. 
The purpose of creating competition in the provision of the services is more visible in 
France than in the UK. Competition exists between the public and the private sector as 
well as within the private sector for the market. The regies must be efficient in order to 
keep the service under public administration. On the other hand, the private companies 
take advantage of the fragmentation of the administrative body where the communes are 
likely to have more limited technical and human resources. In fact, from the technical 
point of view, there is no doubt that the private companies are much more skilled th·an 
the vast majority of 'communes'. Economies of scale are obtained at the operator level, 
different from the British system, where they are sought at the organising authority level. 
One trend in the system seems to be the issue of pricing. Although, so far, pricing has not 
been an issue in France, from now on it seems that the consumers will pay more attention 
to it, for two main reasons: firstly, price rises are expected as a result of investments 
necessary to meet the EC standards in the next ten years; second! y, the Sa pin law which 
came into force in January, 1993, is aimed at preventing corruption and demands 
transparency in public economic agreements. 
As stated above, one of the sources of company profits in France is the "non written 
rules", and the French idea of loose controlling. Under this new law, possibly a new 
arrangement between mayors, 'commune' and private companies will flourish. 
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At least one fact has arisen as a consequence of the new law: in the city of Saint-Etienne, 
the court invalidated the increase of water rates made by the private company with the 
approval of the city council. The action was brought by four customers, and as result of 
the court decision, the mayor resigned. (Financial Times Newsletter, Water Briefing, 
18.5.1994). 
The investigation of the French arrangement presented the experience of a system built in 
an incremental way, without a formal institutional framework, and where private sector 
involvement does not occur by decree or legislation and is not defined (or imposed) by 
the Central government, as happened in England and Wales, where privatisation meant a 
radical policy innovation. The French process shows a procedure where private sector 
involvement takes place when the local authority feels it is necessary and political forces 
have a balance that permits it. The investigation gives subsidies for the construction of a 
new policy, according to the stated objective of this thesis under the hypothesis that 
extending private sector involvement would be a suitable solution for improving the level 
of services. 
3.9 SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS 
Because of the fragmentation and diversity of the French system , which comprises 
different sorts . of management of water and sanitation services with a variety of 
characteristics, it is necessary to analyse the different arrangements in the sector for some 
of the performance categories. 
• National Policy Environment 
France is an industrialised, developed country with a stabilised political economic and 
social situation. With a high income economy, according to the World Bank, the 
country is highly urbanised (73% of the population live in urban areas) with a low 
rate of population growth. (see table 3.2) Political and Economic Indicators- France. 
Regarding social aspects, most of the population already has the basic needs, typical 
of developed countries. 
Concerning technology, France is highly industrialised and outstanding in some 
sectors such as the armaments industry, aircraft, chemicals, etc. Regarding water and 
sanitation, the two biggest French private companies in the sector (Compagnie 
General des Eaux and Societe Lyonnaise des Eaux) are known world wide for their 
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Table 3.2 Political and Economic Indicators - France 
Population (million) YEAR 
Total 1992 57.4 
Urban 1992 41.9 
Urban (as a % of Total) 1992 73 
In urban agglomeration of one million or more (as a % oO 
Urban 1992 29 
Total 1992 21 
Average annual growth rate 1980- 1992 0.4 
Access to (in urban areas as a % of total population) 
Safe drinking water 1980 100 
Sanitation 1980 100 
Safe drinking water 1989 100 
Sanitation 1989 100 
Household income 
Share of top 20% of households 1989 41.9 
Share of bottom 40% of households 1989 11.8 
Share of bottom 20% of households 1989 5.6 
GNP per capita (US$) 
Total 1992 22,260 
High income group 1992 21,960 
Energy consumption per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 
Total 1992 4,034 
High income group 1992 5,101 
Source: World Development Report (WDR), 1994 
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state of the art technology in every part of water and sanitation systems and their vast 
international experience in managing different systems. 
• Legislation and Organisational Autonomy 
French legislation provides high flexibility for managing watsan. The sort of 
management of local services is decided by the elected local authorities, which makes 
the system very decentralised. (France has more than 36,000 communities). 
The system includes a wide range of organisation types, from those with low levels 
of autonomy (n§gies) to the more autonomous private companies. Even the private 
companies which run services under concession contracts, are not considered to be 
highly autonomous as they cannot determine at least one key factor in the system, 
that is the set of tariffs, which is defined in the contracts. (see box 3.2). Also, the 
companies do not own the physical assets of the systems, as they belong to the 
commune, even if built and financed by the private companies. 
Box 3.2 
Regulation says that the communes are free to decide on tariffs with no need for 
higher level approval, provided the budget of the service is in real equilibrium. The 
communal budget can not subsidise the service. (Communal Administration Code 
1970. Quoted by Loodsgret, 1990). 
However, Barthelemy (1992), in a comprehensive research on the ten biggest water 
and sanitation systems in France, noticed that the regies tend to have a lower level of 
auto fmancing compared to the systems under delegated management. 
Competition within the system occurs at two different levels: firstly, between the 
public and private sectors for the provision of the services, and secondly amongst the 
private companies, which try to improve their position in the market, managing a 
higher number of communes, (see box 3.3) 
Box 3.3 
In Barthelemy's (1992) opinion the regies behave in a more competitive manner 
nowadays, than the private companies, as they are always "threatened" by the latter. 
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Although very flexible in choice of management, the sector is monitored across the 
different tasks which comprise the provision of watsan services. Quality of service 
delivered and decisions on invesnnents and financing are monitored by a number of 
bodies at local, regional, river basin and central levels. 
Regulation and control are conducted through legislation formulated by decision 
making bodies, at different levels. 
In delegated management contracts, the first regulatory body is the contract. 
• Long Range Demand and Technological Requirements 
Due to the demographic stability of the country (see table 3.2) invesnnents required 
for covering unattended demand is low, i.e. there is very little need for increasing the 
quantity of water delivered. However, investment is required for two main reasons: 
firstly, for replacing the physical network, in many cases built during the 40's, soon 
after the second world war; secondly for meeting the standards of EC directives. 
• Organisational Culture 
In France some beliefs seem to be shared by those involved in the sector, such as the 
acceptability of jurisprudence as the reference to deal with problems within the sector 
with no need for strict rules on many of the issues, which supports the idea of 
flexibility. 
This is considered an important tool for achieving a better level of service. Also, the 
principle of being a community based service is common sense i.e. the elected Local 
Authorities are the ones who decide on the local services management. There is 
common sense in the idea of "La liberte d'administration" of the Local Authority 
and it is legitimised by the different actors involved, which have different interests. 
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Box 3.4 
About concession contracts 
The freedom of choice for a concessionaire from the delegating commune makes it 
necessary to assure that a public seiVice will not be entrusted to a person in which the 
delegating authority does not have complete trust. Reliability and co-operation are not 
possible in the long term if the freedom of both parties is hampered by strict 
regul!\tion ..... (Loosdregt,1994,p.5) 
About 'Affermage' contracts in France 
France has the best developed lease arrangements for water supply and sewerage 
seiVices. Private operators provide about 75% of the country's water and 32% of its 
sewerage seiVice ...... Contracts are negotiated direct between the private contractor 
and the municipality. Even when there is competition, the incumbent contractor 
usually has an advantage over potential competitors 1 Triche,I992; Walker,I993). 
• Commercial Orientation 
Under the law, water and sanitation seiVices in France are considered Local Public 
services with an industrial and commercial character. Municipalities can not use the 
budget to subsidise the seiVice, no matter if it is run under direct or delegated 
management. (Law n.70-1297 31.12.1970 and LC 193 19.10.1971- quoted by 
Loosdregt, 1990). 
Nevertheless, there are subsidies for financing investments in new extensions and in 
upgrading the systems. (Loosdregt, op.cit; Barthelemy, 1992). Loosdgret explains 
that the subsidies are due to the ease with which public sector loans can be paid off 
because of lower interests rates, a situation which does not apply to the private 
sector. These subsidies affect small communities, (mainly in rural areas) for whom it 
is difficult to raise internal capital for major investments in the system. Grants are 
given through the National Fund for Water Transmission Development (Fonds 
National pour le developpement des adduction d'eau- FNDAE), or by river basin 
agencies. 
Barthelemy (1992), noticed that in the ten biggest water and sanitation systems in 
France the average percentage of auto financing in five regies studied was 50%, 
whereas in the delegated management systems it was 79%. 
• Consumer orientation 
The system has some tools for protecting the customer. In direct management, the 
'n!gies', threatened by private sector involvement, try to keep their customers happy; 
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in delegated management, there are clauses in the contracts concerning customers' 
claims and the relationship between the organisation and the customer. In addition, in 
the "Code du Communes", there is a Consultative Commission of Public Services 
(Commission Consultative des Services Publics), formed by customer 
representatives, which acts on behalf of customers. 
At national level, the customer association deals with customers' interests. Loosdgret 
(1990) states that the regulation of sanitation services, set by the ' Ministere 
d'Interieure' in 1988 was a consequence of customers' association pressure. 
There is no data available on the existence of regulatory parameters or bodies for 
customer demands, nor for special attention to low income households, either 
through tariff structure or facilities for payment. 
3.10 BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS: BRIEF COMPARISON 
The history of watsan services in Britain and France has taken different paths in the 20th. 
century: in Britain the process shifted progressively from a Local Authority and 
decentralised perspective to a national centralised perspective with few actors involved. 
France, at the same time, experienced a decentralisation process (reinforced in 1982) 
which empowers elected Local Authorities to decide on the organisation of the service, 
on behalf of the population. 
These different approaches have led to different managerial and regulatory views of the 
service. In Britain, the aim is to have homogeneity of procedures and global solutions. In 
France, one of the foundations of the system is the diversity of alternatives. 
The differences on views regarding some selected issues within the sector are discussed 
below. Table 3.3 shows some characteristics of both systems. 
In Britain, the service is seen as an industry and seeks managerial efficiency, as much as 
possible away from political and public authority interference. The regulatory body 
works independently of the state bureaucracy. Local Authorities are kept away from 
decisions and customers are assessed directly through the regulators and/or the private 
companies. 
In France, the decentralisation of the provision of service and the power given to the 
elected Local Authority or Municipality for choosing the method of running the service 
makes it more a local political decision. Efficiency of the service is measured through the 
approval of the population communicated to the Mayor. 
In Britain, issues in the system are dealt with between the private companies and the 
independent and centralised National Agencies, whereas in France the reference is the 
contract signed between the private company and the Mayor; and issues are solved on a 
one to one basis. 
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Regulation 
England and Wales experienced the most comprehensive privatisation process in watsan 
service including the divestiture of physical assets. As a consequence of the fear of abuse 
by the private companies in their monopolistic position, an apparently strict regulation 
was established where the companies are monitored in detail through specific indicators. 
The French belief is that the market finds ·natural' ways to avoid abuse by the 
oligopolistic private companies and therefore the main indicators in the system are level 
of service and price, which stay around an average level. The stability of this 
'equilibrium' is convenient and profitable for the actors involved and it is achieved 
through competition among neighbouring and similar towns for the level of service, the 
concern of the private comparties about their reputation and competition between direct 
and delegated management 
Planning and Investment 
In Britain, each one of the private companies provides a 10 year master plan that is 
monitored by the economic regulator. 
In France sector planrting is a state responsibility. Nevertheless, it is made based on 
information provided by the operational body. 
The price cap approach used in England and Wales for tariff setting could lead the 
comparties towards over investment, as the value of K is related to the amount of 
investment. 
In France, investment can be made either by the public or private operator. When the 
body that operates the system is not the same as that responsible for planning and 
investing, the lack of all the necessary information could lead to inappropriate 
investment This tendency is counterbalanced by the full cost recovery tariff, as both the 
one who finances and the operator get revenues from the same source. 
Subsidies 
One important point in the British system is the complete lack of subsidies, after 
privatisation. Private companies get resources for investment from the stock market and 
through revenues. There are also restriction on the use of cross subsidies within the 
companies from different business. In France, sewerage plants are generally subsidised. 
Subsidies are provided by municipalities or regiooal departements. 
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Price regulation and adjustments 
In Britain, prices are defined and modified by OFW AT, based on information provided 
by the companies to determine the value of K, and on inflation rates. The time for review 
is five years. 
In France, prices are defined in the competitive bidding or through negotiation, along 
with formulas used to correct for inflation. In some cases the tariff is defined for the 
whole length of the contract, but changes in circumstances are allowed for the 
renegotiation of the contract. 
An important difference between the two systems is that in Britain the service is charge 
based on the rateable value of the building. Metering has been introduced after 
privatisation for specific cases but it is not the usual procedure. 
In France, metering is universal. 
Competition 
In both of the systems some form of competitiveness was created in the business, but it 
occurs in distinct places. In the UK, competition exists between the companies on the 
stock market, together with other alternatives of investment. In addition, the economic 
regulator tries to create comparative competitiveness among the private companies 
through performance indicators seeking higher efficiency. 
In France, competitiveness exists between the public and private sector and between the 
big private companies. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES 
IN SALVADOR, BAHIA, BRAZIL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the water and sanitation services in the Brazilian state of Bahia 
and in the state capital, Salvador. It includes information on the way the service is 
currently managed and analyses the performance of the state owned company responsible 
for the provision of the service. The aim is to contextualise the environment in which a 
greater private sector involvement in watsan services is suggested, which will be 
described in the next chapter. 
Currently there is no policy for the sector in the country, as since 1990, when the 
previous policy ended, no successor has been formulated. Therefore, the organisational 
structure of, and many of the currenrpractices in the sector, are a legacy from the former 
policy. This is the reason for analysing that policy. 
The chapter is divided into ten parts: 
It starts with an overall picture of Brazil, in general and Bahia, the state, in particular 
with some socio-economic characteristics. 
Secondly, a description is given of the development of watsan in the country and in the 
state, with special attention to the last national master plan for the sector, with its price 
setting and investment structure. 
Thirdly, the current situation of the urban watsan services in Brazil and particularly in 
Bahia is described, through some indicators of the state owned company, Embasa, which 
runs the service, together with some operational information. 
The services are assessed through the analysis of interviews made with representatives of 
the main organisations related to the system, including directors and ex-directors of 
Embasa; the Secretary of State for Water Resources Sanitation and Housing; the 
Secretary of the Council for Infrastructure; a representative of the State Legislature. 
In a further section an Activity Responsibility Matrix of the system is shown, in order to 
visualise the relationship and the sharing of the necessary tasks to provide the services 
under the current model. 
Furthermore, the main identified problems in the system are stated. 
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The service is then discussed through some of the alternatives that have been considered 
for solving the problems presented in the previous section. In addition there is a brief 
discussion of the trends of a new institutional and investment framework. 
Then, a systematic analysis of the sector is presented, following the methodology, and 
finally, there is a section comparing the three studied systems comprising some objective 
indicators. 
4.2 BRAZIL • THE COUNTRY 
The largest country in area and population in South America, Brazil is considered by the 
World Bank as a high medium income country, together with some other Latin America 
countries such as Argentina and Mexico. Table 4.1 gives some socio-economic 
indicators of the country compared to Argentina and Mexico. 
Table 4.1 Socio-Economic Indicators 
Brazil Ar2entina Mexico 
Area (thousand km•) 8,512 2,767 1,958 
Population (millions) 153.9 33.1 85.0 
Urban oooulation (%) 77 87 74 
Gnp_per capita (US$ 1,000.00) 2,770 6,050 3,470 
Adult Illiteracy (%) · 19 5 .. 13 
Access to safe water(% of total population) 86 64 81 
Source. World Development Repon, (WDR) 1994 
4.2.1 Bahia- the state 
The state of Bahia is located in the Northeast of the country (see fig.4.1). Its area is 
566,978Km2 and its population is about 12 million people, of which 59.11% live in urban 
areas, comprising 415 municipalities. Although having the longest coastline in the 
country (1,103Km), part of the state (about 60% of its area) is located in the semi arid 
region, with regular draughts and water shortages. The average annual temperatures in 
the state vary from 19.2DC to 26.6DC (Cabes XVII, 1994; Bahia, 1994). 
The state possesses both industrial and underdeveloped areas, often existing side by side, 
as in the national pattern. Also similar to other parts of the country and other developing 
countries, the poor urban population and the lack of infra-structure is one of the 
problems in the main cities. In the capital city, Salvador, and its metropolitan area 
(RMS), which has 2.1 million inhabitants in urban areas, 93.88 %of the urban population 
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Figure 4.1 BRAZIL and BAHIA 
· .. · .. ~~.· 
'•' .·_; ·:· ... 
source: Bahia, 1994 
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have access to safe water supply and 19% have sewerage services. (see table 4.2). The 
table gives the rate of services in the city and the state, compared to the region and to the 
country. 
Table 4.2 Brazil -Water and Sanitation Indicators in Urban Area 
Metropolitan Area llahia 
of Salvador 
Total population (1000 inh) 2,113 12,092 
Urban population (1000 inh) 7,148 
Urban population (% of total 00 59 
ooDulationl 
Access to safe water (1000 2,007 5,284 
in h) 
Urban population 94 74 
(%) 
Total population(%) 00 44 
Access to sanitation services 443 603 
(1000 inh) 
Urban population 19 8.4 
(%) 
Total population (%) 00 5.0 
Note: Data refers to 1992 
Source: Adapted from Cabes, XVII, 1994: World Development Report, (WDR), 1994 
Sharing of GDP in the state is as follows: 
Service- 55% 
lndustry-30% 
Agriculture and Farming - 15% 
The GDP per capita in 1990 was US$2,174 (Bahia, 1993) 
4.3 BACKGROUND 
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Public water and sanitation services in Salvador, Bahia started in the middle of XIX 
century, together with other Latin America cities and since then has been subjected to 
some institutional changes, most of them determined by external donors or failures in the 
previous system. 
Table 4.3 gives a summary of the different institutional arrangements used by watsan 
services in Bahia. 
At the beginning, in 1853, the service was run by a Portuguese private company, the 
"Companhia do Queimado" on a concession system basis from the Council, in which 
assets belonged to the private company. The contract lasted for 50 years, until the 
beginning of this century, when the Council bought the assets of the private company and 
put the service out to tender. A contract was signed, but this time, financial responsibility 
for upgrading the system lay with the Council, which took out a loan from the "Banque 
L'Union Parisienne". The service was then run as an 'affermage' system. 
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In the first quarter of this century, having as an excuse the deterioration of the service, 
the regional government decided, in 1925, to take over the service and run it in a 'Regie 
Autonome' system where the water department had no financial autonomy and the staff 
were civil servants. At the time, the service was attached to the Secretary of State of 
Health. Later, in the early forties, the service was moved to the Building Secretariat 
which meant the beginning of a new perspective, where water and sanitation services 
were seen as economic goods, a necessary infrastructure for industrialisation and 
economic growth. 
In the early sixties, the first big change in the institutional arrangements occurred, 
because of an external actor. Together with other Latin American countries, a new 
economic development cycle was developing in Brazil, based on the CEPAL (Executive 
Commission for Latin America) model of import substitution. This means that 
infrastructure had to be 
provided in urban areas, not only as basic conditions for the emergent labour force, but 
also as pan of the strategy to encourage the growth of other industries related to the 
sector (Caneado and Franceys, 1994). 
The World Bank and the Inter-American Bank fmanced the infrastructure at that time as 
pan of an agenda where the social problems were addressed and prioritised. (Cardoso, 
1982). The terms of the loans represented a complete change in the national managerial 
approach to the service. In Bahia, the Inter-American Bank provided a loan for 
upgrading the water system of Salvador and its region, including new catchment, 
transmission and water treatment plant. The bank required independent and dynamic 
organisations with autonomy, free from political interference. It was necessary to ensure 
that the money would be used according to the initial purpose and also that the 
organisation would be able to charge tariffs on a full cost recovery basis, making it 
possible for the bank to recover its investment. 
As a consequence of these new conditions, the institutional framework set up comprised 
an organisation officially attached to the regional government, but quite autonomous. 
At the time, the service was managed in a 'Regie Personalisee' basis, as the 
organisation- Superintendencia de A.guas e Esgotos do Reconcavo (SAER) was rather 
autonomous. Because of the financial aspect, the management system changed. It led to 
the construction of big catchments and treatment plants and the physical network was 
mainly directed to areas with a great potential for revenue. 
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TABLE4.3 
INSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR URBAN WATSAN IN BAHIA (1853-1994) 
INSTITUTION Characteristics I I I 
GOVERNMENT 
Government/State Ministry Centralised government control 1970- 1990 Through 
Municipal (Regionai)Department Centralised municipal(statal) 1925. 1960 subsidies 
Ref(ie Directe control 
Decentralised Government Encouraging autonomy at district 1960. 1970 
Department Ref(ie Directe or municipal level 
Semi-autonomous Utility Managerial autonomy 1970. 1994 
Department 
Re!!ie Autonome 
Autonomous Utility Board Managerial, financial and legal 
Ref(ie Personnalisee autonomy 
Regulator Ensures adherence to agreed 
performance standards including 
tariffs 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
Service Contractors Fees per task - conventional 1925. 1990 
contractors 
Informal Sector or Fees per task - small scale 
'Mini'Contractors enterprises 
Management Contractor Fees proportional to physical 1905. 1925 
Gerance outout of fixed assets 
Shared Profit Fees proportional to output plus 
Ref(ie Interesse bonus or shared profits 
Leasing Contract Affermage Agreed amount of tariff to lessee 
of fixed assets 
Concession Contract Agreed amount of tariff to 1853. 1905 
(BOO/BOT/B001) Concession concessionaire who has 
constructed fixed assets 
COMMUNITY 
Community Group Informal ~!;roup 
Cooperative Formal group 
Non Governmental Organisation Voluntary agency providing 
(NGO) services 
CONSUMER 
Household Owner or tenant 
Institution Government 
Commercial/Industrial Private enterprise 
Source: adapted from Coyaud (in Caneado and Franceys, 1994) 
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This organisational structure would be replaced in the late sixties, wiht the state 
following the national master plan - Planasa. 
4.3.1 The National Plan for Urban Water and Sanitation- Planasa (1970-1990) 
Planasa, the Brazilian National master plan for Urban water and sanitation changed in 
many aspects the profile of the sector in the country. After this plan no other policy has 
been formulated in the country for the sector and many of its features are still in use, 
such as tariff setting. 
The current watsan situation in the country is a consequence of the institutional and 
fmancial framework set up by Planasa. 
This major institutional change in urban watsan services took place in the early 70's and 
it would remain until 1990. It was a consequence of the managerial centralisation 
approach established by the central military government, for infra-structure and social 
policies during that period. 
The model was based on the centralisation of decision making concerning investment and 
financing within the central government through the Federal Housing Bank (Banco 
Nacional de Habita{:iio· BNH); and in the creation of regional state companies as 
executive bodies responsible for implementation of the national policy in each state. Also 
important in Planasa was the idea of self sustainability of the system through the viability 
of the regional companies. 
Before Planasa, urban watsan services in Brazil were considered inefficient and one of 
the main causes restricting development. Only 42.7% of the urban population had access 
to safe water and 22.3% had sanitation services connected to the sewerage system in the 
late sixties. (IBGE, 1990). According to the government, at that time the main problems 
in watsan could be summarised as: 
wastage of funds because of the lack of organisational structure and planning; 
lack of an adequate tariff system; 
responsibility for provision of the services lying in the weakest level of the political-
administrative chain, the municipality. 
4.3.1.1 Price definition and control 
The method of tariff defmition in Planasa was set by a Federal law (Law 6.528 
11/5/1978). It was defmed under the target rate of return on capital method, with a 
maximum rate of return of 12% per year. Along the years, tariffs were expected to have 
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lower increases in value as investment would be necessary only for extending demand 
and for maintenance. 
A lifeline tariff was defmed as 7% of the national minimum salary, when it was for water 
and sanitation services, and 5% of the minimum salary when for water supply only. The 
lifeline consumption was 10m3/month. (BNH, 1978a; BNH,l978b). 
This method should guarantee the technical aspects regarding self sustainbility of the 
companies and also ensure affordability for low income households. The tariff structure, 
that is still used in Bahia, is in table 4.6. 
Subsidies were provided in the tariffs from high income households to low income 
households; from large consumers to small consumers, and amongst the different regions 
in the country, which had different levels of development and different levels of income. 
The average tariff for each company should allow its viability when working efficiently, 
but the law did not define efficiency. 
Tariffs were approved for each company by the central government, as unti11986 public 
tariffs were used as a tool for controlling inflation. Since then, changes in tariff have been 
authorised by the state Governor, according to proposition made by Embasa. 
4.3.1.2 Metering 
Under the law, each company would carry out studies in order to define the optimum 
percentage of metering. When metering was not used, the service would be charged by 
the estimated average consumption based on the rateable value of the house. Appendix 
IV -1 shows the percentage of metering in Salvador, Bahia during the period 1970-1990. 
4.3.1.3 Investment 
The Federal Housing Bank (Banco Nacional de Habitat;iio- BNH) was responsible for 
the water and sanitation policy, with a high level of autonomy and centralisation. 
Priorities were decided by the Bank. Financing for the sector in general figures was made 
in the following way: 
25% as grants from the central government, states or municipalities; 
37.5% by the central government, through the bank, with resources from 
compulsory savings from salaries; and 
37.5% from the 'Fundo de Agua e Esgoto'-(FAE), a fund set up in each state for 
investment in urban water and sanitation. 
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The Federal Housing Bank should progressively decrease its participation in the system, 
as FAE was supposed to achieve its sustainibility. FAE were fed by 5% of regional taxes 
and through revenues from loans. 
The targets of the plan were: to provide water supply to 90% of the urban population 
and sanitation services to 65% of the same population by the year 1990. 
To be eligible for participating in the system and receiving funds, each city should give 
the concession of water and sanitation services to the regional state company. 
The majority of cities ( 64% in 1990) joined "Planasa" giving the concession to the 
respective state owned company, thus relinquishing responsibility for the services. 
During the ftrst decade of the plan, during the 70's, there were big investments in the 
sector and a significant increase in the proportion of the population served. 
In the 80's, the results of the policy reflected the recession with high levels of inflation 
faced by Brazil and other Latin American countries. The Brazilian crisis lasted the whole 
decade. The main source of investment, the compulsory loan given by each employee in 
the country as National Insurance, was drastically reduced, due to unemployment. 
Although defmed by law that the average tariff should recover the costs of the service, 
the Federal Government kept the value of tariffs at a very low level, well below that 
required for recovering the costs of the service. Even when the federal government 
stopped controlling inflation through public tariffs, in 1986, the states, especially the ones 
in the poorest regions of the country, found it difftcult to set realistic tariffs, in the middle 
of an economic crisis with high unemployment. 
The institutional model started to be dismantled in 1986 when the Federal Housing Bank 
(BNH), the main reference of the system, was wound up. As a consequence of all these 
factors, investments in urban watsan decreased and the levels of service started going 
down from the middle 80's, with a resultant resurgence of some of the water born 
diseases (Carteado, 1993). 
During the ftrst decade of Planasa, the state owned companies stressed expenditure in 
water production, constructing new systems, and upgrading the ones in use, rather than 
investing in institutional development, effectiveness, programmes on leakage control, etc. 
When the ftrst signs of crisis arrived, the majority of the companies did not change their 
proftle of investments. Nowadays, in some regional state owned companies, unaccounted 
for water reaches ftgures above 50% of the whole treated water (Carteado, 1993; Lobo, 
1993). 
In Bahia huge investments were made for the production of water and for the sewage 
system in Salvador, which ends up serving only a small part of population. The 
operational system in Bahia is discussed in heading 4.4.2. By the end of Planasa, in 1990, 
the watsan situation was that stated in table 4.2. 
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4.4 THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Since Planasa's pattern had collapsed, the central government launched a programme in 
1990, the Sanitation Programme for Urban Areas, (Pronurb) but without any 
commitment to self sustainability or to an organisational framework. 
The lack of an institutional arrangements together with the financial crisis in the sector, 
created a new situation where the regional governments and municipalities, facing 
pressure from citizens, especially in the big cities, started investing in the provision of the 
services. 
This attitude was also part of a process that has developed in the country since the 
middle 80's with a strOng tendency to decentralisation of policies, as part of an agenda of 
(re)democratisation. This tendency is very clear in the current National Constitution that 
came into force in 1988. Many of the taxes that previously remained at the national level, 
now returned to the municipality or to the state where it was generated. 
According to the new Constitution, municipalities hold the concession, but there is no 
definition of the role to be played by the central government, the states or the 
municipalities, with a complete lack of institutional arrangement and financial 
mechanisms. 
The role of regulator formerly played by the central government was not assumed by any 
other level of government, despite the decentralisation process. 
At the end of the national plan most of the regional state owned companies were facing a 
spiral of deficit Researchers still discuss if it is due to mismanagement of the regional 
companies or a problem inherent in the policy itself. Nevertheless, it is common sense 
that part of the deficit is due to the set of tariffs that has always been an issue as part of 
the welfare role played by public authorities (Carteado and Franceys, 1994). 
The current situation in Brazil is that 86.0% of the urban population have treated water. 
Nevertheless, only 31% of the same population have a convenient sewerage system, and 
the greater part of this has no treatment before reaching water courses or the sea. (see 
table 4.2). 
4.4.1 The current situation in Bahia- The Company 
The state owned company in Bahia, Empresa Baiana de Aguas e Saneamento SA. 
(Embasa) was launched in 1971 as part of the requirements of the Central Government 
in order to make the state eligible for joining Planasa and consequently to get capital 
resources. It is attached to the Secretariat of State for Water Resources, Sanitation and 
Housing. 
The company, similar to those in other federal states, operates over a large and dispersed 
area. It covers an area of 561.026km2 and serves about 4.5million people of the 7.0 
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million urban inhabitants in the state. (Embasa, 1994a). Another 726,000 urban 
inhabitants are served by municipalities or other organisations. This means that 43.7% of 
the total population and 73.93% of the urban population are served by the water supply 
system (Cabes XVII, 1994). 
Decisions on budgets, investments priorities and rate of tariff are controlled by the state 
government, which makes the company highly vulnerable to political interference. Every 
four years there are elections for the regional government. The elected Government 
appoints the Secretary of State for Water Sanitation and Housing and the Board of 
Directors for Embasa. On each of these occasions there is a change in priorities within 
the company. Even when the Governor is in the same political party as the former one, it 
is likely that he will put people from his own group in key positions. Sometimes these 
people use their situation to entrench their political position for the next election. In 
many cases priority in investment is given to the Governor's region, or that of the 
Secretary of State, or a director. 
Similar to other water companies in the country, Embasa faces a huge debt- US$ 302 
million in 1993- (Embasa, 1994c) and problems in providing services to the customers. 
The national crisis was reflected in the state by a drop in capital investments in the 
sector, followed by a consequent decrease in the proportion of the population served and 
in metering installation. Poor maintenance of assets or deterioration of installations and 
equipment due to lack of regular maintenance and replacement of fault parts became a 
feature of the system (see Appendix IV -1 Water Supply-Service Evolution-Salvador, and 
table 4.5.- Embasa- Strategic Indicators). 
At that time, diseases such as malaria, "dengue fever" and particularly cholera, were 
responsible for more than 60% of people hospitalised and for the death of one child 
every six hours, consuming about US$2.5million in order to prevent the spread of these 
diseases (Bahia, 1994). 
In 1991, the newly elected regional government realised that there was no external 
source for financing the service and decided to invest 24% of the capital expenditure of 
the government in water and sanitation services due to the visible worsening in the 
service and the degradation of existing assets. 
Although expending about US$300million in the period 1991-1993 in water and 
sanitation services, mainly for construction and rebuilding systems, the analysis of some 
indicators in the company suggests that it has not been working efficiently. One of its 
inefficiencies can be seen in the reliability of information provided by the company. Often 
the same indicator has different figures, according to the department within the company. 
Embasa recognises this problem. In a Mid term report for the World Bank (Embasa, 
1994b) it is stated that the company is improving its internal controls, providing more 
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reliable information which proves failures in the historical data base. Therefore, estimates 
and monitoring sometimes did not reflect Embasa' s real financial and sometimes even 
operational situation. 
Whenever possible, comparisons are made between Embasa and some similar Latin 
American companies (LAU companies) considered by Yepes (1990), as successful, 
despite the problems and constraints faced by all of them in acting in a similar 
environment, such as high inflation; rapid and uncontrolled urban population growth; a 
large proportion of low income population to be served; politically appointed managers 
and controlled rates. 
The strategic indicators for Embasa are in table 4.5 and are defined in Appendix 4-11. 
The figure for connection per employee in LAU companies is 213, higher than the figure 
for Embasa.(170 for 1991; 187 for 1992 ; and 206 for 1993). These figures decrease 
when the number of staff hired temporarily from the private sector is taken into 
consideration. Contracting labour force through service contracts is often used to 
overcome constraints caused by legislation for contracting staff. Although showing a 
tendency to improve, these figures fall short of a high level of efficiency. 
Salary costs in LAU companies has an average figure of 40%. At Embasa, it was 64% 
and 68% in 1992 and 1993, respectively. 
Half of the water treated in the company is lost, according to the percentage of 
unaccounted for water, when in LAU companies this percentage is 34%. 
The analysis of some fmancial indices4·1 shows inefficiency in the company. 
Indicators of good management practices include low level of receivable accounts and 
adequate level of internally generated funds, enough, at least to cover operation and 
maintenance costs. A summary of some indicators for Embasa is shown below: 
Table 4.4 Embasa- Some Financial Indicators- Summary 
1992 1993 
Bill collection efficiency (%) 75 79 
Operational cost/ Operational revenue (coefficient) 1.53 1.14 
source: Embasa, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c 
4
"
1 The analysis of financial indices is based on Yepes, op.cit and Johnson, 1990. 
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Table 4.5 EMBASA- STRATEGIC INDICATORS 
Years 
Discrimination Unit 1991 1992 1993 
Urban population 1000 inh 7,008 7,148 n.a. 
Population served (water supply) 1000 inh 4,368 4,558 n.a. 
Service coverage (water supply) %urban pop. 62 64 72 
Population served (sewage) 1000 inh 443 603 669 
Service coverage (sewage) %urban pop. 6 8 11 
Consumption per capita led 267 278 na 
Percentage of metering % 51 48 47 
Unaccounted for water % 47 50 50 
Connections (x 1000) number 1,043 1,100 1,174 
Staff number 6,141 5,891 5,702 
Connection per employee conn/emp 170 187 206 
Connection per labour force (including people 
hired from private sector) conn/emp na 146 180 
Employees per 1000 connection emp/1 OOOcon 5.88 5.35 4.85 
Total production m3 x 1000 35,024 38,001 41,473 
Total collection (sewage) m3 x 1000 n.a. n.a. 3,483 
Average Tariff 
Water US$/m3 0.43 0.39 0.40 
Sewage US$/m3 0.27 0.50 0.51 
Average cost per cubic metre (water) US$/m3 0.58 0.73 na 
Bill collection efficiency % 75 75 79 
Billed production (water) m3 x 1000 n.a. n.a. 18,636 
Billed production US$ X 1000 99,603 92,147 93,236 
Operational costs US$xl000 91 200,915 192,936 
Salary costs % na 64 68 
Operational cost I operational revenue coefficient 0.76 !.53 1.14 
(working ratio) 
Total billing per volume produced US$/m3 0.24 0.2 0.19 
Total revenue per connection US$/conn 100.7 88.6 n.a. 
Total revenue per employee US$/emp n.a. 10,777 10,407 
Days receivable ratio days na 69 67 
Intensity of use of water network m/conn 9.2 7.0 9.2 
Intensity of use of sewage network m/conn 11.1 1!.6 12.42 
Rate of return on assets coefficient ·0.02 -1.68 0.94 
Short term liquidity coefficient 0.29 0.27 0.37 
Debt service ratio coefficient n.a. 1.00 24.40 
Personnel costs I operating costs coefficient 0.44 0.23 0.32 
Long term debt ratio coefficient 0.47 0.27 0.46 
Note: n.a. data nOl available 
(emp.) employee 
(oper.) operating 
(conn.) connection 
Source: Embasa, 1992; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; Cabes XVII, 1994 
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The low level of bill collection efficiency, in value, leads to a high level of receivable 
accounts. It means that more than 20% of the invoices delivered by the company do not 
turn into revenue.The days n<eeivable ratio was 69 days in 1992 and 67 days in 1993. 
This indicator excludes debts from the public sector and occurred in an environment with 
high inflation. 
In such a situation, funds generation does not cover operation and maintenance costs. 
On the contrary, funds mu•t be supplied from the treasury for covering these costs, 
meaning a bankruptcy situation in the company that, in fact, is not conjectural but has 
existed for many years, as can be seen in table 4.5 Embasa, Strategic Indicators, which 
shows the evolution of indexes since 1991. 
4.4.1.1 Tariffs 
Apart from problems related to inefficiency by personnel and unsuitable managerial 
approach, the setting of tariffs also adds to the poor performance of Embasa. 
Table 4.5-Embasa- Strategic Indicators, shows the decreasing rate of metered connection 
since 1991, which dropped from 51% to 47% in 1993. This is especially important for 
Embasa when examined together with the average tariff per cubic meter (US$0.43 in 
1991; US$0.39 in 1992; US$ 0.40 in 1993) and the tariff structure in table 4.6 Embasa-
Tariff Structure. 
According to the structure, non metered connections are likely to pay less than metered 
ones, especially in the residential households. 
The social tariff is charged for shanty houses, which are described according to their size 
in square meters, their location in the town and are defmed as having only one tap (or no 
internal tap). 
Sewerage service is charged as a percentage on top of the water bill. The rate is 90% for 
those connected to the main system and 45% for independent systems which were 
fmanced by the customers and operated and maintained by Embasa, i.e., customers do 
not pay that part of the tariff related to capital construction costs. 
4.4.2 The Condition of Water and Sanitation Services 
The economic situation in the capital city and in the major economic centres is quite 
different from the situation in the rest of the state. Either because of the climate, or due 
to the incapacity of generating wealth through a sustainable economy, some cities remain 
in a difficult situation, with a low level of income. The level of infrastructure in different 
parts of the state generally reflects the level of economic growth. 
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Table4.6 
Household 
Metered Connections 
Social (poor) 
Residential/ holiday property 
Commercial 
Public building I construction site 
Industry 
Non Metered Connections 
Social (poor) 
Residential/ holiday property 
Commercial 
Public building 
Construction site 
Indus 
Note: Prices in March, 1994 
Source: Embasa, !994a 
Tariff Structure 
92 
Consumption 
(m3 / month) 
0. 10 
11- 15 
16-30 
31- 45 
45 
0- 10 
11- 15 
16-30 
31 -45 
45 
0- 10 
10 
0-20 
20 
0-20 
20 
walsan in Salvador/Bahia/Brazil 
Tariff 
(US$) 
0.39 
0.09 
0.14 
0.26 
0.37 
2.08 
0.42 
0.51 
0.60 
0.82 
6.99 
1.43 
22.53 
2.02 
18.16 
!.53 
0.39 
3.54 
6.99 
83.24 
18.16 
18.16 
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In Salvador, the capital city, 95% of the population have access to safe water, with house 
connections. This, despite the stated problems on reliability in the system, concerning 
quality and quantity of water delivered to certain parts of the city, the level of 
unaccounted for water and the l:lck of customer orientation. 
The per capita consumption in the state was 278 led in 1992 (see table 4.5), and in the 
capital city 340 led (Cabes XVII, 1994). These figures are considered very high, more 
than enough for health purposes, despite the growing demand for services in the main 
urban areas. 
This is the pattern in the main dries in the state, the most important economic centres, 
where designing of water and SJ.Ilitation systems considers a 'per capita' consumption of 
250 led. 
This pattern remains a consequence of the technology enforced during Planasa, which led 
to the use of technologies often inappropriate to a demand driven service, but which 
made the country at that time a contracting engineers' paradise. 
On the other hand there are 127 small municipalities and districts in which water supply 
is not managed by the state owned company, but by the municipality themselves or other 
institutions. Actually, these places are more related to rural areas, as their total 
population is 726,000 inhabitants, representing 13.7% of the total population served in 
the state. (Cabes XVII, 1994). 
Regarding sanitation, only 8.44% (1993) of the urban population in the nine main cities 
of the state had access to the service, which means 603,000 inhabitants in 1992. (Cabes 
XVII, 1994). There are 511 cities and districts without sanitation services. The main 
problem in the major cities is related to the network, as the main sewerage systems, 
conventional sewerage in the main cities, are under utilised. In Salvador, the current 
system catries less than 10% of its capacity, and serves about 9.8% of the population 
(Embasa, 1994a). The capacity of the main pipe of the conventional sewerage separated 
system is 7.8m3/s. The network of the system has not been completed due to lack of 
funds. 
The remaining 9.2% of the population that have access to sewerage use independent 
systems operated and maintained by Embasa in different parts of the city. These systems 
comprise 75 sewerage treatment plants from 5.0 m3/sec to 50 m3/sec, 25 pump stations 
and 5,300 septic tanks, capacities of which vary from 1.5 m3 to 40 m3• Some data on the 
human and material resources needed for operation and maintenance of both systems are 
in table 4.7.- Embasa- Indicators of Department of Sewerage. 
These systems have low prodi!ctivity as they do not generate economy of scale. The 
operation of such a number of small systems distributed in a rather large area, seems to 
work more efficiently when in the hands of small private operators probably working 
locally, rather than operated by a large company with a heavier structure. 
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Table 4.7 EMBASA- Indicators of Sewerage Department- Salvador/Bahia 
Discrimination 
Sewerage treatment plants in condomminial Systems 
Pump stations in condomminial systems 
Pump stations in the main sewerage system 
Employees in operation and maintenance in the pump stations and treatment 
plants in condomminial systems 
Employees in operation and maintenance of pump stations in the main 
sewerage system 
Employees in maintenance of network in condomminial systems 
Employees in maintenance of network in the main sewerage system 
Population served through condomminial systems 
Population served through main sewerage system 
Extension of network in condomminial systems (m) 
Extension of network in the main s stem (m) 
Note: data refers to March 1994 
Source: Embasa, 1995 Deparunent of Sewerage 
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33 
34 
40 
228,303 
243,796 
276,044 
285,724 
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For the poor part of the city, specifically the part with illegal settlement and shanty 
houses, where the normal standard is the open sewer, the municipality intervenes, 
collecting sewage in a main pipe discharging in the nearest canal. This solution, incorrect 
from the technical point of view, is highly utilised by municipalities that respond to the 
demand of this part of the population, who just want to take out open sewage from the 
streets. And this population do not pay for this service, as there is no maintenance. 
There is still a large percentage of the population who produce individual solutions for 
sanitation problems. The general solution is the .use of cesspits which are emptied 
periodically. In major cities this service is generally provided by middle sized private 
companies which use special equipment for cleaning. The state owned company is also in 
the market, competing with the private companies. In small cities this service is usually 
made by individuals.In the absence of public service, the population find their own 
solution for sewerage services. 
4.4.3 Regulation 
Water quality regulation is defmed by the Ministry of Health and monitored by the 
Secretary of State for Health. The quality of water delivered must comply with the 
directive n.36/90 which is monitored at regional level by the Secretary of Health. 
The main indice used by Embasa is the concentration of Chlorine in the network, that 
should be 0.2mg/l in 95% of samples. According to Embasa (1994b), the company has 
been achieving this figure. Currently, Embasa checks the quality of water delivered and 
the quality of effluents and sends the results to the Secretary of Health. 
Environmental regulation is defined by the Central Government through its 
Environmental Regulatory Body (Conselho Nacional de Meio Ambiente- CONAMA) 
National Council for Environment, and monitored regionally by the environmental 
resources centre (Centro de Recursos Ambientais- CRA), which checks discharges and 
places sanctions on those, mainly industries, that do not comply with the regulations. 
Embasa and CRA work well together in analysing projects and authorising new 
settlements. Nevertheless, it is difficult for CRA to push and punish Embasa, as they 
work 'for the same boss', a similar situation to that described for England and Wales. 
4.5 THE VIEW OF THE PRACTITIONERS 
This section is based on the information of some people involved in the provision of 
water and sanitation services in Bahia and in Salvador. It attempts to assess their views 
on the current situation of the service and their views of the future through an analysis of 
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their responses. The questionnaires used in the interviews and a summary of each of the 
responses are in appendix I -1. 
Se'-:en interviews were conducted with the following: the Secretary of State for Water 
Resources Sanitation and Housing; two senior managers, former directors of the 
company, each three times director of the company; a member of the board of directors 
of the company; a member of the state legislature, involved with water and sanitation 
problems, who presented a proposal for a new sanitation policy for the state; the 
Secretary of the Council for Infrastructure; a member of the academy involved with 
sanitation problems in the state, who is co-ordinating the preparation of the Municipal 
policy for Sanitation. The views of the employees in the sector were assessed by 
examining publications produced by the local union and the National Executive of 
workers in sanitation and environment. 
The section is organised by or subject discussed in the interviews, and whenever 
possible, by similarity and diversity of ideas, as it was noticed that the former Embasa's 
directors and the current director together with the Secretary of State for Water 
Resources Sanitation and Housing tend to have similar points of view, whereas the 
Secretary of the Council for Infra-structure, the member of the state legislature and the 
union tend to agree in most of the subjects. 
The main areas covered in the interviews were: 
the current level of services; 
the current policy and the current situation- strong and weak points; 
the need of setting up a new policy and what its main concerns or its main 
characteristics should be; 
the possibilities of more private sector involvement; 
the role of the state in the event of more private involvement. 
There were some points in common among all the interviewed. One of them was related 
to the necessity to consider sanitation in a broader context, water and sanitation services 
together with drainage, solid waste and vector control. Also most of them agree that 
water and sanitation services should be seen as part of a comprehensive health policy. 
For them it is not effective to spend money for providing water and sanitation infra-
structure, if it is not part of a whole chain related to sanitation and health. 
The current level of services 
Most of the interviewed considered the level of provision of the water service to be from 
fair to good while sanitation services were considered to be bad in Salvador. 
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In fact, the production of water in Salvador is higher than necessary, according to an 
Embasa director and a former director. Nevertheless, it was noticed that there is 
discrimination in delivering the service, as many areas in the city have problems with the 
service related to quantity, regularity 311d quality of water delivered, number of leakages 
and time for solving problems. In a study conducted by the university, in some areas of 
the city, more than 50% of the water samples had faecal coli, which are related to the 
intermittence of the service and the quantity of leakage. Sometimes, there is no water for 
two months. According to a former director, " .... the quantity of water produced in town 
is enough ...... we need to upgrade the network in some areas in the outskirts of town and 
slum areas ... " The problems are concentrated in the poor neighbourhoods. According to 
the Secretary of the Council for Infra-structure, the level of the service depends on 
where you live. 
Outside Salvador, water services are not considered good, as many cities do not have the 
service at all yet. Besides, the occurrence of some diseases which were supposed to have 
vanished indicates a lack of proper service. 
Regarding sanitation services, they are considered bad or almost inexistant both in 
Salvador and in the state. In a survey made by the council at the end of 1993, sewage 
services were regarded by 60% of the inhabitants as their biggest priority. 
The current policy 
It is a fact that there is no current policy for sanitation neither for the city nor for the 
state, although it is stated in both constitutions. Because of the lack of policy, there is 
controversy about the efficiency of investments made during the last four years, although 
it was recognised that a great amount of resources were used in water and sanitation 
services in the state (10% of the state budget, i.e. about US$ 300million ). All 
interviewees recognised the lack of policy as one of the weaknesses of the sector. 
For the director of Embasa and for the Secretary of State for Water Resources Sanitation 
and Housing, investments were made without a plan, supporting the claim of the 
population. 
According to a member of the ·state legislature, the co-ordinator of the policy for 
Salvador, and the union representative, expenditure was based only on short term 
political aims, and in accordance with the will of the Governor. There was no technical 
or social support for allocating the resources or for choosing the technological pattern. 
Often this resulted in rebuilding instead of upgrading systems. 
The lack of a national and regional policy was regarded by the majority of those 
interviewed as the main constraint on the system. 
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For the Secretary of State, the lack of a national institutional organisation causing the 
management of the sector to be divided among the three levels of government (central, 
regional, local) is not good, as Brazil is an under developed country, where the 
succeeding administrator does not give continuity to the plans made by his predecessor. 
It is therefore necessary to make a framework, to discipline the sector. For him, it is also 
necessary for the central government to prioritise investments in water and sanitation 
services in its ten-year planning. 
Strong and weak points 
One of Embasa's directors pointed to the current regional government's prioritisation of 
sanitation as being a strong point in the present system, in addition to the good 
operational and technical levels of the regional state companies. 
Weak points in the system are considered to be the lack of planning for investments and 
the tariffs. According to a former director of Embasa, most people in the state capital, as 
well as in the inland cities, cannot afford to pay tariffs related to the cost of the benefit. 
Another weak point is the sewage service and the lack of organisation of the company 
and the system; as investments are made only in construction and not in these other vital 
areas. 
For the co-ordinator of the Sanitation Policy for the capital city, the current system is 
still too centralised and creates a culture in the sector where decisions are taken on a 
technocratic basis, without community participation, even making the discussion about 
different forms of management difficult. For example, the question of "municipalisation" 
i.e. a greater participation of the municipalities in the system since they are 
concessionaires. Those who suppon this idea have difficulties in discussing the issue with 
those who suppon a regional state company. 
The size of the company and its lack of autonomy was also indicated as a constraint in 
the system, by a former director. Embasa has 5,600 employees (March, 1994) 
throughout the state. In his words, " .... the lack of specific legislation makes the company 
vulnerable to political use ... " Although the company defines the tariffs, which must be 
approved by the governor, it is considered difficult to charge for the service. Besides, 
investments are not made through tariff revenues. 
Need for setting a new policy 
The need for setting a new policy at the national, regional and local level was stressed by 
all the interviewees, as it is seen as the main current constraint. Some of them 
emphasised the lack of a central organisation to control and deliver financial resources; 
others mentioned the necessity of creating a flexible national policy. 
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For all of them, the policy needs to be very flexible, exactly the opposite of the previous 
policy, which was centralised through the national government 
Some characteristics of a new policy were mentioned by the interviewees: 
1. the necessity for local authority participation. The current system is derived from 
the former policy, where the council gives the concession to the regional state 
company to take over the service. Currently, the municipalities have no voice 
either about the investments that would be made or abo11t tariffs. Nevertheless, 
there are different view points on it. The Secretary of State for Water Resources 
Sanitation and Housing, thinks that the Local Authority should maintain its role 
of concessionaire; former directors of Embasa think that the current concession 
contracts must be analysed and that some municipalities may think the terms of 
the contract are not good, deciding to run the service by themselves as a regie or 
under a delegated management contract The last possibility is not well viewed by 
the union, as from their point of view the local authorities are more difficult to 
control which could give more chances for an involvement of the private sector, 
which they are completely against Besides, most of the cities can not afford the 
service. 
2. flexibility. The policy must be flexible enough to allow each state to decide the 
most suitable model. Although the broad idea is the same, there are important 
differences about some points, such as community participation. Whereas the 
Secretary of State thinks that in a representative democracy the elected can 
decide and act on behalf of the citizen, the union asks for community 
participation, both during the setting up of the policy and for decisions on 
investments, model of management, etc. 
3. universalisation and equity of the service. The aim of the policy must be that 
100% of the population are served with the minimum necessary for health 
purposes, independent of the level of income. 
Possibility of greater private sector involvement 
This was the point which created the greatest diversity of opinion. For the Secretary of 
State for Water Resources Sanitation and Housing, it is time for a greater private sector 
involvement, providing the service for the part of the market that can pay, making the 
government free from this obligation, released to deal with education and health. 
Although being aware that private sector involvement is not the solution for the water 
and sanitation problems in the state, he argues that there are two factors to support his 
idea. The first is that it would force the end of cross subsidies in tariff, which he sees as 
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one of the main weaknesses in the system. The tariff now is set for the whole state as an 
average tariff. Because of it, even though the cost of the service is different in different 
cities, the customers pay the same tariff. In his opinion the customer should pay the real 
price and the Government should run the service in those places where it was 
unaffordable or should subsidise the population unable to pay the real cost. The second 
factor is that the level of service for those who could pay would be upgraded in many 
cases through lower prices. 
On the other hand, the union is completely against a greater private sector participation, 
as it is seen as one way to exclude the poor from the service. For them, the Government 
can not give away its responsibility for providing such " ... an important service in an 
essential social area" (Saneamento: saude e cidadania, 1993). In their opinion, the 
consequence is always a decrease in the quality of the service and an increase in tariffs 
for the society. Besides, the involvement of the private sector destroys the influence of 
the employees' organisation. 
For the others interviewed, private sector involvement is a fact. Apart from the 
traditional involvement of contractors, consultancy and designing, the current trend is 
.towards private sector involvement through "terceirizaflio" i.e. giving some tasks to a 
third part or company. In fact, it works as contracting out, specifically for services such 
as metering, network maintenance, invoicing, etc. This sort of involvement has been 
increasing lately and it has been accepted by the system, with the exception of the union. 
For them, it should not be used because it is not legal to contract services on a 
permanent basis. 
For the former Embasa's directors, the "terceirizaflio", contracting out service, should 
be used in those services which require high productivity. It was meant, at the beginning, 
for services different from the main activities of the company, such as operation and 
maintenance. 
According to a current director, when any service is provided by the private sector, it is 
easier to ask for a better service for the customers. 
The "big step" would be a management contract for operation services. This issue divides 
opinion. The Secretary of the Council for Infrastructure considers that, in spite of it 
being a trend, the state should not give away operation activities for security reasons. For 
a former Embasa's director, those contracts will check the capacity of the private sector 
to participate in a further process of privatisation, but he does not relate the quality of 
the service to public or private management. For him, both of them must provide a good 
service. The private sector is considered a partner. Privatisation was also seen as 
implying greater efficiency, with more profit. But it would lead to higher tariffs and 
discrimination, as not everyone who is connected could pay. A private sector 
involvement also implies awareness on the part of that sector. 
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For an Embasa director, the service should not remain only in the hands of the state. The 
latter could share the activities without losing physical and financial control of the 
sector. Who owns the concession must have the control. 
The role of the state 
There was no great divergence of opinion on this subject as it is clear that in case of a 
greater private sector involvement, the state would act as a regulator, setting the policy, 
organising and helping the implementation. 
For the member of the state legislature, the state must monitor the service under society' 
supervision. In his opinion, in case of privatisation the state would keep investing in areas 
with no affordability which would otherwise lead to increasing costs without 
improvement in the quality of the services, mainly for poor areas. 
For the Secretary of the Council for Infrastructure, only the state could invest in areas 
where there is no return of investment Moreover the state's role is planning, investment 
and operation. Also, the state is responsible for the environment. 
An ex-director of the company said that in such an irregular income distribution as in 
Brazil, the state can not desert the service. "The poor are a Government responsibility". 
For the Secretary of State for Water Resources Sanitation and Housing, the state will 
always be the concessionaire for using the water resources, whereas the local authority 
are the concessionaire for the urban water and sanitation services. 
By way of conclusion some issues, comments and opinions which were expressed in the 
interviews, will be discussed. 
Investments are predominantly directed towards construction rather than to core 
activities such as operation and maintenance. Some community leaders have stated 
that they 'want water in the pipes,not pipes in the street". Besides, there is a lack of 
investment in institutional strength, of upgrading an organisation seen as inefficient, 
with an excessive number of administrative staff. There is distortion in the distribution 
of salaries, favouring unskilled and administrative personnel. 
The idea of preserving the state owned company on a regional basis. The interviewees 
from different sectors used different reasons for preserving the state owned company 
in a regional basis: for some it is necessary due to the technical knowledge gathered 
through the years; for solving supra-communal problems and regional peculiarities, 
such as lack of water in a given city, integrated systems which serve different cities, 
etc.; but many of the concerns are related to corporatism. 
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The flexibility of the new policy and the tendency to decentralisation in contrast to the 
former centralised policy with no local authority involvement. 
The necessity for local authority participation. This trend creates a duality for the 
union, for example, as theoretically they support this idea because, for them, the 
service must be managed by the level of authority which is nearest to the citizen. The 
idea is also strongly supported by private contractors who seek the opportunity of 
taking over the service through any sort of delegated management, as the majority of 
the council do not have the technical or financial expertise to operate the service. This 
consequence of decentralisation is seen by the union as a risk. 
The tariff structure with or without cross subsidies. For some people there should be 
no cross subsidies through tariffs, as in some places the cost of water is much lower 
than in others, as the catchment is near the city or the transmission is done by gravity, 
etc. For those who support this idea, the customers in such places should get the 
benefit from it and the tariff should be related to the real cost in each place. In those 
cases where the population could not afford to pay, Government should subsidise the 
system. For those who do not hold this point of view, cross subsidies through tariff is 
one way to balance inequalities in society and a means to facilitate investments in the 
sector. 
The effect of private sector involvement on the cost for customers. As there is no 
comparative study on the cost of "terceiriza~:ao" the government and the company 
say that the cost of the tasks provided by private companies is lower than those which 
are provided by its own staff due to the higher productivity of the private sector. They 
also say that if the whole system were operated by private companies, it is likely that 
tariffs could decrease, due to gains in efficiency and productivity. On the other hand, 
some people say that a greater private sector involvement would certainly lead to 
higher tariffs and worsening in services, mainly for the poor, as the private sector 
would invest only in areas with a quick return of investment. For them, the customer 
would be adversely affected by private sector involvement. 
There was a remarkable lack of faith in Brazilian entrepreneurs as being prepared to 
make long term investments, putting their capital at risk. Some comments on Brazilian 
private companies follow: "they are used to getting quick and easy profits from public 
goods. Why are they going to invest?"; " ... so far, they have been saying that they want 
to operate and build in a lower cost environment (compared to public companies) but 
the Government is supposed to invest". 
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The issue of community participation arose in different ways. Some persons want 
direct control by the community on investments and operation through participation 
of community leaders, whereas others think that the communities should be consulted 
about new investments and services. For the Secretary of State for Water Resources 
Sanitation and Housing, the elected representatives are there to represent people's 
views. 
4.6 ACTIVITY AND RESPONSffiiLITY MATRIX 
The Activity and Responsibility Matrix for the current system in Brazil shows that there 
is some overlap in activities and a lack of communication and relationship between some 
of the bodies involved. The Local Authority is the concessionaire of the service, but does 
not participate in decisions on investment made by the state owned company. Action 
regarding sanitation for the poor areas is dissociated from the global solution employed 
by the state owned company. On the other hand, Embasa, responsible for the services, 
does not have autonomy for setting the tariff or deciding investment. 
4.7 MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE SYSTEM 
This section points out the main problems faced by watsan in Brazil, more specifically in 
Bahia state and Salvador city, as an introduction to the next section, where the trends 
towards solving the constraints are stated. 
Currently, the main problems could be summarised as: 
lack of policy and consequent lack of institutional and financial framework in the 
sector, together with the lack of financing and clear rules; 
division of responsibility among the different levels of government 
The gap left by Planasa has not been filled. After a long period of decisions by the central 
government, when the companies were responsible for the executive part of the policy, 
the states became responsible for the whole system, but without following a plan or a 
stated policy. As a director of Embasa said, the state has been investing in the sector just 
as a response to localised pressures, without following any plan. 
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Some of the key problems which need to be addressed in any new policy are: 
institutional issues; 
lack of regulation, with clear definition of roles and responsibilities of each level of 
government required; 
lack of clear financing and investment instruments ; 
financial situation of regional companies and the debt of the public sector; 
deficit of population served, mainly regarding sewerage and the consequent 
necessity to universalise the service; 
setting of the tariff; 
definition of adequate and appropriate technology; 
community and municipal participation. 
The eternal dilemma faced by the authorities in high urbanised low income countries is to 
try to balance the contradictions between the different demands from high income and 
low income householders in the same geographical area where the service must be 
provided for different markets with different expectations and willingness to pay 
(Carteado, 1993). 
4.8 DISCUSSION 
Because of the lack of policy for urban watsan, there has been a discussion within the 
sector about new arrangements for the services in the country. This section discusses 
some of these trends and analyses possible suitable approaches for Bahia. Alternatives 
vary from decentralisation, with operation of local authorities, to placing shares of the 
state owned companies on the stock market for financing the sector; from compulsory 
loans to community decisions and participation on the level of services to be provided. 
Flexibility seems to be the key word in the new trend, in order to accommodate so many 
different situations in the country regarding differences in household incomes and among 
regions. 
These differences, together with the necessity to universalise the service, independent of 
the level of income, makes the idea of having just one strict institutional and financing 
framework for the sector very difficult. 
After a centralised masterplan, where decisions were taken in the capital city of the 
country, and states and municipalities were only executives, these lower levels of 
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government are willing to play a more important role, as they see themselves as being 
closest to the citizen/customer and consequently more able to understand his/her 
situation and more likely to be more sensitive to community participation and local 
solutions. 
Those who support decentralisation see the national and regional governments defining 
the general policy and the local government, which is legally the concessionaire, finding 
their own particular solution for running the service, either through a 'regie' or through 
a delegated management. 
The flexibility in the institutional framework should allow the different levels of 
government (local, regional, central) to have freedom to discuss and decide with the 
actors involved, including customers, potential customers and the private sector, the 
most suitable level of service and alternative of financing. 
A variant of this alternative is the one within which the distribution of capital sources 
takes place at the regional level, the states, for the bulk part of operation, catchment and 
treatment plants, being the local authority responsible for the distribution network. The 
role of central government would be to define the general rules and to regulate the parts 
of the systems which require a general view in a supra state basis, such as river basins 
and discharges. 
Some of the professionals in the sector still support the idea that part of financing should 
be through the treasury, as a grant. It would be used to guarantee the universality of the 
services, but one important trend is that there is no condition for financing the sector 
through tax policy only. The debt of the public sector and the financial situation of the 
country does not allow it. Thus, it seems the trend will lead to financing through a 
mixture of public funds and credits, and a tariff which allows the recovery of operation, 
maintenance, and part of the investment costs. The new thing in this case would be the 
exposure of the society to the two very different markets with different expectations 
about the level of services. 
Regarding the setting of tariffs, the trend seems to be a balance between a market based 
and a social based approach, tariffs recovering operation and maintenance costs. 
Nevertheless, cross subsidies in this sense, did not solve the problem of the poor. As 
stated by Carteado and Franceys (1994), in many cases, industry ends up paying more by 
constructing its own facilities to ensure a reliable supply, and the poor continue to 
receive a very low level service, sometimes even paying more to water vendors. 
Also, the system leads to discrimination in delivery of the services, between poor and 
rich households. Jacobi (1989) studied the difficulties faced by low income households in 
poor areas of Sao Paulo city in order to get water connections. Carteado (1993), 
quantified the number of complaints made by customers because of the lack of water in 
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high income and low income areas of Salvador, Bahia, from 1976 to 1986, which 
demonstrated the discrimination. 
A beneficiary of a highly subsidised system is the middle class, which gets high standard 
service at low price. As is shown in table 4.8 below, the tariff charged by Embasa does 
not cover their operation and maintenance costs. 
Table 4.8 EMBASA- COST AND TARIFF OF SERVICES- SUMMARY 
1991 1992 1993 
cost of water (US$/ m3) 0.58 0.73 n.a 
average wmcr Ulriff (US$/ m3) 0.43 0.39 0.40 
Suurc.:c: Cahc.~ XVII, IW4; Emhas11, 1994c 
The problem of the provision of services for the poor can be assessed in different ways. 
The customer must pay for the service, according to his or her capability and willingness 
to pay. If the government is to subsidise part of the tariff, it must be done in a clear way, 
as the subsidies and social tariffs cannot be used as an excuse to cover low efficiency and 
political abuse of the system. Moreover, its destiny and its effect over the level of 
government must be clearly revealed. 
Comparative competitiveness among the state owned companies has been thought of as. a 
tool to increase efficiency and improve managerial approach, together with the use of 
compulsory loans, managed by the central government and by the federal states, for 
financing bigger projects. 
Many of the proposed alternatives imply private sector involvement: 
One of these is the possibility to solve problems related to lack of capital investment by 
putting shares of the companies on the stock market. It is seen as a tool for getting 
private capital to finance the investment for upgrading infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, as a prior condition, it would be necessary to balance the deficits of the 
companies, writing off debts and balancing their situation related to number of 
employees, inefficient management, etc. 
One other alternative, that has already been passed in the national parliament, leads to 
regulations by which the private sector could be involved in the provision of public 
services, establishing a revenue pattern. 
The traditional form of private sector participation in the sector that has already been 
enforced is through contntcting out services, where the state owned company contracts 
private companies for specific tasks such as meter reading and bills collection, operation 
of treatment plants, besides contracts for projects, constructions and consultancy or for 
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temporary work. It is not common in the country to use the private sector for operating 
watsan services through leasing or concession contracts. As mentioned earlier in chapter 
I, the first concession contract was signed in April, 1995. 
Concession and management contracts have been seen as an option to get private capital 
to fmance the sector, as long as the state remains in its role as finally responsible for the 
provision of the services. The participation of the private sector could be in the existing 
physical system or exploring the margins of the services, for future investments, in BOO 
or BOT schemes or taking over concessions from municipalities. 
Similar to some of the previous major changes in the institutional framework, the 
influence of international donors may be about to play a key role in the defmition of the 
next profile of managing watsan in Brazil. Water supply and sanitation have been 
responsible for a great amount of the Inter American Bank and the World Bank 
expenditure in the country in the period 1986-1993 (Dain and Lima Verde, 1993). 
The influence of these organisations can be detected in the current . concern about 
liberalisation of the economy and the market, a more market based approach for the 
sector, etc. 
It is known that the current approach in these international organisms tends to encourage 
the implementation of tools to increase the level of efficiency in the companies and more 
private sector involvement. In Bahia, Embasa is one of the three regional state owned 
companies in the country selected for receiving fmance from the World Bank, in a 
programme for modernisation of the sanitation sector, including institutional 
development aiming to increase efficiency, profitability and competitiveness within the 
companies in order to receive international grants and funds from the central 
government. 
This means, to some extent, an approach close to the one used in England and Wales, 
seeking comparative competitiveness among the private companies. 
The alternatives discussed, apart from the ones supported by the employees' unions, 
directly or indirectly, lead to a bigger private sector participation in the provision, 
financing and operation of water and sanitation services. 
An issue in the country is that due to the culture and to recent experiences, Brazilian 
society has a suspicious attitude towards private companies. The involvement of the 
biggest contractors in the country in corruption made society distrust, to some extent, 
the private sector. It becomes a constraint, because for the amount of investment 
involved in some actions involving water and sanitation, only big companies, national or 
international, are able to make long term investments with a long term rate of return. 
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As one of the interviewees said, it is necessary to see a Brazilian entrepreneur putting his 
money at risk. Their common attitude (the entrepreneurs) is to recover their money as 
soon as possible, especially if it is from the Government. 
Brazilian entrepreneurs are not risk takers. And it is one of the main constraints against 
more private involvement in operation and maintenance in Brazil. 
Since the service has a strong social impact, it is possible that public authorities will tend 
to take action to back short term electoral interests that could restrict investment. 
The investigation on Brazilian and Bahian watsan services confirmed that the major 
problems in the systems are institutional, mainly due to the negative managerial 
characteristics typical to public bodies cited in Chapter I. In addition, for the specific case 
of Bahia state, the lack of any defined policy that permits allocation of resources and 
defmed rules for managing the services since 1990, contributed to a process of 
deterioration in the services, followed by a large expenditure made by the state 
Government in rehabilitation and construction of new systems, that did not necessarily 
achieve the highest cost benefit level. According to the hypothesis of this thesis, a higher 
level of private sector involvement will lead to a better managerial approach to solve the 
current problems of the service. 
4.9 SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS- BRAZIL, BAHIA 
• National Policy Environment 
Brazil has a stabilised federal representative democracy. On the other hand, the country 
has an unstable economy with a high rate of inflation. It has experimented with many 
different economic programmes in order to stabilise inflation, and since 1986 it has had 
· six different currencies. (4·2cruzeiro, cruzado, cruzado novo, cruzeiro, cruzeiro real, and 
the current one, real). Although rated as the eighth economy in the world, the large gap 
between rich and poor (shown in table 4.9 Political and Economic Indicators- Brazil) 
represents a big social problem. 
The economic pattern of Bahia follows that of the entire country, with industrialised rich 
areas surrounded by poverty in the big urban agglomerations and in small cities, where 
the main economic activity is traditional agriculture. Many of these small cities are 
located in semi-arid areas with frequent occurrence of draughts. 
4
·
2 The average annual rate of inflation (1980-1992) was 370%, according to the World Development 
Report, 1994 (WDR,1994). 
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Table 4.9 Political and Economic Indicators - Brazil 
Population (million) 
Total 
Urban 
Urban (as a % of Total) 
In urban agglomeration of one million or more (as a % of) 
Urban 
Total 
Average annual growth rate 
Access to (in urban areas as a % of total population) 
Safe drinking water* 
Sanitation* 
Household income 
Share of top 20% of households 
Share of bottom 40% of households 
Share of bottom 20% of households 
GNP per capita (US$) 
Total 
Upper medium income group 
High income group 
Energy consumption per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 
Total 
Upper middle income group 
High income group 
Source: World Development Report (WDR), 1994 
(*) Cabes XVII, 1994 
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YEAR 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1980-92 
1989 
1989 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
!992 
!992 
1992 
watsan in Salvador/Bahia/Brazil 
153.9 
118.5 
77 
51 
38 
3.3 
86 
31 
67.5 
4.9 
2.1 
2,770 
3,870 
21,960 
681 
1,649 
5,101 
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• Legislation and Organisational Autonomy 
Urban water and sanitation services in Brazil are provided by municipalities or by state 
owned companies, although responsibility for the service in urban areas lies at the 
central, regional and municipal level, which seems to be dubious. Nevertheless, it is the 
Municipality which has the right to run the service, under direct management or through 
concession. 
In practice, due to the former master plan for the sector, (Planasa), in most of the urban 
areas, mainly in the North East where Bahia is located, the service is run by regional 
state owned companies (see table 4.10 and section 4.4) 
Table 4.10 BAHIA- PROVISION OF WATER AND SANITATION 
Population served 
Water supply 
Sanitation 
Source: Cabes XVII, 1994 
Note: Data refers to 1992 
Total 
5,284,384 
603,000 
State owned company 
4,558,384 (86.3%) 
603,000 (100%) 
Municipalities and others 
726,000 (13.7%) 
0(0%) 
The current legislation (1988) also states that the country, the state and some 
municipalities (depends on the local legislation ) shall set up a specific policy for the 
watsan sector, although they have not been set yet neither for Bahia, nor for Salvador, 
the state capital. 
There is no competition in the system, which is considered to be centralised, as decisions 
are taken by the company and the Secretary of State without the participation of the 
local authorities (the delegating commune). 
The regional state owned company is supposed to be quite autonomous, (one principle 
of the former national sector policy was self-sustainability), but in fact it is not, as there is 
considerable political interference in its management. Approval of tariffs, salary policies, 
hiring of personnel and investments are decided by the Secretary of State for Water 
Sanitation and Housing, with the approval of the elected state Governor. 
As there is no sector policy, decisions are generally taken in accordance with short term 
political interests. 
The revenue collected from customers is forwarded to the general state budget, through 
the treasury, while the assets belong to the company. 
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• Long Range Demand and Technological Requirements 
Due to the rate of population growth and the high population in urban areas in Bahia, the 
necessity for infrastructure, especially water and sanitation services, is increasing. 
On water supply, although the figures which represent the access to safe drinking water 
are not very low (see table 4.2), it is necessary to analyse the level of actual access to 
water, as it was noticed that in some cases the neighbourhood or a specific area has the 
network, the pipes, but not the water, as reponed by Lobo (1993) and Moraes (1994). 
(see box 4.1) 
Box 4.1 
Concerning the water service in Bahia 
" .. .it was noticed in a research that in many poor neighbourhoods, there is no 
regularity in provision of water ... Many communities in Salvador have water three or 
four times per week, during four or five hours ... One of the consequences is a drop in 
the quality of the water due to the intermittence of provision ... 
The leaders of the communities are used to saying that they want "water in the pipes, 
not only pipes in the street" ... (Moraes, 1994) 
Concerning the service in Brazil 
" ... in 1990, almost 20 million people in urban areas did not have the water 
connections .. .It is necessary to deliver water to these people, let alone the ones who 
are supplied almost only for statistical purposes. It is necessary to provide the service 
"with water, not with pipes" ... (Lobo, 1993, p.6). 
As regards sanitation, the figures show a relatively low level of provision. It seems to get 
worse especially as pan of the raw sewage collected returns to water flows. 
Thus, the wide range of physical and social environments in the state demand snitable 
selection of appropriate technology that will meet each necessity. Technology can be 
provided by the national industry and by the technical personnel in the sector. 
• Organisational Culture 
There are some beliefs and attitudes that are normally accepted throughout the system 
that could be seen as pan of the organisational culture of the sector. There seems to be a 
general trend in designing and planning general solutions for water supply and sewerage 
systems, which demand a high degree of capital investment There is also a common 
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attitude to information in the sector. The company can provide different figures for the 
same indicatorS. 
Information in the company does not seem to be available for all those who require it, 
although it is a public body. 
• Commercial Orientation 
The system in Bahia has a low level of commercial orientation. The state owned 
company, although supposed to work in a commercial oriented approach, does not, 
neither at policy level nor at operational level. 
The data in table 4.5 shows the gap between operational costs and revenues. Political 
interference regarding level of tariff and policy for in debt customers and illegal 
connections contributes to poor performance of the company collection efficiency, level 
of unaccounted for water, etc .. Box 4.2 cites an example of this. 
Box 4.2 
About commercial and consumer orientation 
A low income household with seven people at home in a poor neighbourhood had a 
metered water connection. The head of the household made a complaint to the water 
company, as his bills were showing a consumption of 92m3/ month to 100m3/ month. 
He complained for three months without any response. As the bills were not paid, the 
company disconnected the supply. Further, the customer gave up complaining to the 
company and made an illegal connection, obtaining his water at zero cost. .... (Moraes, 
1994) 
• Consumer Orientation 
The system in Bahia has a low level of consumer orientation. Although there are, in its 
organisational chart, hot lines and departments to facilitate interaction between 
consumers and the company, in fact, many of those bodies do not work. Staff are not 
completely aware about their role in the community. They just do things as part of their 
duties, without thinking of the population as their customers. The company does not 
have a good public image and the media frequently report complaints about the time 
taken to solve leak problems, the quantity of mistakes with billing and the time taken to 
deliver requested services, such as new connections. 
Very often, consumer's requests are dealt with through personal relations. In cities where 
the municipality runs the service, about water are dealt with in a personal way, using 
personal influence. 
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Box 4.3 shows some views on customer's service. 
Box 4.3 
About customers' service 
The quality of the service (concerning time for recovering leakage, reply to 
complaints, etc.) depends on the area income ... (Bastos, 1994) 
... recently, the company asked the customers to show their receipts from two years 
ago, otherwise they would be disconnected .... All because of a mistake in the billing 
system. (Villas Boas, 1994) 
... the relationship between the company and its customers is poor. Customers need to 
know their rights and duties. (Lessa, 1994) 
... the average time for a connection to be made is three months (Vianna, 1994) 
4.10 THE BRITISH, THE FRENCH AND THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEMS- BRIEF 
COMPARISON 
This section compares and analysis some data on the three studied systems. An Activity 
Responsibility Matrix (fig. 4.2), shows the share of responsibilities for tasks among the 
bodies involved in the provision of watsan services in each country. For France, though 
there is a variety of existing arrangements, the 'Affermage' contract was chosen to 
represent the system as previously cited, it is the main type of contract for providing 
services nowadays. Comparisons are also made through some quantitative (objective) 
indicators of the three systems, despite the stated difficulty in finding compatible and 
comparable data for the three countries. Some data are related to the countries, whereas 
other are related to the provider company. They are displayed on tables 4.12; 4.13; 4.14; 
and a summary of some political and economic indicators are in table 4.11. For England 
and Wales, when information refers to the companies, it is data from Thames Water 
Services Limited (Thames), and Wessex Water Services Limited (Wessex). Both of them 
are water and sewerage private companies. Thames is the largest company in population 
served, both for water and sanitation, and Wessex is the smallest for the same indicators. 
In France, wherever possible, data refers to Compagnie Generale des Eaux (Generale) 
and Societe Lyonnaise des Eaux (Lyonnaise) which are the biggest French companies in 
the service (see chapter Ill). Concerning Brazil, data is provided for the country as a 
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TABLE 4.11 Political and Economic Indicators- Summary 
- Year UK France Brazil 
·----- - ---- --- -
Population (mill ion ) 
Total 1992 57.8 
Urban 1992 .51.4 
Urban (as% of totaiJ 1992 89 
ln urban agglomeration ol 
one million or more. As~ of 
Urban 1992 26 
Total 1992 23 
A v~rage annual growth rate (%) 1980/ 1992 0.3 
Household income (% of in~.:ome) 
Share or top 20~ of bou ehold~ 1989 44.3 
Share or bottom 40% of hou. ehold 1989 lO 
Share of bottom 20~ or hou ehold~ 1989 4.6 
Acce ... ~ to (in urban areas as a ~ or tota l population) 
Safe drjnking water 1990 100 
Sanitation 1990 lOO 
GNP per capita (USS) 1992 17,790 
Energy consumption per capiTa (kg of 198711992 3,74.' 
oil cquivaJent 
our ce: World Oev.elopmem R.eport WDR, ( 1994) 
(*) Cab.es XVI. 199 J 
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TABLE 4.12 
lndkt• 
lPopulall<>n 'crwd (wnl~r ~upply) 
(1.000 11~1 ) 
~.Emplll)'t't: • (mnnbcr) 
5.Populotion ~erved/,•mployc.· (inh/cmp) 
10.1\ \'eragc Annual TanllfGNP ('P·). 
II .Profllflo,,.;c, ( I IS$ milloon)d 
13.Profu t~r employee (liS$it:1llp) 
y, ... .~,. 
Note: ee notes and ources on next page 
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TABLE 4.12(cont. ) The British, French and Brazilian Systems- Some Objective Indica to rs 
SOURCE: 
1.l; 1.2 
1.3 
3. 1 
3.2 
:1.3 
4.1; 4.2 
u 
''·'; 6.2 
fi.3 
7.1; 1.2 
7.3 
X. I ; 8.2; X.3 
9 
MOeller & Scheele (1993): 
Cabcs XVII (1994): 
or-w AT ( t993b): 
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumct (1994); 
Cabcs XVII (1994) and Emhau (1994b); 
r=inancial Times Newslcner (9.2.1994): and Lyonnaisc des Eaux-Dumc7. (1994); 
Cabcs XVII (1994); 
:-IUS, in European Water Pollution Control (1992), v.2, n.3, p.4 . 1, quoted hy Mucllcr & Schcclc (1993): 
Cubes XVII (1994) and Embasa (1994b); 
1\US, in European Wa ter Pollution Control (1992), v.2, n.3, p.4 . I, quoted hy Mueller & Scheelc ( 1993); 
Embasa, (1994c); 
WDR (1994h), Sociull ndicators of Development. 
The Average Annual Tariff was Calculated in the following way: 
,\veragc 1\nru••l Tariff (AAT)= Total Annual volume (TA V) per household (m3/year) • Avcntge Tariff (£/m3) 
TA V= per capita eonsump1ion • 365• aver11ge household siu 
per capita consumption I 57 led (according to OF\V AT (1993b), Facts and Figures) 
I 1.1; 11.2 
11.3 
14.1; 14.2 
14.3 
NOTES: 
Financial Times Newsletter, (9.2.1994); 
Embasa (1994c); 
Lorrain, Dominique (1994b). For further information on calculation sec appendix 4-3; 
Embasa (1994 b). 
a Data refers to the country, the stat.e or to Embasa, due to unavailab11ity of data; 
b Prices are based on a model supply for a conswner using IO,OOOm /year, 
c There was a decrease in tariffs; 
d Figures in brackets have a negative value. 
--\Q 
Table 4.13 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF T HE BRITISH WATER COMPANIES 
AND L YONNAISE DES EAUX 
Ouerating Profit 
Company Operating revenue Operating Profit Operating revenue 
(£Million) (£Million) (%) 
Year 90/91 91/92 92/93 90/91 91192 92/93 90/91 91/92 92/93 
Thames 835 899 1,040 190 134 248 22.7 26.0 23.8 
Severn 627 822 905 194 259 292 30.9 3.5 32.3 
North West 599 789 878 219 276 324 36.6 35.0 36.9 
Anglian 46 1 523 583 170 199 212 36.9 38.0 36.4 
Yorkshire 389 441 482 111 t34 155 28.5 30.4 32.1 
Welsh 293 342 382 139 176 J 81 47.4 51.5 47.4 
Southern 251 291 319 90 106 L 19 35.8 36.4 37.3 
Wessex 167 191 206 58 68 81 34.7 35.6 39.3 
Northumbrian 167 203 252 34 55 73 20.3 27.1 28.9 
South West 144 167 194 51 65 83 35.7 38.9 42.8 
Sources: Nat We t Securitjcs; Financial Times, Performance Reports quoted in Lorrain, (1994b) 
Method{ q uoted in Lorra in, op.cit): We have compared the operating profits, which correspond to water activity, and 
not the pre-tax profits, used by in vestors as a performance indicator, as they incorporate movements of funds coming from 
sub idiaries, which would include activities otJ1er tJ1an water upply and sewerage which are not regulated and of which 
tbe extent varies widely between the French company and its English counterparts. 
Note: F igures related to Lyonnajse des Eaux, originally in French Francs, were convened into sterling for each year 
according to ilic average exchange rates in table 7.1A (Average rates against sterling) , in Financial Statistics (1994). 
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Table 4.14 
England and Wales:! 
Lomhm 
Bdsto1 
Manchester 
~ewcastle Upon Tyne 
Card it I 
watsan in Sa lvador/Dah ia/D razil 
ANNUAL WATER CHARGES PER 
HOUSEHOLD IN SOME CITIES (in ECU)1 
ECU 
136 
189 
199 
210 
26 J 
BRAZJL3 ECU 
Source: Achtienribbe, G. (1992), p. 361, quoted by Mueller & Scheele (1 993); Cabe XVII (1994); 
Emba a(1994b) 
Charge~ are for a family of two adult and two children living in a house and consuming 200 
m3/year. 
2 Data refer to metered connection~. 
3 Data refer to charge of tlle state owned company of eacb state. 
Charge were calculated taking tlle average tariff (US$/m3 in 1992 taken from Cabe XVII 
converted into ECU according to table 7.1A (Average rate against terling) in financial 
Statistics (1994), for tlle year 1992. 
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whole, together with some in formation on Bahia state and for Embasa, the company 
which supplies about 86% of the population served in the state, (Cabes XVII, 1994). 
Responsible Organisations 
The highly decentralised approach for water and sanitation services in France can be seen 
through the quantity of water organisations in the country (15,000). Regarding Babia, 
although having as an average, the figure of two organisations for each million people, it 
does not mean a decentralised approach within the sector, as Embasa is responsible for 
the vast majority of population served and the nine remaining organisations supply only 
about 730,000 inhabitants. 
Employees 
The huge French companies have a much greater number of employees than any other 
analysed. This is mainly due to their internationalisation process and the diversity of 
urban services and engineering business they are involved in, discussed under heading 
3.5. Nevertheless, data provided from Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez on the number of 
employees actually working in the watsan sector in France permits the assessment of its 
efficiency when relating population served to number of employees, as compared to the 
same indicator for Brazil and for Embasa, which represents half of the figure. The 
analysis of the figures for the 
British companies, considered low, must take into consideration that the number of 
employees includes those working in the non core business of the companies. 
Thames Water has diversified its activities into building overseas water plants and waste 
management, and Wessex Water has been working in waste management business (The 
Sunday Times, 15.5. 1994). Although the non core and overseas business does not 
represent the same for the British companies as they do for the French ones, it is likely 
that the indicator was highly affected by the number of employees in other areas within 
the British companies. 
Tariffs 
Analysis of indices number 6 to!O on table 4.12, and tables 4.13 and 4.14 shows the gap 
between prices in Brazil and Europe. In Brazil only Sao Paulo state, the richest and most 
industrialised in the country, has a similar tariff to Europe. Nevertheless, the percentage 
of GNP expended in the provision of watsan service in Brazil is about four times that in 
Europe. This indice is more important when related to the pattern of income distribution 
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(see table 4.11, which shows that the bottom 40% of the households share around 5% of 
the income in the country). 
In Europe, the average price in France is higher than that in England. Nevertheless, due 
to the value of GNP per capita in France, (about 25% higher than in England), the 
percentage of GNP used in the provision of watsan services is lower than that in England 
and Wales. 
Profit 
In Europe, the big French companies show actual profits higher than those of the British 
companies, while the Bahian state owned company shows a loss of US$302million. 
However, when the figures related to the European countries are analysed against the 
number of employees or population served, the British companies demonstrate greater 
profitatbility than the French ones. A big issue in England is the high level of profitability 
of the private providers. Tilis level of profitability is also due to the concentration of 
geographical area and the centralised management within which the British operate, 
while the French companies work in a more scattered area and deal with each of the 
Municipalities or Syndicate des Communes. 
Concerning financial performance in watsan, the negative figures shown by Embasa are 
remarkable, when compared to the private companies. Tilis financial situation, already 
analysed in this chapter, supports the findings of Haarmeyer (1994) and Ingram and 
Kessides ( 1994 ), on the position of public bodies that do not face the possibility of 
bankruptcy, and where irresponsiveness, mismanagement and lack of autonomy is made 
up for by subsidies and writting off of debts. 
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CHAPTER V 
A PROPOSAL FOR MANAGING URBAN WATER 
AND SANITATION SERVICES IN BAHIA, BRAZIL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Proposal 
This chapter describes a proposal for an institutional arrangement for urban water and 
sanitation services in Bahia, Brazil, with a higher private sector participation. 
The general objective of the proposal is to promote the provision of drinking water and 
collection and treatment of waste water at the lowest cost with reliability and long term 
sustainability; with an increasing improvement in the rate of population served, and in the 
quality of the service offered. 
The aim of the proposal is for the service to achieve a high level of performance with 
better service to the customers at lower cost, according to the pattern in the "Qualitative 
Analysis of sector" used for assessing the English and Welsh and French systems; and 
current approaches for urban watsan services in Bahia, Brazil. 
It is based on the findings of investigation carried out in the European countries adapted 
to Brazilian situation and managerial culture. 
The proposal considers different issues, organisational autonomy, commercial 
orientation, consumer orientation and market based management 
Some aspects have been prioritised among the variety of issues dealt with in these 
suggestions for managing the service. The key issues addressed in the proposal are a 
consequence of the literature review and the field research, with special attention given 
to the problems which arose during the interviews in Bahia, when influential people in 
the sector pointed out some of the key constraints which prevent the sector from 
achieving a higher level of efficiency and effectiveness. They are related to the autonomy 
of the organisations involved in to the provision of services, to strategic choices 
regarding decentralisation, and to commercialisation. 
The proposal attempts to solve the prioritised problems in the watsan sector, which were 
assessed in chapter IV, taking into consideration the characteristics of the state. 
The chapter is organised in the following way: 
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Firstly, the main problems in the system are stated, together with the priorities chosen for 
solution in the new arrangement; 
Secondly, the principles of the proposal are stated and discussed; 
Thirdly, the proposed arrangements for solving the problems are briefly outlined. 
Then, the proposal itself is described, initially through the description of duties of the 
formal bodies involved in the provision of services, and then through the characteristics 
of and solutions given to issues, such as setting of tariff, regulation, etc. in each of the 
different institutional arrangements proposed for the state. 
Afterwards, the Activity and Responsibility matrix of the institutional arrangements is 
shown. 
In a further section some of the key issues in the proposal are discussed. 
Some current conditions that facilitate or adversely affect the implementation of the 
proposal are then described. 
Later, a strategy for implementing the proposal is briefly discussed. 
Finally, the strong and weak points of the proposal are assessed. 
5.2 THE PRIORITISED PROBLEMS· OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES 
The main general problems in the system are those defmed under heading 4.7. As can be 
seen, the problems are related to the lack of institutional arrangement in the sector, 
ratifying the findings of the research confirmed throughout this thesis. 
Of the number of problems faced by the urban watsan sector in Bahia, many are caused 
by the lack of policy in the sector, and some have been prioritised for treatment in this 
proposal. 
For the system as a whole, the major elected problems are: 
lack of autonomy of the state owned water company; 
the company's inefficiency regarding financial management; in delivering the 
service to a reliable standard; 
lack of investment in operation and maintenance; 
high level of unaccounted for water. 
As has been shown in the last chapter, there are different, well-defined, problems in the 
big and in the small cities. That is the reason why the proposal offers an alternative for 
management of the sector: the first method is supposed to be more effective in cities 
where the service is more likely to be profitable. 
It would apply in big cities and in major economic centres in the state where the main 
problems are not related to the quantity of water produced. The second approach should 
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be more suitable for small cities with low income where the service is less likely to reach 
self sustainability. 
The specific issues elected to be solved first are: 
In the most populated cities (more than 100,000 inhabitants) and economic centres: 
quality of water delivered; 
quantity andregularity in water delivered, mainly for low income areas; 
high level of unaccounted for water; 
Jack of customer orientation; 
lack of market-based orientation; 
high number of population without sanitation services. 
In the small cities, with low income and/or located in the semi-arid area, the elected 
problems to be solved are related to: 
high number of unattended (unsupplied) population related to the necessary quantity 
and quality of water for health purposes; 
high number of unattended (unsupplied) population regarding sanitation services; 
quality of water delivered. 
5.3 PRINCIPLES OF THE PROPOSAL 
The investigation carried out on both European highly privatised systems provided some 
answers to the issues outstanding in Bahia. Results of analysis of the British and French 
systems suggests that both of them have useful characteristics that can be adapted and 
used in Bahia state in order to solve the institutional problems of the system. It is these 
institutional problems which are regarded in this thesis as the main constraints on the 
present system. It is for the solution of these problems that an extension of private 
sector involvement is sought, in the belief that it will produce improvement of 
effectiveness if investment, efficiency of service, and of those characteristics typical of 
successful organisations in the watsan sector. 
One of these characteristics is flexibility related to the type of management and to the use 
of subsidies. This attribute, taken from the French system, became the main principle of 
this proposal, as it permits accommodation of the different situations existing in Bahia 
state related to the economic situation, to the size of cities, to their location, the climate, 
etc .. 
The flexibility in type of management- This is defined in two levels: the first is related 
to the systems currently managed by the municipalities. In these cases, the community 
could choose between direct management or a delegated management, involving the 
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private sector in the provision of the service. A community could also decide to give the 
concession of the service to the regional government 
In the latter case, the regional Government would take over responsibility for the service 
and would delegate it according to one of the main management systems defmed in this 
proposal, both with private sector participation, depending on the defmed criteria, which 
will be detailed later. 
The second level is related to the systems in which the regional Government already 
holds the concession and the service is run by the state owned company- Embasa. 
In these cases, in which are included most of the urban centres and 82% of the urban 
population in the state (Cabes XVII, 1994), the management of urban water and 
sanitation services could take two different approaches. This scenario is the main 
concern of this proposal. The approaches are: A-Management Contract with profit 
sharing, (Regie /nteressee) to be used in the major cities, whereas approach B-
Management Contract (Gerance) is to be used in the other cities. Figure 5.1 shows the 
structure of the system. 
The management contract envisaged in this proposal is very much similar to the pattern 
defmed by Coyaud (1988), comprising the characteristics cited in chapter Ill. As 
opposed to affermage and concession contracts, under management contracts the private 
operator carries little commercial risk. Management contracts can give complete 
responsibility for carrying on operation and maintenance activities to the private operator 
and are convenient for both public authorities and private operators to assess the system 
as a whole before making a more comprehensive commitment such as in an affermage or 
concession contract. 
Compensation for the private company is generally linked to a physical output such as 
volume of water delivered and collected for, so that the operator is encouraged to 
operate efficiently, but it without commercial risks. 
The main difference between the two proposed approaches is in the level of risk taken by 
the private company. In system A, the private company shares the commercial risk with 
Public Authorities, while in system B, the private company has little · financial 
commitment and therefore takes little risk. 
In major cities, the private companies have more opportunity for higher profits, so it is 
worth taking bigger risks. 
In management contracts, in smaller cities, the level of uncertainty for a private company 
to make profit is very high. This means that contractors would not price services at a 
lower level. To make up for the risks involved, they would charge a very high price for 
their services. Thus, in these cases it is more efficient for the Government to carry the 
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risks of the service, without having the day to day problems related to operation and 
maintenance. 
The use of subsidies- Although against the use of subsidies in principle, the proposal 
seeks the possibility of utilisation of this tool in specific cases, provided that it is applied 
according to a defined criteria in an appropriate situation, with defmition of level of use, 
the budgets, the amount and the purpose. 
This key feature in a model becomes eve'! more important in a country like Brazil and a 
state like Bahia, with such income distribution profiles (see chapter IV and table 4.9) and 
with a growing demand for services in urban areas. Further details on the rules of the use 
of subsidies in this proposal are discussed later under subheading 5.5.3. Nevertheless, the 
broad utilisation of subsidies is not encouraged in this proposal. Such use generally 
produces a negative social effect. It becomes a subsidy to the service, provided for the 
high and medium income domestic consumers with household connections, since the 
poor, having an unreliable, if any, service, continue to use water vendors or water from 
unsafe sources (Franceys, 1993a; Saunier, 1991). 
It is important not to confuse social objectives with the cost effective provision of 
services, as in practice, subsidies can distort the efficient allocation of resources; 
5.4 THE SOLUTION OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS 
For the main cities: 
Most of the problems faced by the system in the bigger cities are related to inefficiency in 
managerial skills. The centralisation in management, with one single company and 
general directives for the whole state, including the same tariff, are constraints againt the 
achievement of higher performance standards. 
Autonomy, flexibility and agility seem to be essential for these areas.· 
The necessary investment is in operation and maintenance rather than in capital 
investment, as the quantity of water already produced is sufficient. Investment for 
upgrading the system should be aimed at the issues related to the network, monitoring of 
physical and commercial losses and in training for customer orientation, with special 
attention to the provision of a quality service and the lifeline quantity of water necessary 
for health purposes, for the poor urban population, according to the their willingness to 
pay. 
The unfulfilled demand must enter into the system, again with a level of service 
compatible with the willingness to pay, respecting the minimum quantity of water 
necessary for health purposes within a market based approach. 
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A greater private sector involvement will help in improving the quality of service through 
gains in productivity and flexibility. 
On the other hand, it was reported in the interviews that experience in the state owned 
company has demonstrated that many of the operation and maintenance tasks reach 
higher productivity when conducted by private companies under services which are 
contracted out. This method is often used when it is necessary to improve productivity in 
a specific task such as meter reading, billing collection or leakage controlling. This 
procedure was also suggested by one of the former Embasa directors interviewed. 
The private sector will be used for increasing the level of service to the customers, 
therefore emphasising the market based approach of the system, through an increase in 
productivity. 
For small cities 
The market based system is again a principle in these cases, but now with a different 
approach. Communities need to be listened to decide which level of service they want 
and are willing to pay for. Even in urban areas, technology could provide alternatives for 
the citizens according to their ability to pay. 
The main concern in these cities is the unattended demand. Thus, investment in 
appropriate technology for water and sanitation is necessary. In these areas, priority in 
investment will be in providing water, with a physical network where necessary, to the 
population, together with a snitable solution for sewage, using either individual or 
condominia! sewerage systems. 
Due to the low levels of income in the cities and the likely difficulties in reaching water 
sources in the semi arid regions, subsidies are likely to be necessary in these areas, to 
guarantee an affordable service for everybody, to keep them above the lifeline level 
watsan. 
In the majority of cases the main issues coincide with those described by the literature 
concerning low income and peri urban areas. 
5.5 DESCRIPI'ION OF THE PROPOSAL 
The proposal offers some difference in the institutional arrangements for different 
situations. Some of the features are for the whole state, whereas there are different 
solutions for the different situations within the state. 
Thus, for some activities, the description stresses different ways of dealing with them in 
the capital city and main cities in the state; as opposed to small cities. 
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To solve the prioritised problems the proposal suggests a management contract with 
profit sharing, (regie interessee) as a preparation for a possible leasing (Affermage) 
contract in the medium term for the main cities and a management contract (Gerance) 
for the other cities in the state. 
The description of the proposal is given in two parts: Firstly, the system is explained 
through the formal bodies involved in the provision of the service and their main duties; 
then, both alternatives for managing the watsan services are detailed. 
The regional Government sits on the top of the structure and is formed by the governor, 
the secretaries of state and the legislature. 
It is a duty of the legislature to approve laws, providing the legal framework required for 
different forms of private sector participation, according to the ·limits defmed in the 
National Constitution. The importance of having a consistent legislation. for the sector 
can be seen in Franceys, (1993b) and Burchi (1991). 
An Administrative and Technical Department (A TD) is required, placed in the 
Secretariat of State for Water Resources, Sanitation and Housing, having the duty of 
overseeing the administrative and technical aspects of the contracts including monitoring 
the operating accounts. It should work following rules established in the legislation and 
in the contracts. 
The proposal suggests that a Fund should be set up for use in the sector. The sources of 
the fund should be defined by law, and could be similar to those in the previous policy. 
As a starting point, the fund could be formed by: 
0.34% of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) which has been the average 
expenditure in the service in the last 22 years (Bahia, 1994, p.15); 
that part of the profit sharing due to go back to the public authorities; 
the component of the tariff related to capital costs. 
In establishing the fund, the regional legislature should also regulate its use, mainly as 
subsidies, that will be managed by the Secretary of State for Water Resources, Sanitation 
and Housing, through the Administrative and Technical Department 
A decrease in the amount of money provided by the regional treasury is envisaged in the 
long run due to the expected efficiency gains in the sector. As a first attempt a target 
could be to reduce by 20% the percentage of GDP to be used in the system in the next 
five years, when comprehensive analysis of the conduct of the Fund shall be carried out 
in order to redefme its composition. 
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Because the setting of tariff is not only a technical matter but also a political one, the 
elected Governor is responsible for its approval, based on studies made by the 
Administrative and Technical Department (ATD), following the advice of the Council for 
Water and Sanitation Services. Changes in the tariff are to be approved personally by the 
elected Governor. 
The Council for Water and Sanitation Services is a consultative body placed above the 
executives, which an~lyses issues which could not be solved at the other levels. It is also 
responsible for proposing new features to upgrade the services and for advising the 
Governor on the main issues. The council will be formed by no more than eleven people, 
and should represent the interests of those involved in the sector, including: 
the state owned company that will continue to run the service in some systems, 
for some time; 
local authorities; 
customers, formally represented by the neighbourhood associations; 
private operators; 
Secretary of State for Health; 
Secretary of State for Water Resources, Sanitation and Housing; 
Secretary of State for Environment; 
employees in the sector; 
professional associations. 
This body .should meet regularly, twice a month, to analyse the service and major issues 
that affect it, fo~ example, new directives, after hearing from those involved, specially the 
executives placed in the Secretary of State for Water Resources, Sanitation and Housing, 
in order to advise the Secretary and the Governor on important issues in the system. The 
importance of this Council for Water and Sanitation Services is related to the necessity 
for the system to provide a 'locus' where the different interests of those sectors involved 
in the service, either as providers, consumers or playing the role of regulators, or those 
who are affected by decisions within the sector such as the local authorities, employees in 
the sector, etc., can be discussed in a forum that has right and legitimacy to make 
representations to decision makers. 
Environmental and water quality regulators are already established in the system, as 
noted in chapter 4. Nevertheless, the Administrative and Technical Departtnent, working 
closer to the service, will be in charge of monitoring operation of the contracts, 
surveying the system, carrying out studies to find ways to provide better services and to 
control the whole system. The A TD would be the first locus for solving problems in the 
system. Placed within the Secretariat of State for Water Resources, Sanitation and 
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Housing, the Department would have the power to penalise the private operators and, in 
serious cases, to advise the Secretary of State on the termination of contracts. 
A slim structure is proposed for this Department, with highly skilled staff with the 
necessary expertise to control the system. It needs to have a simple and flexible structure 
so that responses to the urgent necessities in the service, which need to be approved by 
the public sector, will not be delayed. 
The Administrative and Technical Department (ATD) has as its main duties: 
to monitor the conduct of the contracts signed by the private operators; 
to carry out studies on the standards of service for customers; 
to carry out studies on the tariff structures and value of tariffs, proposing changes 
when suitable; 
to study and analyse the contracts, proposing changes when necessary; 
to penalise the private operators when necessary; 
to prepare bidding and contracts; 
to carry out studies on levels of subsidy; 
to analyse claims for disruption of contract with a specific private company made by 
any citizen or group of citizens. 
Embasa, the current state owned company, still has a role to play during the 
establishment of the new system. The company has been running the service since 1971 
and it is the owner of the physical assets. It also has knowledge of the service. Its 
knowledge and information on the service in the state are very important during the 
preparation for a higher private sector involvement Besides, it is likely that it will 
continue to run the service in cities that would not interest the private sector. In this case 
its responsibilities as provider are the same as those of the private companies. 
Nevertheless, in establishing legislation, a period of time should be defmed for the 
company to be dissolved. 
The private operators are the private companies chosen to run the services according to 
the rules defined in their specific contracts, which are related to the type of management 
The criteria for decision on the type of management for a specific city are based on : 
the size of city; 
population density; 
level of income of the city based on V AT collected, average salaries, etc.; 
situation of assets regarding age, state of maintenance; 
potential market or expected increasing demand; 
level of uncatered for demand both for water and sanitation services; 
cost of the provision of the services related to cost of transmission- if gravity fed 
or pumped, quality of raw water, etc.; 
• 
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. level of production of water related to the demand; 
• reliability on physical and commercial files. 
Proposal 
The actual figures and boundaries for defining the potential profitability of a specific city 
would be defmed through studies conducted or contracted by the state owned company 
that currently operates the services and owns the assets. 
Private operators will submit tenders and will be selected according to suitability 
concerning technical skills, capacity of investment and form of compensation. 
A single company would be contracted for operation and maintenance tasks defmed in 
the contract. 
This proposal assumes that one single contract would be signed for each city or area of a 
city. It means that it would not have different companies for the operation of the bulk 
part of the system (transmission and treatment plants) and the network. 
The private company or pool of companies (consortium) could sub contract some of its 
tasks to other companies, provided it is agreed with the Secretary of State for Water 
Resources Sanitation and Housing under the conditions stated in the contract. 
Nevertheless, the first private company remains responsible for the service in the view of 
the Government. 
In both regimes suggested in this proposal the private operator would be chosen through 
bidding, the bids to include technical and fmancial proposals. 
The technical proposal will deal with the knowledge and analysis of the private company 
concerning the specific system, and its proposal for operating and maintenance. It 
comprises studies of the situation of current assets, the demand, the commercial system, 
the master plan of the city and/or surroundings areas, etc., and its prograrmne for · 
operational costs during the contract, specifying the time span for achieving the 
benchmark performance indicators defmed in the contract by the public authorities, such 
as level of unaccounted for water, percentage of metered connection, rate of population 
served, and indicators related to customer orientation, such as time for solving customer 
claims. 
The financial proposal deals with the basic tariff that the private operator intends to 
charge customers, taking into consideration its operating, maintaining and 
commercialising costs plus compensation. 
A referential tariff (RT) would be given to the private companies, which would reduce or 
add a factor related to its own costs and profit projections. 
The referential tariff is calculated by the public authorities or consultants under contract, 
together with Embasa. For the main cities in the state, tariffs should be calculated based 
on the current methodology employed by Embasa (ROFA) described in heading 4.3.1.1 
which takes into consideration operation and maintenance costs plus a rate of return on 
fixed assets. For the other cities in the state, the referential tariff should be calculated 
following the methodology of Average Incremental Costs (AIC), that takes into 
consideration the future costs for providing services to additional demand. They should 
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be applied in the current tariff structure, which provides a 'lifeline block' with a social 
tariff for lifeline consumption (10m3/month) and increasing charges per cubic meter 
above this consumption ( see table 4.6). Details on the mechanism of tariff setting are in 
heading 5.5.1. 
The company chosen should be the one which offers the greatest efficiency according to 
the bidding rules, and which offers the highest technical skills, which means achieving 
1
the 
highest indicator levels in the shortest time, charging the lowest tariff. 
The state owned company- Embasa- should provide the private companies with the 
necessary information on the systems, so that they will be able to formulate f\leir 
proposals. This information would include data on expected demand, current quantity of 
water production and installed capacity, the estimated level of unaccounted for water, 
current level of metering. 
In option A, management contract with profit sharing, the public authority will share 
the profits gained with the private company, which will be in charge of operation and 
maintenance. 
The contracts should be valid for a period of five years with possible renewal or 
upgrading into a leasing ( affermage) contract. 
The private operator must be committed to achieving certain performance indicators 
during the contract, such as maximum level for unaccounted for water (30% is normally 
accepted for bigger cities); minimum level of metering (the target is universal metering). 
By the end of the contract, assets should return to the public sector in good condition. 
Compensation to the private company comes from revenues of the service and from 
gains through increasing productivity due to its investment in operation and maintenance 
tasks such as billing efficiency, unaccounted for water, metering, commercial 
management, market driven management. 
The efficiency and gains in productivity will decrease the value of incremental operating 
and maintenance costs of the private company which will be charging the same tariff. 
From the surplus, a minor amount, around 20% could go to the public sector and would 
be included in the public fund to be created for investment in the sector. The remaining 
80% increases the profit of the private company. This mechanism will encourage the 
private operators to invest in the system. 
In addition, the public sector also will receive resources for the Fund, and gains when it 
postpones possible capital investment. 
Monitoring of the values due to the accountancy balance would be made through open 
book accounting, where the private contractor declares costs, and which is regularly sent 
to the public authorities. 
In this scheme, customers become clients of the private company. 
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Many of the small cities in the state still have problems related to the provision of water 
let alone the already mentioned problem on sanitation. 
In option B, the management contract proposed for small cities, the private sector would 
have the duty of operation and maintenance of the whole system in a contracting service. 
The time span of the contract will be initially of five years, with possible extension. 
Similar to the contract for bigger cities, the private operator is due to attain a certain 
level of performance indicators. Thus, the level of unaccounted for water should not be 
more than 20% (the normally acceptable level for small cities) by the end of the contract, 
and full metering would be an aim defmed in the contract, as experience in the country 
has demonstrated that, despite the cost of installation, maintenance and reading, the 
metering system of charging is more equitable for the providers and for the customers, 
the households with unmetered connections tend to misuse and waste water, as they are 
due to pay the minimum tariff in their category, which, in the end, increases the costs of 
the services. 
By the end of the contract, assets should return to the public sector in good condition. 
Compensation to the private operator should come from the tariff charged to the 
customers plus a fixed fee and productivity gains. 
The possibility of subsidising the service constitutes a big difference between the two 
proposed systems according to the rules described in heading 5.5.3. 
The customers are clients of the private operator. Although differing from the normal 
pattern of management contracts, according to the standard described in chapter Ill, it is 
proposed that the customers become clients of the private company, so that they know 
where to address complaints and requests. 
5.5.1 Price definition and control 
This proposal suggests the use of two different methodologies for setting tariffs. 
The first one is the Rate of Return on Assets (ROFA) system5·\ currently used in Bahia, 
which considers historical costs as the best indication of what consumers should pay in 
the present. It is to be used in cities where physical assets for provision of services are 
already existing and the bulk of future investment would be in operation and 
maintenance. It is likely to happen in the major cities, according to the description made 
under subheading 5.4. 
The second method is the Average Incremental Cost (AIC), to be used in cities where 
the bulk of future invesnnent will be in physical assets for the provision of the services. 
This procedure of setting tariff considers that future costs are the best indicator of what 
consumers should pay now. It is more likely to be applied in small cities.5·2 
~-~The maximwn rate of return current permitted in Braril is 12%. 
· For description of the different methods and criteria for tariff setting and calculation see Franceys (1993b) and WHO (1990). 
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In setting a tariff under this proposal, one should bear in mind that consumers must be 
aware of the cost of the resource they are using, which encourages their efficient use. 
Besides, one goal to be achieved is the recovering of the costs of the provision of the 
service through tariff setting and tariff structure. 
I AT= SC/ Vol. I 
Where: 
AT= Average tariff 
SC= cost of service (defined by one of the methods previously defined) 
Vol.= chargeable volume 
Due to the economic reality of the state, it is unlikely that the tariffs will rise to the 
necessary level in the short term for all the systems in the state. 
Besides, the "necessary level" is not known, as inefficiency and low productivity in the 
current state owned company responsible for the services disguises the real costs. Also, 
currently there is only one tariff for the whole state, without taking into consideration the 
cost of water in different systems, as described earlier. On the other hand the already 
discussed role of the State in providing welfare, makes it difficult to raise the tariffs. 
Because of these factors, it is necessary to have commitment from the regional 
government in taking actions such as: writing off or assuming part of the debt of the 
state owned company; raising tariffs steadily; seeking to lower the level of subsidies, both 
from the industrial to domestic sector and from medium and high income to low income 
areas. 
A referential tariff (RT) should be set by the public authority to be disclosed to the 
private competitors as a guide for their own costs. Embasa or consultants under contract 
should study each system and define the value of the referential tariff using the 
established criteria for each city. 
Embasa, through the defmed methodology, will set capital costs based on the necessary 
investment set out in the master plan, and on its own historical costs for provision of the 
service for each system. 
The private company, in its financial proposal, should disclose its operational costs and 
its profit expectancy, together with the value of its C factor, that will be multiplied by the 
referential tariff. The result of this calculation should be the proposed tariff of the 
competitor. The competitors should also provide the calculation of the C factor. The C 
factor should include the level of profitability, the operational expenses and operational 
investment to be made by the private company. 
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The C factor will be applied in the current tariff structure (table 4.4) which provides 
increases in tariffs for increases in demands as described in section 5.5. The tariff will be 
set as follows. 
TARIFF (reais/month) = C* RT (reais/month) 
The private operator expands its profitability through increasing productivity when, 
during the contract, it diminishes its operating costs but retains the ~ame revenue, thus 
creating a surplus, of which a minor part (20%) should go to the fund to be created for 
the sector, together with the portion of the tariff related to capital costs. 
In the big cities the portion related to future capital investment would not be high. In the 
small cities, this amount can be the major part of the set tariff. 
When the level of set tariff represents a politically unacceptable value the regional 
Government can decide to diminish it by, reducing its part of the tariff. 
Studies on the level of the economic and fmancial equilibrium and the consequent level of 
necessary subsidy for each system must be conducred by the public authorities before 
offering the service for tender. 
Currently, Embasa uses the figure of 10 metres per connection as the reference for 
economic feasibility. If the necessary extension for a connection is longer than that, the 
customer will provide the labour force and material and Embasa will give the technical 
support for the extra length. 
The tariff policy for sewerage systems could be the same as that currently used, with 
90% on the top of the water bills for the households connected to the main systems and 
45% for the ones connected to condominia! systems. 
5.5.2 Price Adjustments 
The tariff may be adjusted during the contract if alreration occurs that justifies it. The 
private operator may suggest changes in the tariff srructure and in the value of C. The 
Public authority will carry out studies that will be discussed by the council, which will 
advise the Governor on the approval or not of the change. If the public authority is the 
one that suggests changes, the private company shall carry out studies and analyse the 
impact of the change on the economic equilibrium of the contract 
Adjustment to the tariff due to inflation rates will be automatically made according to the 
law. 
5.5.3 Use of subsidies 
The use of subsidies is considered a necessity. The previously discussed situation of the 
small cities and those with a low income level, makes it necessary for the proposal to be 
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flexible enough to permit the regional government to decide on subsidising pan of the 
service, as long as the use of the subsidy is clearly defmed. 
A subsidy should be used when the capital investment made in a water and/or sewerage 
system leads to an unaffordable tariff, according to the maximum percentage of the 
minimum national salary (5% for water services and 7% for water and sewage services) 
to be spent on the service for lifeline consumption. In this case, the Government, after 
carrying out studies, will decide which level of s:Ibsidy will be given for a specific 
system. 
The subsidy will come in the form of a reduction in the capital costs used in tariff 
calculation. As capital costs are to be made through public funds, customers will be 
charged lower tariffs without decreasing the profitability of private companies. 
5.6 REGULATION 
As now, water quality regulation would be conducted by the central government through 
the Ministry of Health and would be monitored by the Secretary of Health. 
The provider of the service is to be responsible for accomplishing the directives as part of 
the operation and maintenance tasks. 
The Central Government remains responsible for environmental regulation in the current 
manner which was described in chapter 4. The regional state Government, through its 
environmental department (CRA), is responsible for monitoring the execution of the 
pertinent legislation, with the power to adopt action according to the law, to prevent the 
actions of those who do not comply with the stated rules, causing pollution as illegal 
discharge, etc. The pertinent actions, such as the value of penalties and other 
punishments are described in legislation. 
The provider is the one to be monitored according to the regulation. It must be aware of 
the regulation, which could be a constraint in carrying out its duties and achieving higher 
profits. 
The Secretary of State for Water Resources Sanitation and Housing is involved in 
environmental issues through the Administrative and Technical Department, as part of its 
duties as overseer of the water and sanitation services and the executive body in charge 
of monitoring regulations. 
5.7 INVESTMENT 
The private operator is to be responsible . for operation costs (current financing or 
working capital) which includes services for upgrading the system. Major repairs would 
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be discussed with the Administrative and Technical Department which will approve the 
budget and will authorise the utilisation of sources from the fund in the service, sharing 
the costs with the private operator. The latter should be interested in upgrading the 
system and its performance, as part of its revenue will depend on gains in productivity. 
The private operator is responsible for laying the extensions in the network. When the 
extension is not profitable, the government can subsidise part of the cost by agreement 
with the community. Studies on the minimum level of profitability for an extension or 
increasing demand will be discussed between the private operator and the Administrative 
and Technical Department and will be defined in the contract. The study may be 
reviewed regularly. 
The regional government through the Secretary of State for Water Resources Sanitation 
and Housing is to be responsible for monitoring capital investment. As the manager of 
the Fund, it is also responsible for defining sources, asking for the necessary capital from 
different sources, negotiating conditions of loans and grants. Its duty is to define the 
necessary areas for investment, to provide the necessary studies and projects and then 
search for the means of financing the work. The aim is that the major part of the work is 
financed by the revenues of the service. Nevertheless, loans should be obtained from the 
regional and/or central Government and Local Authorities, developments banks, etc. The 
financial regulation would allow for the possibility of the private sector financing the 
capital investment. 
Decisions on investment are taken by the regional Government. Prioritising investment is 
a political decision based on the technical studies made by the Administrative and 
Technical Department 
The Local authorities are interested in this subject, generally trying to draw investment to 
their area. It is likely that decisions on this issue will often be made through political 
negotiation between local authorities and regional government. 
The private operator is interested in capital investment on two courts: firstly, capital 
investment used to upgrade the system will facilitate their duties as operator of a specific 
scheme. Secondly, the private operator could act as investor, using the possibility to 
finance the construction of a system .. 
5.8 ACTIVITY AND RESPONSIDILITY MATRIX 
The activity and responsibility matrix shows the relationship between the different bodies 
involved in the provision of the services in both proposed systems, and the boundaries 
within which they work. 
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5.9 DISCUSSION 
The proposal has some characteristics from both the European systems which were 
studied. 
From the system used in England and Wales, it has taken the rather centralised character 
where the regional government is responsible for the policy of the service in the state, 
and the Local Authorities, who formerly held the power of concession, become support 
actors. Although without a formal and independent regulatory body, one could say that 
the Administrative and Technical Department takes up most of the tasks of such bodies 
in Britain. 
From the French system, this proposal takes the contract arrangements. Also, the 
possibility of changing the initial contract into an affermage contract gives some 
flexibility to the system together with different contractors for different situations. 
One important point in this proposal is that the public sector retains the ownership of 
assets, even the ones bought by the private company during the period of contract. 
In a new system, some important issues for which there is no related experience, must be 
included and adjusted. Among them the reasonable and fair level of profitability for a 
private company running a public service on a monopolistic basis in long contracts 
(France) or forever (England and Wales). The study of the two European systems did 
not provide the means for the setting up of an average level of "fair" profitability. As 
already mentioned in a previous chapter, the new English/Welsh companies, have been 
receiving profits over US$40,000 per employee; the two major French companies make 
about US$3,500. 
In both European countries, the industry has low risk with a stabilised and compulsory 
market. These characteristics generally decrease profitability, due to the certainty of the 
business, but it does not seem to work this way in England and Wales. 
The approach chosen for the setting of the tariff follows the one already in place in Bahia 
through rate of return on fixed assets for cities in which the major part of physical assets 
are already existent; and average incremental costs for those in which physical assets for 
the provision of services are not provided. The one in use in England does not seem to 
suit the Bahian situation, where capital investment should be made by the public 
authorities and mainly in low profitable areas. On the other hand, the French system of 
solving the problems without bidding or defined rules, constituting an agreement 
between the mayor and the private company, would not suit a more centralised approach 
and would make the culturally necessary transparency in the process difficult. 
In the major cities, tariffs are likely to be lower than in small cities, as assets could be 
already fully depreciated, so customers have already paid for them. Besides, systems built 
during Planasa were highly subsidised. In the new systems, which are in the majority of 
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the cases located in small cities, the new assets will lead to higher tariffs. It is reasonable 
that the population in those cities should take advantage of the use of subsidies, as they 
were not provided in the past. 
However, the setting of a tariff is not only a technical problem. 
Thus, although based on the studies made by experts, the final decision should be made 
by the Governor. 
There are many different views on regulation. The description of the British and French 
models of management, illustrated the opposite "schools" of regulation. The British 
approach, with its formal bodies, represents the school in which regulation is carried out 
in a micro approach to the providers, while the French system, with no formal regulatory 
bodies, represents the view in which auto-regulation is more efficient and the state just 
oversees the system. 
Regulation can not be taken directly from one situation and transposed to another, as it is 
closely related to the social, political and economic conditions of the place. There are 
many combinations of actors and different forms for developing a regulation system. This 
proposal recommends regulation able to deal with the different situations, either with 
private or public provision of the services and the diverse Bahian conditions. In this case, 
the Administrative and Technical Department (ATD) should act in a system close to the 
French approach which is considered more appropriate, although overseeing both the 
contract and the service. 
The A TD should have an overall view of the whole system, giving information to 
providers and others involved. It also has the power to penalise those providers that fail 
to attain the regulated standards stated in the contracts. 
The challenge for this Department would be not to turn into one more powerful 
bureaucratic part in the system, where short term interests and damaging political 
interference could prevent its efficiency in playing its role properly. Also, over regnlation 
should be avoided. The balance between flexibility and commitment to fixed rules must 
be a major concern of AID. Whereas flexibility is necessary to allow the correction of 
mistakes and adaptation to changing situations, fixed rules are important in order to 
prevent one of the groups involved in the service from gaining control of the process. 
The proposed Council for Water and Sanitation Services, in which the full range of 
interests would participate, provides transparency to the system and facilitates control by 
society as a whole. This level of participation is important in Brazilian/Bahian society 
due to the aforementioned fears. 
The head of A TD should be chosen from professionals having authority to decide on 
matters, according to the guidelines defined in the policy which was approved by the 
state legislature, having as his main guideline the signed contracts. 
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The levels of setvices are to be accomplished by any of the providers; private or public 
bodies. 
Competition is provided for in the proposal by using the French approach, where 
competition takes place for a specific water service rather than in the market generally or 
in the stock market as happens in England and Wales. 
5.10 CURRENT CONDITIONS THAT FACILITATE OR INHIDIT THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL 
Some conditions mainly related to the cultural and economic situation will facilitate or, 
on the contrary, will constrain the implementation of the proposal. 
The proposal, which backs a wider private sector involvement than the current one in 
urban water and sanitation setvices, does not mean that government will give away its 
responsibilities concerning the setvice. This p()int facilitates its implementation politically 
as there will be no strong rupture in the sector. This solution "in between" private and 
public management makesr the necessary political negotiation easier with the employee's 
union and staff and managers of the state owned company which have a strong sense of 
corporativism as well as one part of society who does not accept private sector 
participation in public services. 
Also, this first phase, with the public sector controlling the system, will allow the actors 
involved to adjust regulation and contracts to identify their strengths and weakness and 
to identify those rules which are either too stringent or too loose. This is in order to gain 
a better knowledge for future contracts and for possible ajfermage or concession 
agreements. 
The programme for modernisation of the sector financed by The World Bank and in 
which Embasa is involved is also considered to be a facilitating condition. The 
managerial approach and the comparative competitiveness introduced by the Bank 
forces the company to achieve higher performance indicators. 
On the other hand, although softened by the clauses of the proposal which maintain a 
rather strong involvement of the public sector in the provision of setvices, the mere idea 
of a private company running such an "important setvice for the population and strategic 
for security reasons" will certainly provoke strong reactions against the proposal within 
the system and in part of society as a whole. 
Other constraints will come from the already mentioned distrust held by Brazilian/ 
Bahian society for Brazilian entrepreneurs, as very often lately they have been linked to 
corruption in the country. In addition, there will be resistance from managers of the state 
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owned company, whose professional culture relates strongly to the encouragement of 
technical skills. The majority of managers today are engineers and chemists. Under the 
terms of this proposal such a culture will have to include other skills of a managerial and 
financial nature. 
5.11 STRATEGYOFIMPLEMENTATION 
Prior to full implementation of this proposal, a detailed preparation must be carried out 
in order to avoid failure of the process. 
These procedures involve defmition of the current situation and clear rules for the private 
companies. In this proposal important issues are related to: 
the debt of the state owned company; 
evaluation of assets; 
clear defmition on investment due to be fmanced by the public authority and/or by the 
private sector; 
the bidding process of selection of the private company; 
the contract; 
negotiation; etc. 
According to Triche (1992) the lack of suitable preparation of contracts has been one of 
the reasons for failure in attempts to involve the private sector in different countries. 
The new policy would be discussed with local authorities, neighbourhood groups, 
professional associations, unions, within the state owned company, etc .. Not only for 
those people to be informed, but also to gain contributions from the actors involved. 
Implementation should start from the major cities in the state, the profitable ones. This 
will help gain the support of public opinion, as problems in adjusting the new scheme at 
the beginning will be more easily dealt with. Also, these cities do not have problems in 
the quantity of water. Thus, the service in these cities should be used as " shop windows" 
for the new managerial approach. The service should be provided by big companies, with 
a considerable capacity for investment from the beginning of the contract and with the 
ability to stand losses in the early years. 
In the meantime, Embasa would operate the services in the other cities under the current 
scheme but with a clearly defmed period for termination. 
The Phasing schedule on the page 147 gives a brief idea of the steps of the 
implementation process. 
145 
M.F.D.Carteado Proposal 
5.12 STRONG AND WEAK POINTS 
The strong points in the current proposal can be highlighted through the qualitative 
analysis of the sector already used in this work. The proposal will provide a rather 
autonomous body as provider, with clear rules to be followed. In addition, the scheme 
encourages a market and customer oriented approach from the provider, and investment 
in gains in efficiency and productivity. 
There is no suppon in this proposal for the use of subsidies in a large scale, rather the 
customer is made responsible as far as possible for the level of service provided. 
The existence of contracts as the first reference for solving issues between private 
providers and the public sector is seen as a strong point. The executive governmental 
Department (ATD) acting as technical and administrative supporter for the government 
and monitoring the system according to established and agreed rules, makes it unlikely 
that over-regulation from one side and abuse from the private operators on the other 
side, would occur. 
The weak point in the system is the relationship between the local authorities and private 
companies, which is poorly defined. Though there is provision for the local authorities to 
repon to the regional Government or the Council concerning the quality of service 
provided by the private operator, the actual mechanism of this has not been detailed. Nor 
have they the powers to claim a proper service for the community, which would reside in 
the local authorities. One of the current complaints made by the local authorities is their 
inability to intercede in water and sanitation matters in their communities, when they are 
the governmental level closest to the citizen, the one who theoretically knows their 
requirements. 
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Phasing- Schedule of implementation 
1. evaluation of assets 
2. study of the debt of Embasa 
3. defmition of costs of provision of water in each city 
4. defmition of cost of provision of sanitation service in each city 
5. negotiation of debt ¥'ith banks, central government and regional government 
6. inventory of assets that will be used by the operator 
7. bidding preparation 
8. defmition on minimum tariff to be charged according to the principles in setting the 
tariff 
9. writing off debts 
10. tendering the service 
11. judgement of proposals 
12. defmition of winner company 
13. contract signature 
14. hand over of operation and maintenance tasks to the private company 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the introduction, the objectives of this thesis were an investigation of the 
British and French models for providing watsan services, and the development of an 
institutional framework for managing watsan in Bahia. This framework is based on the 
study of the two European countries and responds to the hypothesis that an extension of 
private sector involvement is the most suitable method to solve problems related to 
watsan in Bahia. These problems are associated, as in other developing countries, with 
inadequacy of organisations and institutional frameworks. The conclusions and 
recommendations discussed below are a result of the findings described in the previous 
chapters. 
The findings of the research are related to the development and implementation of 
watsan policies, models for managing the services, and to the provision of services. The 
investigation showed two different models for the provision of the services, both with 
large private sector participation, but with differences in approach and form of 
implementation. The study of the Bahian watsan system and of Embasa also permitted 
the analysis of a state owned company providing such services in a developing country. 
6.2 DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW POLICY 
The French model for managing watsan services was put in place in an incremental way 
according to necessities and political balance. Changes in the system seem to occur 
without great traumas and conflicts between those involved. Private sector involvement 
is an issue dealt with at local level in accordance with local politics and administration. In 
England and Wales private sector participation was part of the Central Government 
policy at the time and involved a radical change in the system, imposed on society as part 
of a political agenda aimed at reducing the PSBR of the state and at providing 
investment in the sector in order to comply with EC directives. 
For the French, watsan services are local public services, decisions are taken at local 
level, within the community, between users and providers. Being a local service, the local 
148 
M.P.D.Carteado Conclusions and Recommendations 
representative, the Mayor, is the one able to take decisions on the subject. The central 
state only intervenes in those subjects related to supra communal issues such as river 
basin matters. This is different from the British approach where decisions are taken at 
central level by the regulatory bodies, without the participation of local authorities. 
As a result, the research seeks to demonstrate that the most important aspect in urban 
watsan is not who runs the service or who owns the assets, but is the capacity building of 
who runs it and the coherence and internal logic of the system, which makes it work 
efficiently. In other words the way services are managed will define their efficiency. A 
management by objectives with well defmed targets and where managers are accountable 
for their actions, seems to be an efficient way for watsan organisations to achieve high 
performance levels. 
The general lesson learned from the study was that there is no single model that can be 
used to solve any specific case. A context-specific approach should be set up according 
to legal and institutional needs. Thus, the proposal developed for Bahia, while drawing 
from the differing European models, does not follow either of them faithfully. 
The study illustrates that private sector involvement is not the only means for providing 
higher efficiency levels in watsan institutions. The tools used by the private sector to 
maximise profits, either in a competitive environment or constrained by regulation, end 
up improving effectiveness and should be used by any organisation, private or public, 
responsible for running the service. These tools are related to a managerial approach with 
clear objectives. This means that in whatever sort of watsan organisation, public or 
private, the management style should comprise functions, objectives and responsibilities 
clearly defmed and easily attained to avoid confusion and overlapping of action, and that 
targets are set to achieve the objectives. These characteristics could be achieved in a 
public organisation through an institutional strengthening programme which includes 
setting tariffs, managers being accountable for results, etc .. Thus the ownership of assets 
or who runs the service is not the core issue in the provision df services. 
However, in practice, public-private partnership seems to be the most efficient means of 
providing watsan, as it represents a short cut for putting into use the necessary 
managerial tools for achieving high efficiency, because experience has shown that the 
private sector is better motivated. 
The research also made clear the need for defined. legislation and rules and an 
institutional framework where the actors involved know their roles, without overlapping. 
This can exist in a formal or informal way. The first approach is the one used in England 
and Wales, where the Water Act 1989 and complementary legislation gave the regulatory 
bodies the power to resolve issues in the system. In France, although there is no formal 
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regulatory body, the service is organised in such a way that the Mayor is responsible for 
the service and different levels of Government deal with different defined issues at supra-
communal or national level. 
From the literature review and the study of Embasa the conclusion is made that the 
Bahian company is not different from other state owned watsan organisations in 
developing countries, which suffer the impact of institutional aspects as consequences of 
political implications, lUld of legislation which is a consequence of a political culture with 
Administrative Control. Regarding this point, the study considers that action must be 
taken to remedy inadequacies in such institutions and organisations. In this sense, it is 
necessary to examine those aspects of the institutions which affect performance. 
Once more the problem is not technical, but depends upon the managerial approach 
adopted, where supply has been stressed rather than demand. 
The research also revealed that important issues that have either been neglected or 
superficially examined by decision makers in Bahia, must be considered key points in the 
management of the service. Among them are the bias about subsidies and the use of an 
appropriate level of service and technology. The discussion on the possibility of reducing 
the use of subsidy has always been taboo in the sector, due to the high level of poverty in 
the country. Discussion on this point is regarded as indicating a position against the poor 
and a lack of social sensitivity. However, experience throughout the world has shown 
that subsidising tariffs is not always the best way to provide services to the poor. On the 
contrary, those who take advantage of subsidies are often the middle class, with house 
connections. Discrimination in the provision of water and sanitation services in Bahia 
was discussed in chapters IV and V. 
In this sense, adequate budgetary allocation to particular sections or regions, removal of 
price distortions which supports a bias against the poor and the selection of more 
appropriate technology, can be more effective than the use of subsidies alone, which end 
up subsidising the or better off (WDR,l994). 
In fact, the use of subsidies becomes an excuse for many of the actors within the system, 
mainly some politicians, some of the staff in the state owned .company and large 
contractors. If one assumes that the service can never reach sustainability it is easier to 
justify putting resources into the system for big construction projects, sometimes 
unnecessary, for the sake of public health and to increase the coverage mainly for the 
poor population, who will not always be the beneficiaires and could end up paying more 
for the service. The assumption of Jack of sustainability also favours the 
unresponsiveness and mismanagement of some managers that are not accountable for 
their mistakes. 
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One other problem to be faced in the system is the use of appropriate technology in the 
provision of services. The preference for big construction projects often makes it 
impossible to use lower cost technology, which in some cases is presented to the 
population in a biased way, as 'second class' technology that has been provided only for 
the poor. As a consequence, the poor are often the ones who end up having no access to 
the service because the high technology makes it unaffordable. (See the case of the 
sewerage system in Salvador, Chapter IV). 
The main problem is not whether the service is running under a private or public 
organisation, but is to seek the managerial approach that meets the needs of the 
population, considering the diversity of necessities according to the level of income, at 
the lowest cost. 
The proposal defined in this thesis, detailed in chapter V, suggests an approach in which 
the necessities of the customer ate the main input for definition of technical solutions. 
Above the lifeline, the level of service should be compatible to the willingness to pay and 
affordability. It is necessary to include the different income profiles that define different 
markets with different necessities, without prejudice. Thus, the bench marks and the 
standard of service must be different 
The consumer or potential consumer must have channels to disclose his wishes and, 
which are at the same time, responsible for the level of service provided. In this sense, 
technology, even in urban areas should take into consideration the customer's 
affordability. 
As Coing (1994a, 1994b) points out, the management of urban services in Latin America 
has been characterised by consecutive transformation which shows instability in the 
system. This pendulum in which the service keeps swinging, cited by Carteado (1993) 
referring to the management of watsan services in Salvador during the 20th century, 
demonstrates that the models do not succeed when there are internal contradictions and 
incoherence and a lack of socio-political commitment about the stability of issues such as 
financing, quality of service, tariff policy, etc. 
So far it seems that transformation in urban services management has occurred to 
overcome crises or external demands without being sufficiently internalised by the bodies 
involved. 
The author strongly believes that a defined combination of public and private sector 
involvement will provide the best balance in order to enable the system to achieve its 
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objectives to provide a reliable service to the urban population of Bahia state, according 
to customers' ability and willingness to pay, under a fair tariff, able to ensure self 
sustainability and a long life for the system. 
In the proposal the main executive body is the private company, together with Embasa, 
which will be responsible for operation and maintenance in different cities. It is planned 
that cities with different income profiles will be regarded differently in the provision of 
the service. 
Entry by the private sector should be paced so as to make it possible to monitor the 
changing system. This will be necessary as, initially, all the actors will be involved in a 
learning process: the public bureaucracy and technicians and the private providers, the 
consumers, who will have more responsibility within the system, and the regulatory 
bodies, will all have to accustom themselves to a new approach for which they have little 
experience. Within the implementation process, an important step is the method of 
disciplining and organising participation of NGO's and communities in project designing, 
execution of systems such as providing extensions of the network, etc.. This type of 
participation in urban areas is rather new and has become a trend, mainly for poor areas. 
Therefore, this system should be encouraged but, at the same time, rules should be set up 
in order to avoid overlap of functions and conflicting measures in the system. Thus, 
flexibility must be one of the principles of the proposal. In this sense, the Administrative 
and Technical Department together with the council placed below the Regional 
Government, have the important duty of making a permanent assessment of the system 
during implementation to provide changes in direction when necessary, in order to assure 
a long and stabilised life to the system. 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research does not assume that privatisation or a major private sector involvement 
are the only solutions to the inefficiency of public institutions or to serving the 
unattended demand. 
Efficiency, good management and other good practices are not intrinsic in any form of 
management, private or public, centralised or decentralised. The most efficient water and 
sanitation service in Asia is the Singapurian public company, which has a low level of 
autonomy (Asian Bank of Development, 1994 ), for example. 
The argument of inefficiency and the use of populism and clientelism of local authorities 
were the basis of the Brazilian military government policy for centralising the financing 
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and management of public services from the early 60's to the late 80's. This centralised 
policy lead to the same faults. (See Coing, 1991; Carteado,1993). The interviews 
conducted in the field research in Brazil also pointed to the lack of autonomy and 
political interference as one of the problems in the current system. 
In the same way that one can not ensure that the private sector will run the services 
better than the public sector, it is impossible to restrict the problem of efficiency and 
effectiveness of the service to management aspects only, disregarding the political issues 
involved. Thus, it is necessary to ensure political commitment to the principles of the 
plan. 
The research recommends Embasa's efficiency to be compared with that in the private 
companies. Also, it is important to assess the follow up of Embasa and its response to 
the institutional development programme currently in operation, sponsored by The 
World Bank. There is a doubt about whether or not a programme that was, once more, 
brought from an external agency, will last long after that agency's withdrawal. If the 
programme was not internalised throughout Embasa's staff, any improvement achieved 
by the company could be jeopardised by changes in the board of directors, or after 
elections. 
Further research into the French system is needed in two ways. First, an analysis of the 
contracts, and the protection they provide for the customers as well as for the private 
companies. Second, a follow up of the Sapin Law: the changes in the relationship 
between local authorities and private companies and the consequences, if any, for the 
provision of the services, that will occur in order to accommodate this law which was 
brought in in 1993 to decrease the level of corruption within the system. 
Apart from the already mentioned studies within the French system, a rich field of 
investigation would be the gains in productivity and effectiveness achieved by public 
bodies that had undergone different types of programme focusing on managerial 
strengthening. In this sense, useful research could be conducted into organisations that 
had used the Total Quality Management approach for services, where "the 
client/customer is the king", and into different managerial approaches to improve 
efficiency in the public sector. 
Finally, the important thing is to be aware that changing the form of management is not 
an abstract choice or just a decision among different solutions. It is the consequence of 
specific conditions in a specific place at a specific point in time, in order to overcome a 
crisis. Hence, it is fundamental for the system to have trust amongst all those involved, 
customers, providers, public bodies, regulators. 
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APPENDIX 1-lA 
Questionnaire to policy makers, Embasa (board of directors and senior managers, 
secretary of state for infrastructure, employees union, Abes, Aesbe)- Salvador, 
Brazil 
l.How do you evaluate the level of service in water supply and sanitation in Bahia? 
2.How do you evaluate the current policy in water supply and sanitation services in 
Bahia? 
3.Which are the weak and strong points in the current system? 
4.Which are the main constraints in the current system? 
5.How do you evalute the current customer service in urban Watsan? 
6.Is there a need for setting a new policy for urban Watsan in Salvador/Bahia? 
7.In an eventual new policy, which aspects would be stressed? 
8.What is your opinion about the increase of private sector involvement in urban water 
supply and sanitation services? 
9.Do you think that a wider involvement of the private sector in the system would help 
the improvement of the quality of service? 
10. In which ways could the private sector increase its participation in urban water 
supply and sanitation services in Bahia? 
ll.Given the possibility of having a wider involvement of private sector, what should be 
the role of the State within the service? 
12.In an eventual privatisation, which sectors could be adversely or positively affected, in 
youropinon? 
13. Who would be the key actors in setting a new policy for urban watsan in Salvador? 
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APPENDIX 1-lA 
QUESTIONNAIRES TO COMPANIES AND COMPANIES' 
ASSOCIATIONS- Europe 
Company: 
Interviewee: 
Status: Date: 
Appendix 
l.How do you compare the level of service in urban water supply and sanitation in your 
region before and after privatisation? 
2.Do you think the tariff is adequate? Why? 
3.What are the differences in management style before and after privatisation? 
4. How did customer service change after privatisation? 
5.Which are the strong and weak points in the current system? 
6. What are the main constraints in the current regulation that prevent the service from 
achieving a higher level of efficiency ? 
7.Which are the key points or issues neglected by the policy makers at the time of 
privatisation? 
8.What should be the role of the regulators? 
9. In which ways could the private sector expand their business in the sector? 
lO.Within the different kinds of private sector involvement in water supply and sanitation 
services in France, which one do you think is the most suitable? Why? 
11. Which one is the least suitable? Why? 
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APPENDIX 1-IA 
QUESTIONNAIRES TO REGULATORS- EUROPE 
Institution: 
Interviewee: 
Status: Date: 
l.How do you compare the level of service in urban water supply and sanitation before 
and after privatisation? 
2.Which changes in management style could you notice before and after privatisation? 
3.Which are the key issues the regulators must watch carefully on behalf of the 
customers? 
4.What practical problems have arisen in the implementation of privatisation policy ? 
5. Which ones are the strong· points in the current regulation? 
6. Which ones are the weak points in the current regulation? 
7 .What are the main constraints the regulators face in the current system that prevent the 
service from achieving a higher level of efficiency ? 
8.Do you think that the tariff is adequate for the level of service and customer's 
willingness to pay? 
9.Within the different kinds of private involvment in water supply and sanitation services 
in France, which one do you think is the most suitable? Why? 
10. Which one do you think is the least suitable? Why? 
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APPENDIX I-lB 
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
Name: Jose Hamilton da Silva Bastos 
Position: Secretary of the Council for Infrastructure in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil 
Duration of interview: 40 min 
About the current level of services 
There is a reasonable service as far as the quantity of water is concerned, but there are 
many doubts about the quality of the water and the quality of the service. The local 
authority who gave the concession to the regional state, in 1925, had never followed the 
service nor participated in any decision on it. We are now discussing how to review the 
concession contract in order to get the local authority to participate in the service. 
Regarding sanitation, there is a low level of utilisation of the general sewerage system. 
The higher part of the sewerage goes to the drainage system which the local authority is 
responsible for. There is a conflict as water supply, sanitation, drainage and solid waste 
are not treated in an integrated form which does not lead to the best solution and which 
causes conflicts. 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is no policy at the moment. The Local authority (council) together with the 
University (Federal University of Bahia) is setting up the Municipal Water and 
Sanitation Policy which will comprise of studies on the management method. The 
possibility of privatisation has been discussed. Even if we decide on public 
management, the method must be well defined. 
The current customer service depends on which region of the city you live in: in the 
high and middle class neighbourhood the service is good, except for the time Embasa 
needs for responding to customer's complaints and solving leaking problems. In the 
poor neighbourhood, 'favelas' and shanty houses there are many complaints related to 
interruptions of service, delays in attendance to services besides the already mentioned 
problems of leakage. Also, there are complaints on the quality of water delivered, and 
the population is relating the presence of cholera to the quality of water. Embasa says 
that it is due to the illegal connections. 
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About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
The private sector has a strong tradition. The natural tendency is the 'terceirizariio', 
contracting out for some services. But operation tasks should not be contracted out, 
they should remain on the hands of the state. Only tasks outside the core business 
should be contracted out. There is also the social question, it is necessary to socialise 
the service. If the public sector does not provide good service for part of the population, 
consider the private sector .... The state is responsible for the health of the population 
and this must be kept in public hands - at local, regional or central level of 
Government. The private sector would go only for the profitable areas. 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
The state should have the duties of planning, investing and operating. The latter due to 
the return of investments. Only the state could invest in non profitable areas. The state 
should also look after the environment. In our situation, unlike from the first world, the 
private sector will act only in very profitable areas. 
Name: Cesar Augusto Rabello Borges 
Position: Secretary of State for Water Resources, Sanitation and Housing in Babia, 
Brazil 
Duration of interview: 30 min 
About the Current Level of services 
During the last few years there has been a great improvement in the level of services 
regarding quantity and quality of water supply delivered. Regarding sewerage, there is 
not enough coverage, demanding a huge effort in the near future. 
There is a need for thinking on sanitation in a broader spectrum, i.e., including urban 
drainage, solid waste and vector control. 
The first concern of the administrator is water supply, which is not get available to all 
the cities in Bahia. 
In the semi arid region, comprising about 60% of the state, water is scarce, both 
surface and groundwater. The ground water in those areas tends to have salinisation 
problems. Thus, it is necessary to build long transmission systems (120km, 130km) to 
get water of good quality in the necessary quantity, which is very expensive. Moreover, 
most of the water supply systems were built to last for 20 years and most of them were 
built from the late 60's to 75, under the Planasa system. Now, the systems are declining 
and there is no external source for financing rehabilitation and reconstruction, as the 
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central government has no money and the international agencies take a long time to 
make decisions on investments. 
That is the reason why the regional government (1990-1993) decided to invest 10% of 
the state net revenue in water supply and sanitation ... 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is the need to organise the sector, the central government should set up a ten year 
master plan prioritising investments in water supply and sanitation. 
The management is too fragmented, is split into too many levels (Local Authority, State, 
Central Government), nowadays. There is also the possibility of privatisation. 
About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
A wider private sector involvement will improve the quality of service, but only for those 
who could pay. 
We should involve the private sector in various tasks, so releasing the State. In addition, 
the involvement of the private sector would force the implementation of tariffs related to 
the cost of the service. The current average tariff used in the state is unfair. There is no 
use in compensating tariffs. Each region of the state should have a tariff according to 
the cost of the provision of the service in that specific area. On the other hand, the 
households of the semi arid area can not afford to pay for expensive water .... then, the 
state should pay the difference. The private sector has one task to do, the regional 
public sector has another, and the local authority has yet another ... 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
The state will always be the concessionaire, as it is responsible for the sources of water. 
The local authority holds the concession for the exploration of water supply and 
sanitation services. 
The state should play the role of regulator, organising the exploration of the services. 
The private sector should be responsible for operation and maintenance tasks. 
About the sectors that would be adversely and positively affected with private 
sector involvement and the key actors in setting a new policy 
The system would improve its efficiency and effectiveness. 
The key actors should be the elected representatives. The Executive, the Legislature and 
the Parliament should deliberate and start the privatisation process. The executive 
should release itself from the responsibility of running the service, sometimes 
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inefficiently, and use privatisation that has been working well in many countries. 
Privatisation increases efficiency within the service. It should work in urban areas 
which can be self sustainable. 
Name: Carlos Alberto de Carvalho Heleno 
Position: Former's Embasa Director 
Duration of interview: 50 min 
About the Current Level of services 
The service in Salvador is good. There is a need for a network in the outskirts of town in 
order to rationalise the provision of the service. The production of water is higher than 
necessary. 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is no central institutional body to organise the sector and provide resources, as 
there was under Planasa. 
The policy has been made by the states with resources from the state treasury. 
There are some attempts to set up a national policy. 
The strong point is the prioritisation that this Government ( 1991-1994) gave to water 
and sanitation. The tariffs are a weak point. Bahia state is half in the semi arid, with a 
poor population. In addition, in Salvador, the number of poor is very high. It makes the 
possibility of setting tariffs related to the real cost of the service very difficult. The cost 
is not affordable for the population. On the other hand, the service can nat rely only on 
the treasury, it is necessary for the company to have its own resources in order to be 
self sustainable and provide resources for investments. 
There are organisational and financial constraints. To have a good service, it is 
necessary to charge high tariffs. Sometimes it is necessary to contract out. The biggest 
difficulty is the lack of a national policy. 
Water and sanitation services always depend on the government. Without a well defined 
framework, the sector is weak. 
As water and sanitation had been neglected, there were big problems in the systems due 
to their degradation. The customer service is not good. Failure in the system is more 
likely to be noticed by the customer. 
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About the need of setting up a new policy and what its main concerns or its 
characteristics should be 
There is a need to set up a national policy for water and sanitation. Bahia state should 
keep investing in the sector. Aspects such as centralisation, decentralisation, 
privatisation, contracting out, should be discussed, as all of them have positive and 
negative aspects. Cross subsidies should be used between cities in order to make the 
service viable in the whole state. 
About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
The government is not supposed to solve all the problems in a capitalist country, thus, 
the private sector must participate. On the other hand, watsan services are strategic for 
public health. The government can not desert from the service as its responsibility is to 
guarantee the service to the population. The private sector should work together with 
public authorities. Both the private and the public sector should run the services 
properly. The management method depends on the Government. 
The private sector must demonstrate that it is ready for participating in the process. It 
has been checked under the contracting out contracts. If the private sector is not ready, 
if it is clear that they just want quick profits and increased tariffs, this is not good. 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
The state cannot withdraw from the service in this country. The public sector must be an 
active participant due to the level of income distribution. The private sector would not 
be concerned to the provide services for the poor. It is a government responsibility. 
About the sectors that would be adversely and positively affected with private 
sector involvement and the key actors in setting a new policy 
Under privatisation, some systems would increase the level of efficiency, but only for 
those who could pay. However, they could not charge a tariff which would cover the 
cost of a high standard service, as it is unaffordable for a large part of the population. 
The problem is not to privatise. Privatisation is profitable, but creates discrimination 
and considerable difficulties for parts of the population. Privatisation can not be an 
objective. Water and sanitation are strategic sectors. This is possible only in high 
income areas. The alternatives must be well discussed in order to decide which sectors 
(private and public) will be responsible for which tasks. At this moment, the government 
must participate, it is the moment for contracting out services. Privatisation involves the 
consciences of private companies 
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Nothing can be done without planning. There is a necessity to make a complete 
diagnosis of the sector in the state, to do strategic and tactical planning. One cannot 
think about sanitation without thinking of drainage, solid waste. 
Name: Marcio Costa Lessa 
Position: Member of board of Directors at Embasa 
Duration of interview: 25 min. 
About the Current Level of services 
In Bahia, water service is good but sewerage practically does not exist in relation to the 
population. 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is no policy. There are resources but no planning. Because there is no planning 
at state level, the resources are not used in the best wtty. Interventions are made as a 
response to complaints from the population, and are localised. 
A strong point in the service is the water supply in Salvador (the capital city), together 
with the amount of resources available. The weak points .are the sewerage system in the 
state, together with lack of planning and the quantity of investment made in 
construction, not in the organisation of the company (Embasa). 
The service could be less centralised, with action at regional level. There are 
administrative difficulties in having a stronger relationship between the company and 
municipalities. 
The current customer service is poor. The communication between customers and the 
company is also poor. Customers need to know their rights and their duties. 
About the need of setting up a new policy and what its main concerns or its 
characteristics should be 
There is need for a study for the whole country. The current system, if well managed, is 
good and will work out. The company must have more autonomy. Targets should be set 
and the company should be accountable for the results. 
It is necessary to have a better relationship between the company and municipalities 
and between the company and the communities involved. 
About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
There is nothing against private sector participation, but municipalities should have 
higher participation in the process. Responsibility for water and sanitation should 
remain on the hands of the public sector, either municipalities or the state. Some 
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systems are very peculiar, with a lack of water, or a source in different municipality, 
etc. 
It is possible to contract out part of the tasks. But there is the problem of shonage of 
water. One only company managing the whole system facilitates the service. 
We already have private sector participation. At Embasa, many services are privatised. 
The services should not remain only in public hands. A solution 'in between' would give 
a balance to the system. Even the system maintenance could be contracted out, but 
Embasa should not lose control of the system. The body that holds the concession 
should have control over it physically and financially. 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
The state defines the policy, co-ordinates, organises and helps implementation. 
About the sectors that would be adversely and positively affected with private 
sector involvement and the key actors in setting a new policy 
It is possible to claim higher efficiency for the customers from the private sector. On 
the other hand consumer's pockets would suffer more. 
Municipalities and involved communities should participate in 'decisions. And 
community participation is different from the Mayor's participation. The communities 
are the ones able to define their necessities. Also the Health sector should be involved 
in decisions on investments. 
Name: Luis Robeno Moraes 
Position: Co-ordinator of the preparation of Municipal Policy for Sanitation 
Duration of interview: 70 min 
About the Current Level of services 
Concerning water, the service is adequate, although with some problems concentrated 
in the outskirts of cities (poor areas). The middle and upper classes have a better 
service, according to research done by the Federal University. In poor areas, the 
provision of water supply is not reliable or regular, concerning quantity and quality of 
water delivered. 
In some areas of town 50% of the Water samples analysed were contaminated with coli 
faecal and, some communities are reported to have no supply for two months. In such a 
situation, any improvement in the service is celebrated. 
In the inland cities (not the capital city), there are complaints from all the regions of the 
state. The poor population complains about the tariffs in relation to the quality of the 
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service provided. The community leaders are used to saying that they want water in the 
pipes, not pipes in the street. It does not help just to have a pipe without water. 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is no water and sanitation policy, although required by in the State Constitution. 
There is a programme for water and sanitation, and investments are made according to 
the willingness of the governor. The current government (1991-1994), has been 
spending a considerable part of the state budget on water and sanitation. An analysis of 
the investments related to the technological pattern, where it has been spent, either in 
water or sanitation, the concepts of the systems, etc., demonstrated that there are no 
social or technical criteria for establishing the facilities. The criterion is the personal 
will of the governor, sometimes prepared to rebuild systems, because there is no 
sanitation policy. There is a proposal for a policy, in the State legislature. 
The former policy (Planasa), had a few strong points and a number of weak points. It 
was too centralised and the model created an organisational culture among those who 
work in the state owned companies. The power of decision was removed from the 
communities ,from the population, and technocratic decisions were exacerbated. It is 
difficult to discuss different alternatives for managing the sector. Those who support 
local authority management do not discuss with those who support the management 
through the regional state owned companies and vice-versa. The employee's unions of 
the state owned companies think that if watsan services go back to local authorities, the 
involvement of the private sector will be facilitated, as the local authorities are more 
difficult to control. In this sense, the private companies stimulate the 'municipalizaflio' 
i.e. the local authority power, and then take-over the services. These sort of problems 
are a consequence of Planasa. But fortunately discussion has been started and society 
has been organising itself. 
The coverage of water supply services in urban areas has increased, but this has also 
increased the gap between the urban and rural areas, as the policy was only for urban 
areas. 
The service to customers is poor. This is a nonsense, at a time when the country has set 
up a customer law. A low income household with·seven people at home in a poor 
neighbourhood had a metered water connection. The head of the household made a 
complaint to the water company, as his bills were showing a consumption of 92m1f m to 
100m1! m. He complained for three months without any response. As the bills were not 
paid, the company disconnected the supply. Further, the customer gave up complaining 
to the company and made an illegal connection, obtaining his water at zero cost .... 
This sort of attitude from the public sector makes the population think that public 
services are always of a low level, making a private sector involvement necessary. There 
is an opportunity for the private sector to put itself forward as a qualitative alternative 
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for the public in providing the service with better quality at lower cost. The private 
sector with support from the midia conveys this image. 
The heavy structure of the public sector related to lower costs of the private sector also 
should also be revised. It seems that public service has low quality on purpose to make 
users disillusioned with the situation, questioning it. 
About the need of setting up a new policy and what its main concerns or its 
chl!racteristics should be 
There is a need for a new policy. The university is trying to set up a policy for water, 
sanitation, urban drainage, solid waste and vector control. The Local Authority gave 
the concession to the state owned company, which has not been included in the 
elaboration of the new policy. It is necessary to discuss how planning is done, how 
operation works, which sort of priorities are taken into consideration, which ones are 
the criteria, how they interfere in the tariff structure, how the tariff is set, and to provide 
a transparent management. It is also necessary to revise the concession contract. The 
employees' union wants a revision of the concession contracts, the involvement of the 
local authorities and the social control that does not exist at present. 
The principles of the service should be equity and integrity of the service. We cannot 
have such a difference in the town, when one consumes 350 led, supplied 24h a day, 
while the low income households ha.ve water three times a week, for three or four hours 
around dawn. 
About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
The Brazilian state is already privatised. Water and sanitation services are privatised 
in many ways. The water supply company uses a private company for designing, 
construction,for some administrative tasks, and now there is a trend towards the use of 
private sector for operation and maintenance. There is a need for a quick but deep 
discussion on the subject. Today there is no community involvement in public policies in 
Brazil. It is necessary to measure the benefits and disadvantages to society. The 
Brazilian political and social situation is different from other countries where 
privatisation or higher private involvement works well. It is difficult to measure the 
consequences to society. It is a black box. In Bahia, one can not say if the cost of 
Embasa, when contracting out services, is lower or higher than when tasks are carried 
out by its own staff. 
It is necessary to see Brazilian entrepreneurs putting their maney at risk. Generally they 
just want easy and quick profits. I do not know any case in Brazil where the private 
sector said it would invest its own money. The private sector has been saying that they 
can build and operate, but the government must invest. It is said that the private sector 
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would invest, but in practice, the government is taking expensive loans from the World 
Bank and Inter-American Bank. 
The private company could help to formulate the policy. The private sector can help a 
lot, but it is necessary for them to avoid easy profits, in practice, taking over public 
resources in a more ethical way. The Brazilian private sector and Brazilian society are 
different from the British, French and even Argentinean ones. 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
In case of privatisation the state should have the role of regulator. It is different when 
the majority of the population already have the services, but in Brazil the majority of 
the population do not have the service. There is the possibility after privatisation for the 
poor to be even more discriminated against the provision of the services. 
About the sectors that would be adversely and positively affected with private 
sector involvement and the key actors in setting a new policy 
The whole of society should contribute: Embasa, the academy (University), civil 
organisations, local authorities, professional associations, industrial associations, etc. 
Although more complex and difficult to discuss, the process is richer. 
Name: Luis Pereira Vianna 
Position: Former Embasa's Director 
Duration of interview: 55 min 
About the Current Level of services 
The provision of water supply service is fair, but in sewerage, the provision is very 
poor. The quality of the service is not good. In the 25 years since Embasa was created, 
the ser\lice has remained deficient, both in supply of product and service to the 
customer. The company and its staff failed to recognise service to the customer as its 
main purpose. The company works with the negative mentality of a public service. 
Therefore, the company has a negative public image, with many complaints in the 
media, questioning whether the currentform of management is the appropriate. 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is no policy and a lack of management bodies. This has been discussed by the 
legislature. A higher private sector participation and a higher local authority 
participation are need. The local authorities must have a permanent involvement as 
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they are the ones who know the day to day problems in a community. It would be useful 
to have different tariffs in different places due to the varying difficulties of getting water 
and also different salaries of Embasa's personnel. In some cities, Embasa's staff have 
higher salaries than the Mayor. A strong point of the system is the good operational 
level achieved by the water and sanitation state-owned companies all over the country. 
On the other hand, political inteiference cause the companies to oscillate in their 
peiformance. The state owned companies have no autonomy, although nowadays they 
can define the tariff , but investments are not financed through tariff alone. Another 
problem is the size of the company. Political inteiference makes the company highly 
vulnerable. There is no specific legislation for protecting the executive companies. It is 
difficult to charge for the services. The company has too many employees in activities 
not related to the main tasks, and high salaries, (higher than the market) in 
administrative tasks. The purpose of the organisation is to provide the services at fair 
prices to whole of the population. This is not achieved. It takes 3 or 4 months to respond 
to a request for water connection! 
About the need of setting up a new policy and what its main concerns or its 
characteristics should be 
A national policy should be flexible enough to accommodate the different situations in 
the country. In a big country such as Brazil, we have very different situations ... It is not 
possible to use the same management model in Siio Paulo and in the Amazon .. .Even 
within the state, there are different conditions. In some places, municipalities could take 
over the services. The concession contracts (between the state owned company and a 
municipality) that no longer satisfy municipalities, could be terminated. Nowadays 
there' are one sided contracts where only the interests of the state owned company are 
taking into consideration. 
The main concern of a public utility must be to provide a good service to the population 
. If the majority of the water and sanitation state owned companies in the country are 
not providing a good service and the private sector is interested and is able to do so, 
then it should happen. But regulation must be very efficient. The private sector should 
not restrict itself to running the service only in the most profitable cities. 
About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
Contracting out of services is happening in areas demanding high productivity such as 
metering reading, leakage repair, billing, etc. The first reason for this is the restrictions 
on hiring people. There is a need for a civil service exam, which would not be well 
received by society, which regards the company as over staffed. Besides, there are many 
salary distortions in the company: an office boy in the company receives the equivalent 
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to US$400/mM!th, while in a private company, his salary would be between 
US$70/month to US$100/month (May, 1994); a meter reader receives US$500/month 
at Embasa, and the private sector pays about US$140/monthfor the same service. This 
means that it is better for Embasa to contract out such services rather than hiring 
personnel. Contracting out has shown positive results. 
A wijer involvement of the private sector would improve the level of services. Embasa' s 
staff productivity has been falling. The newest Embasa employee has been in the 
company for 8 years. Therefgre, staff are older ... an employee contracted 10 or 15 
years ago as a meter reader or as a field worker, can not do it any more, as they are 
very tiring jobs ... 
So far, the private sector has been interested only in the new pan of the system, and 
they always want the bulky part of the system, (catchment and treatment plant), not the 
network which is more problematic. 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
With privatisation of the system, the State should act as a regulatory body, supervising 
the system in order to guarantee a good level of service for the population. The private 
companies must provide the same level of service to everyone. 
About the sectors that would be adversely and positively affected with private 
sector .involvement and the key actors in setting a new policy 
Under the private sector, there would be an improvement in the level of service 
provided and, maybe, a lowering in tariffs, due to the greater efficiency. Tariffs should 
be controlled by the state in order to avoid unacceptable levels of profitability for the 
private companies. Besides, the companies could not direct services to solvable areas. 
There must be participation of the state government, municipalities, professional 
associations, private sector (contractors, consultants, equipment manufactures), 
Environmental bodies, the National Secretary for Sanitation ..... 
Name: Paulo Jackson Villas Boas 
Position: Member of the State Legislature in Bahia, Brazil 
Duration of interview: 35 min 
About the Current Level of services 
Bahia state has very poor levels of water and sewerage services. It is said that the 
current operation and maintenance services hove been degraded. There is a lack of 
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equipment. Water borne diseases such as cholera have been returning.In a survey made 
by the local authority in Salvador, when preparing the annual budget, sanitation was 
chosen as the first priority for 60% of the population. 
About the current policy and current situation- Strong and weak points 
There is no policy. Because of the lack of governmental interest, the proposals made by 
the legislature do not come to fruition. 
There is a need to set a national policy. The employees (the union), are struggling for 
the setting up of a national institutional policy for the sector. There is no planning, or 
definition of priorities for interventions. Since 1990, (and until May 1994) Embasa was 
unable to achieve the necessary level of indexes in order to get a loan from the World 
Bank. The company can not achieve the lowest level of efficiency and productivity.lt is 
impossible to follow the actions of the executive politically. 
About the need of setting up a new policy and what its main concerns or its 
characteristics should be 
The relationship between Embasa and the customer is inappropriate. The centralised 
and authoritative culture remains from the Planasa period. There is no educational 
campaign. Increases in tariff are not explained. Also, the direct response to complaints 
is not adequate. Recently, the company sent a letter to the majority of the customers in 
Salvador, asking them to show their receipts for the last two years, otherwise, they 
would be disconnected. This was done due to a mistake made in Embasa' s system. 
The relationship between Embasa and the municipality should be strengthened and the 
concession contract should be revised. Also, there is a need to democratise the service, 
and the relationship between the provider (Embasa), municipalities and users. 
It should remain a state owned company. In Bahia state, the majority of municipalities 
do not have conditions to run the service, as 90% of the systems are lacking. The 
dictatorial aspects of the system should be removed, but the knowledge gathered by the 
company can not be forgotten. A participative management is envisaged. 
About the possibility of more private sector involvement 
Contracting out is illegal. Embasa could not contract out services such as leakage 
repairs, meter reading, etc .. The involvement of the private sector conflicts with public 
health activity in which water and sanitation services are included. Private companies 
go only to profitable places. A wider involvement of the private sector would be 
damaging to the industry. Historically, they have performed poorly. Either acting in a 
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oligopolistic manner sharing financial resources, promoting directed tendering, 
overbidding services. 
About the role of the state in the event of more private sector involvement 
The state should monitor the operation of the policy, having the society supervising 
(inspecting). There are instances that involvement of the private sector led to worsening 
of services and an increase in costs. 
About the sectors that would be adversely and positively affected with private 
sector involvement and the key actors in setting a new policy 
The society will share only the losses. There is a conflict between water and sanitation 
services and the private sector. The state will remain investing in non solvent areas and 
the costs will increase. Studies on privatisation always mention the need to increase the 
tariffs. And the level of the service will not be upgraded, especially in the outskirts of 
town, shanty houses and 'favelas'. 
Name: Hugh Tebutt 
Position: Director of Biwater 
Duration of interview: 35 min 
About the level of services before and after privatisation 
Privatisation came at the same time as the EC Directives which are highly detailed and 
yet to be achieved. The trend in the British legal system tends to give general 
statements. As a preparation for privatisation, the Government decides to separate the 
water and sewerage bill, which was not done before in this country- people that to start 
paying for water. In .order to comply with the EC directives the tariff has been 
increasing to bring the quality of water to the same standards .. It encourages people to 
think that privatisation can not be a good thing as there was an increase in charges. 
Severn Trent' charges are growing up at about three times the rate of inflation. Also the 
salaries of executives of the private companies increased from £30,000- £40,000 to 
£200,000. These people were paid as the local authorities .. Jt should be much more 
difficult to invest in order to comply with the EC Directives without privatisation. The 
Government did not realise what they were getting themselves in to ... The purpose of 
privatisation was to remove expenditure from the public sector. 
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About tariffs before and after privatisation 
The tariff is adequate. The private company has limited freedom. OFWAT has to protect 
consumers, but also to ensure the shareholders a fair return for their investments. 
OFWAT argues that rate of return expected from the privatised water industry would be 
less than something which is more risky. Water is a pretty low risk business as every 
body v;ants it and it is not easy to get competition in the business. Profit that you get in 
a safe industry like water should not be as high as in other, more risky industries. Water 
companies do not like it as a concept ... 
About management style before and after privatisation 
That was one of the biggest changes after privatisation . Historically, water and 
sanitation were run in a local authority style and the managers in the water industry 
were chemists and engineers. It has change completely. The chief executives now are 
not technical people, but financial people. The industry switched from the technological 
driven style to a financial driven style. 
About customer services 
The customer service changed because of OFWAT. It became more customer friendly 
and responded quickly to people, giving information and dealing with complaints. 
Customer's relations managers are quite important people in the organisation. The 
local authority organisation s did not think of customers to the same extent that private 
companies do nowadays. They were not concerne~ about the public image ... They used 
to do what a local authority had to ... Customer's relation mangers are quite important 
people in the private companies as they are seen as the interface between the customer 
and the organisations. This is considered as a good point of privatisation. 
Strong and weak points of privatisation 
After privatisation the companies got more freedom which is a good point. Freedom in 
terms of capital expenditure and how to run their own affairs in order to get happier 
customers and make more money. In the old days, the local authority could make the 
plans, but everything depended on the treasury, and then the investment profile was 
based on the treasury, not on technical aspects. After privatisation, as part of the 
regulations, companies have to put forward a ten year asset management plan, and they 
are able to prepare their investment profile. It is more cost effective and questions the 
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way things are done. Why build something to last 100 years, when probably in 30 years 
something else will be needed? ... 
The weak point in the system is the public perception of privatisation. The population 
thinks that people do everything for profit. They are suspicious now of the water 
industry. If an environmental group says that the water quality is terrible, the public 
will believe it. Even if the evidence says the quality is very good. The public prefer to 
believe people outside the industry. 
Constraints in privatisation process 
The main constraint is money. The difficulty is in deciding what people really want. 
Now, there is a gap between customer's appreciation of the cost of things and what is 
technically possible. NRA are looking at reasonable use of water. 
It should be interesting to have a regulator to control the whole water cycle. It is 
important to have no gaps in which people could exploit or Government could lose 
control. 
Ways for private companies to expand its business in the sector 
Companies are investing in out of core business- building, construction, solid waste, 
laboratory services, hotels and operation and maintenance overseas .... The main 
attraction for doing that is that OFWAT only controls the core business, although, 
politically they try to control more. OFWAT wants to be sure that companies are not 
putting resources that should be in to the core business in the non core business. 
Key issues for regulators 
The NRAfirst had to gain credibility to show ihat it was an independent body, as a lot 
of its personnel previously worked with people in the water industry. It needed to show 
that it was able to prosecute those who polluted, etc. 
Name: Henri Coing 
Position: Docteur d'Etat es lettres et sciences humaines, est responsable du departement 
amenagement de l'Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausses, France 
Duration of interview: 30 min 
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About the main advantages and disadvantages of the French model for managing 
watsan services 
The services in France are a consequence of a specific moment in time. It is not an 
abstract and ideal model. It is the result of a process that reflects forces, relationships 
and commitment between parts. It is necessary remember the context within which the 
system developed. In France, it is impossible to forget the importa;zce of local 
communities. 
Strong and weak points in the French system 
A strong point in the system is the relationship between the operator and local 
authorities. It is very pragmatic and based on the solution of problems. On the other 
hand, the weakness of the system is its lack of transparency. Nobody verifies the system 
completely. Regulation is political and works. The private operators are almost 
invisible ... They are 'hidden' behind the local authorities ... Another strong point of the 
system is the stability of the model. 
Investment is decided upon and made by the community. Public accountability does not 
require a return on investment. The logic of investment is different from in England, 
where the logic is based on the rate of return of investments. Lately in France a mixture 
of 'ajfermage' and concession contracts have been growing where the private 
companies have to invest in the system. In France there is no big conflict about the 
price of the water ... Water price is not a sensitive variable. The price is accepted by 
society. 
About the different sorts of management in France 
The situations in French cities vary. Each sort of management (regie, ajfermage, 
concession ... ) is suitable for a specific situation. French historical conditions permit 
that variety. Everything depends on the structure. In France regulation is not sectorial. 
The two partners (private company and local authority) define the rules together that 
should work for the whole of urban services (water supply, sanitation, solid waste, 
public transport, etc.). This intersectorial character is completely different from the one 
in use in England. 
The main regulator in France is the municipality. This means that the regulation is 
placed within the system, different from England. In France one does not think about 
the possibility of an independent regulator. There is a different logic. 
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Name: Dominique Lorrain 
Position: Researcher at the CNRS (CEMS, Paris) 
Duration of interview: 40 min 
Strong and weak points in the French system 
Appendix 
Strong points in the system are the q!Ullity of the water, the engineering and the efficient 
solutions. The low price is increasing now because of the EC Directives. The regulation 
is smart, flexible and simple, different from the British one. The base is the contract 
between the private company and the Mayors. In this sense, regulation is done between 
the users, the Mayor and the private companies. In England and the USA there is a 
fourth actor, as they assume that these people are not able to regulate the system. 
Regulators as an independent body are formed by academic people who are not 
working with their own money and do not respond to people. They are not elected and it 
is a technocratic system. But are they efficient concerning industrial policies, strategies 
and costs? 
About the role of regulators 
The role of regulators shauld be the minimal. Strong regulatory bodies are made under 
the assumption that oligopolies and monopolies will abuse their position. It is not very 
clear. The car industry is an international oligopoly. Nevertheless, in the last 20 years 
the industry has made many innovations. Regulators' should have a minimum role, only 
providing information, comparing prices. The users are the voters and self-regulation 
through politics can be highly efficient. Besides, the cost of regulation can be a 
disadvantage. There should be comparisons with the cost of regulation in France, in 
England and Argentina. There ·is also a risk of loss of independence of the regulators in 
the long term. Another risk is that they are moving in a field that is not their business, 
such as providing information for industrial strategies. They have no capacity , no 
knowledge to do this. They are playing a game that they are not prepared for. During 
the 80's in France the trend was to give more freedom to the private companies saying 
that they would be judged by the market. The argument then was that the bureaucracy 
was not competent to judge the companies. · 
Constraints in the system came from the market. The politicians need smooth and 
discreet service. And the private companies need to make money providing a good 
service. The dynamics of the market is increasing pressure on the French private 
companies. The market is international and if a company does a bad job in its own 
country its credibility is reduced. 
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About the different sort of management in France 
The type of contract does not make a difference regarding the quality of the service. 
What really counts is who you are working with. In the French system now, which is 
highly organised, there are only three big operators. On the other hand, 80% of the 
population is serviced by the private sector. There are a few good 'regies' surrounded 
by big private companies. 
The contract is the technical tool defining how to provide the arrangement to find the 
institutional financial and political equilibrium between the provider and the 
municipality. 
The other point is to ask what would happen without a regulatory body. The point is 
that it does not mean that the company would charge high prices, as they must protect 
their reputation. 
The difference in management between private and public systems 
The private sector knows that they can lose their contract and therefore they are less 
bureaucratic. Another difference is that the public sector has no growth strategy, like 
the private sector. 
The tariffs in the public sector are always cheaper. But they are not measuring the same 
thing. The public sector just calculates operating costs, not research costs or investment 
costs. That is why, in many cases, the transfers from public to private service occur 
when there is a need for upgrading the ~ystem. As the Mayor does not have funds 
because he did not charge enough, then they need to increase taxes or take a loan, and 
some prefer to transfer to a private company. 
The big issues in the system 
One is the renewal of the systems in order to have more clean and environmentally 
friendly services. But it is a general issue. The other one is more specific to France: it is 
that the companies must expand. Now we are close to the limits as the private 
companies are already in every sector.ln the end, because they are too big, people can 
ask who has the power, the Mayor or the private companies. It is a serious issue for the 
future strategy of the private companies. 
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Appendix I-2 ACTIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX 
ACTIVITIES Environmental Water Quality Financial Set of Tariff Tariff Operation Capital Operation and 
Regulation Regulation Regulation Preparation Approval Investment Investment Maintenance 
AGENCIES 
Central 
Government 
Regional (State) 
Government 
Local Authority 
or Syndicate 
of Communes 
State Owned 
Companv 
Privute 
Company 
Financial Basin 
A!!encv 
Rlgie (Municipal 
Company) 
Regulators 
R = Responsibility IV = Involvement IT= Interest 
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Appendix 1-3 
Qualitative Analysis of Water and Sanitation Sector 
INTRODUCTION 
An analytical framework was developed to make possible a systematic analysis of the 
urban watsan sector of the three studied models. It was based on the WASH Technical 
Report 37 (Guidelines for Institutional Assessment Water and Waste Water Institutions). 
This approach was adapted to include some key indicators such as National Policy 
Environment, legislation, etc., found to be important through the literature review and 
through experience. 
The strengths and weaknesses of each model were identified in this analysis. This relates 
to the key issues that must be addressed in developing a new water and sanitation policy 
for Bahia. 
Where possible quantitative data was used to support the analysis and conclusions. 
However, the lack of sufficient primary quantitative information, such as financial data, 
mainly for the European countries, only made a qualitative assessment possible. 
Nevertheless, quantitative data was used to support the analysis and conclusions where 
possible. 
An institutional assessment was also made of the state owned company for Bahia. This 
company is currently responsible for the provision of water supply and sanitation services 
in urban areas of the state. 
METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
The major Performance Categories used for assessing the sector were the following: 
o National Policy Environment (Political, Economical, Social and Technological 
Environment- PEST); 
o Legislation and Organisational Autonomy; 
o Long Range Demand and Technological Requirements; 
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• Organisational Culture; 
• Commercial orientation; and 
• Consumer orientation. 
• National Policy Environment (Political, Economical, Social and Technological 
Environment- PEST) 
This is included to give the broader environment within which the watsan sector is 
established. It is assessed through some economic and social indicators which point 
out the level of stability of PEST in the country. 
• Legislation and Organisational Autonomy 
This is seen as a broader category. It comprises indicators such as flexibility of choice 
of management; existence of competition within the sector; centralisation and 
decentralisation in management; regulation and legislation. 
Legislation can be a constraint in developing the sector. Le Moigne (1991) and 
Burchi (1991) pointed out the importance of adequate legislation and regulation to 
provide a suitable environment for institutional development. Legislation on the use 
of water sources must be flexible enough to allow different arrangements suitable for 
different situations, yet firm enough to discourage misuse of the resources available. 
Besides, the institutional framework of the sector, including the level of autonomy of 
organisations within the sector, is defined by the legislation. 
It indicates the autonomy of the provider organisations within the sector, which 
shows, to some extent, the flexibility of the system. Autonomy is assessed through an 
organisation's freedom to set tariffs, to make its own decisions in matters such as 
budget, revenues, hiring employees, salary policy, ownership of assets, decisions on 
investment. 
• Long Range Demand and Technological Requirements 
This indicator represents the type and level of technology required by the sector, in 
order to fulfil the long range demand of the country. 
As reported by Le Moigne (1991 ), water and sanitation programmes take a long time 
to design, finance and construct and have long term consequences. A new policy 
should address both short and long term perspectives. 
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• Organisational Culture 
This is seen as the set of values that can be noticed throughout the system. Generally 
it is formed not by written rules, but shared beliefs and assumptions followed by 
those who deal with the service. In both positive and negative ways, it is a powerful 
means for supporting the system or for changing it. 
Although difficult to measure within a whole sector, it becomes apparent when a 
particular issue appears. 
• Commercial orientation 
This index points to the principle on which the sector is based, regarding cost 
effectiveness, sustainability, financial equilibrium. Attention is given to the prevalence 
of cross subsidies, as a tool to assess the level of self sustainability. 
• Consumer orientation 
This index shows the sector relationship to the customer, encouraging or 
discouraging provider organisations from taking into account customers demands 
and community involvement. In assessing this index, attention was given to the 
existence of a special policy for low income households, both through tariff structure 
and facilities for payment. 
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Appendix IV-I 
Water Supply- Service Evolution- Salvador 
(1970 I 1990) 
Year Population Network Water Metering 
Served(%) Extension (Km) Connections Rate(%) 
1970 n.a 1,050 74,022 48 
1971 n.n n.H n.a n.a 
1972 n.a. 1,0(\0 91,570 46 
1973 63.3 n.u 97,460 45.35 
1974 n.a 1,223 101,710 45 
1975 66.6 1,27X 110,210 50 
1976 57 1.4 I <J 128,953 47 
1977 IU.l 1,450 122,565 46 
1978 7(> I ,600 122,222 50 
1979 91.5 1.871 126,227 59.1 
1980 86.1 1,916 133,600 55.4 
1981 84.(\ 2,009 183,361 50 
1982 R6 2,397 195,794 54 
1983 R7 2,557 286,000 55.2 
1984 88 2,664 235,045 58 
1985 86.4 2.734 254,335 58.9 
1986 100 2,840 273,362 76.2 
1987 90 2,849 255,000 74.5 
1988 83.96 2.908 284,\)58 67 
1989 R8 2,932 344,804 83 
1990 93 3,607 n.a n.a 
Note: n.a. Oata not available 
Source: Cancado, 1993 
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APPENDIX IV -2 
STRATEGIC INDICATORS- DEFINITIONS 
In dice Definition 
Service Coverage(%) population served 
urban population 
Percentage of metering metered cmmections 
total connections 
Unaccounted for water(%) IQ!lll El~ urody~~-IQilil w!!Jcr llill!lll 
total produced 
Average tariff (water) (US$/m3) EJter billed 
total volume billed 
Average tariff (water+ sewerage) (US$/m3) average billed <water+ sewerage) 
total volume billed 
Bill collection efficiency total revenue 
total billed 
Salary costs (%) rersonnel costs 
exploration costs 
Days receivable ratio (days) bills IQ CQIIeg CUS$) * 360 
total revenueCUS$) 
Rate of return on assets net income before interest 
average total costs 
Short term liquidity (current ratio) IQU!l currenl assm (US$) 
total current liabilities ({iS$) 
Debt service ratio nel incQIDe (US$) 
total debt service (US$) 
Long term debt ratio IQW non cwrem 1i3bililies CUS$) 
non current liabilities and enuity (US$) 
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